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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CO-DESIGN OF SECURITY AWARE POWER SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION
ARCHITECTURE AS CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM
by
Tarek Youssef
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Osama A. Mohammed, Major Professor
The modern smart grid would involve deep integration between measurement nodes,
communication systems, artificial intelligence, power electronics and distributed
resources. On one hand, this type of integration can dramatically improve the grid
performance and efficiency, but on the other, it can also introduce new types of
vulnerabilities to the grid. To obtain the best performance, while minimizing the risk of
vulnerabilities, the physical power system must be designed as a security aware system.
In this dissertation, an interoperability and communication framework for microgrid
control and Cyber Physical system enhancements is designed and implemented taking
into account cyber and physical security aspects. The proposed data-centric
interoperability layer provides a common data bus and a resilient control network for
seamless integration of distributed energy resources. In addition, a synchronized
measurement network and advanced metering infrastructure were developed to provide
real-time monitoring for active distribution networks.
A hybrid hardware/software testbed environment was developed to represent the
smart grid as a cyber-physical system through hardware and software in the loop

vi

simulation methods. In addition it provides a flexible interface for remote integration and
experimentation of attack scenarios.
The work in this dissertation utilizes communication technologies to enhance the
performance of the DC microgrids and distribution networks by extending the application
of the GPS synchronization to the DC Networks.

GPS synchronization allows the

operation of distributed DC-DC converters as an interleaved converters system. Along
with the GPS synchronization, carrier extraction synchronization technique was
developed to improve the system’s security and reliability in the case of GPS signal
spoofing or jamming.
To improve the integration of the microgrid with the utility system, new synchronization
and islanding detection algorithms were developed. The developed algorithms overcome
the problem of SCADA and PMU based islanding detection methods such as
communication failure and frequency stability. In addition, a real-time energy
management system with online optimization was developed to manage the energy
resources within the microgrid. The security and privacy were also addressed in both the
cyber and physical levels. For the physical design, two techniques were developed to
address the physical privacy issues by changing the current and electromagnetic
signature. For the cyber level, a security mechanism for IEC 61850 GOOSE messages
was developed to address the security shortcomings in the standard.
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Chapter 1
1.1

Introduction

Introduction
The increased penetration levels of renewables and distributed energy resources result

in increased challenges in maintaining reliable control and operation of the grid [1].
Integrating a wide variety of systems governed by different regulations and owned by
different entities to the grid increases the level of uncertainty, not only on the demand
side but also in terms of generation resource availability [2]. This complicates the process
of achieving generation/demand balance. Renewable energy sources vary by nature and
require intelligent forecasting and prediction systems to determine how and when this
energy can be used [3]-[5]. Most of these distributed resources will be installed on the
distribution network, which already in its current state lacks the proper communication
and control network necessary to control the applicable resources [6],[7]. Moreover, the
large number and widespread use of these resources makes controlling them from a
central location difficult [8]. To overcome these problems, deep integration between
intelligent measurement nodes, communication systems, information technology,
artificial intelligence, power electronics and physical power system components must be
made to manage the smart grid resources [9]. On the one hand, this type of integration
can dramatically improve the grid performance and efficiency, but on the other, it can
introduce new types of vulnerability to the grid. The risk of vulnerability escalates when
the level of integration between the physical and cyber components of the power system
increases [10].
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The security threats to the grid due to deep integration with cyber components are
significant and widespread, taking on various forms ranging from compromising smart
meters to attacking wide area monitoring system (WAMS) and generation control
system [11],[12]. The transmission system and substations represent the backbone for the
grid. Attacking the substation automation systems could lead to severe damage and
blackout [13],[14].
Considering this type of potential issue in the original design will lead to a more
optimum design for cyber and physical components, ensuring continuity of service and
system resiliency under various types of events and/or attacks. The design and
optimization of such complex systems requires coordination between the cyber and
physical components in order to obtain the best performance while minimizing
vulnerability risk. The challenge is not only how to design the new secure cyber-physical
system, but the transition from current systems to the new design is another challenge.
Most of the installed components utilize older protocols and will last for decades [15]. It
is necessary to consider the interoperability between current and legacy component in the
design of the new system [16],[17].
For the co-design of such a complex system, first, the interaction between cyber and
physical component needs to be identified. The power system control uses different types
of measurements and feedback signals. The impact of compromising these types of the
signal on the power system stability should be identified to define the level and type of
security required for each type of signal. An integrated modeling and simulation
framework that presents an integrated model for cyber and physical components is
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required to study this interaction and the impact of different types of vulnerabilities on
the system stability.
Smart grid systems could be affected by different types of vulnerabilities from
different sources. The first source of vulnerabilities come from lacking security measures
and data integrity checks in old protocols, control tools, and software tools. For example,
Most of the protocols used in WAMS and substation automation, such as IEEE C37.118,
were designed for efficiency and don’t have any security measures [15],[18],[19]. Even
for new protocols that specify some security measures, such as IEC 62351 standard, the
control and operation requirements possess some restriction on applying these measures.
As an example, the encryption is not supported for GOOSE messaging, which operates
at Layer 2 to meet the performance and 4ms maximum delay restriction [20]. The second
source of vulnerabilities could result from miss-configured systems and components.
Miss-configured equipment, such as default accounts, open ports, etc. can leave the back
door open for an attacker. The last source of the vulnerability is the software and
implementation bugs [15]. Even if the system utilizes a strong security standard,
encryption and authentication mechanism, undiscovered software bugs can lead to
dangerous security threats. For example, the famous heart bleeding bug that affects a
large percentage of secured web servers that use OpenSSL server was related to an
implementation bug. In this particular case, the problem was not related to the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) standard or the encryption algorithm [21]. The bug comes from the
software implementation of OpenSSL server. The affected servers have a buffer overflow
software bug, which allows the attacker to obtain security keys and certificates [22].
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Since the vulnerability of the system could result from system protocols,
implementation or particular hardware equipment, the integrated modeling and cosimulation framework should be equipped with hardware in the loop (HIL) and software
in the loop (SIL) capabilities to test the actual components and firmware related
vulnerabilities.
1.2

Co-simulation of smart grid as a cyber-physical system
The concept of co-simulation has been introduced. In[23], co-simulation is described

as the process of integrating two software packages together and providing
synchronization among them. As an example, [23] proposed the integration of Simulink,
which is concerned with modeling the physical system’s dynamic behavior, with
Omnet++, which is concerned with modeling the communication network behavior, to
develop smart grid applications. Similarly, in [24] a co-simulation framework was
developed by combining OpenDSS and Omnet++ for power system and communication
networks simulations in order to investigate wide area smart grid monitoring systems.
The work in [24] focused on the time synchronization between the solvers for the
aforementioned software packages. Authors in [25] argued that there is a large gap in the
area of simulating cyber-physical systems, which relies on having the communications
and control working as intended and more effort needs to be put in the co-simulation
area. For that, they introduced an event-driven co-simulation module based on the
OpenDSS and Network Simulator NS2. MATLAB was used for the coordination of
events. A co-simulation platform of a low-voltage grid based on IEC 61850 was
presented in [26], where MATLAB’s SimPowerSystems and SimEvents toolboxes were
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used to model the system’s physical and cyber information flow, respectively. There are
many other similar efforts in the literature which rely only on simulation software
modules. These systems represent an important step towards properly modeling the cyber
and physical domains of a cyber-physical system. Nonetheless, these simulators are not
implemented over a real communication network. Therefore, they will not be able to
account for practical issues with high fidelity, as they are limited with the functionalities
provided in the network simulation software, which most of the time is proprietary. For
instance, network simulators do not work on the packet level; they usually model
networks on the large scale and use statistical and probabilistic models to predict delays.
Also, practical issues due to different firmware implementations cannot be realized in
network simulators. Two Ethernet switches from different vendors might have a different
implementation to which specific vulnerabilities can be analyzed and found. Such
simulation environments usually have their solvers synched and do not operate in realtime and therefore cannot be easily interfaced with actual hardware and intelligent
electronic devices (IED).
From another perspective, there are several works that included hardware modules in
the loop of the simulation platforms. Here, there are two methodologies: (1) is integrating
power equipment, such as generators, actuators, converters, etc, into the simulation
environment to test control algorithms on real hardware, whereas (2) is network design
and testing by integrating IEDs and other embedded devices with traffic generation
software packages. A hardware in the loop simulation testbed for distributed microgrid
management based on multi-agent systems was presented in [27]. The presented system
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is based on the Zigbee protocol and the simulation and hardware were integrated through
an I/O conditioning board. This approach is limited to the specific application it was
developed for and is hard to expand to include various smart grid applications. Also,
in [28] actual Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) were integrated with a real-time digital
simulator via an IEC 61850 bus to model passive islanding schemes. Although an actual
IEC 61850 network was integrated with the simulations, this implementation is
application specific and is hard to expand and manage the complex communication
requirements for other smart grid applications. In a pure networking perspective, [29]
proposes a method for testing intelligent devices’ communications in distributed systems.
This platform is interesting since it incorporates several protocols, such as IEC 61850,
DNP3, IEC 61870-5, IEC 61870-6 (ICCP/Tase.2), and Modbus. However, the integration
of these protocols is based on a proprietary Distributed Test Manager and therefore is not
easily expandable and requires special libraries to interface with other simulation tools.
Both modeling approaches do not provide a comprehensive framework for properly
modeling cyber-physical systems and most importantly the interactions between them.
Also, the second approach (2) is usually concerned with a single or a few protocol
combinations and will require a lot of engineering and programming effort to integrate
different applications and devices together.
1.3

Smart Grid design challenges
Several technical challenges need to be identified and addressed during the design of

the smart grid architecture. These challenges are spread over a multidisciplinary area
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including communication, control, and power system. These challenges can be classified
as below.
1.4

Integration of distributed energy resources (DER)
Smart grid is characterized by large penetration of distributed and renewable energy

resources. High penetrations of renewable energy increase the uncertainty of generation
resource availability.

Moreover, most of these resources will be installed on the

distribution side. Current grid control model was designed to control a few generation
stations from centralized control systems. Applying the existing control model for
distributed energy resources, taking into account large geographic area and the amount
of data needed to be transferred to control centers possesses large technical and
economic challenges. The technical challenges are associated to design the
communication system that covers the large geographic area and transfers huge
amounts of raw measurements and control signals. The processing power needed to
process this information and take the necessary action in real time is another challenge.
Implementation of such control and communication network will be costly.
Moreover, the centralized control model suffers from the reliability and single point
of failure problems. Failure of a centralized server or communication channel may lead to
severe system problems. To solve these issues, the control model should be changed from
centralized control to decentralized control model. Instead of a centralized control center,
which collects and process all information locally, the system will be divided into a
number of subsystems with a local intelligent controller. The local controller will process
the data locally and perform the necessary control action in their area. Neighbor’s area
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controllers will be able to exchange the information to coordinate the operation in the
local area and support the overall system stability. Only high-level data and control
command will be needed to be transferred between intelligent controllers and control
centers. By processing the data locally and performing local control actions, the amount
of data transfer and communication bandwidth will be reduced. The required processing
power on control centers will be less and the system reliability will be improved by
avoiding a single point of failures.
1.5

Interoperability challenge
Integrating a wide variety of systems governed by different regulations and owned by

different entities to the grid possesses an interoperability challenge. Several protocols and
standard were developed for smart grid operation, such as DNP3 for process automation
and SCADA systems, IEC61850 for substation automation, C37.118 for phasor
measurement and OPC UA for M2M communication. In many application cases, it’s
required to map the data from protocols to another. There is a lack of a common data bus
or interface that can be used by the application developer to develop smart grid
application, such as Energy management systems EMS or demand side management
systems.
1.6

Communication challenges
The communication network for smart grid applications should consider the special

requirements for real-time control. Smart grid control relies on different types of signals;
each type of signal has a special requirement regarding the bandwidth, delay, and
availability. The data availability means the ability to access the right data at the right
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time. The communication infrastructure design should be coordinated with the control
requirement. Some data are sensitive to delay, such as the protection and feedback signal
in low inertia systems. The communication middleware is a critical component in smart
grid control. The smart grid implementation involves data exchange between local and
remote nodes. These nodes represent devices manufactured by different vendors and
owned by different entities. The communication middleware provides an abstraction
layer to simplify and manage the communication between different nodes without being
concerned with the complexity of hardware layers or network details [23][24],[30]. Most
of the old protocols use the message-centric approach. The data exchange in the messagecentric approach is based on defining a set of messages and data formats to support the
expected data types and use scenarios. These messages are predefined and embedded in
nodes. Using a set of predefined messages puts some limitations on the system
expandability when expansion requires defining new data types or operation
scenarios [30].
1.7

Problem statement
The increased penetration of distributed renewable resources located on the

distribution side requires extending the current communication infrastructure. This is
because the distributed nature of the renewable resources force re-shaping the grid
structure from centralized to decentralized control architecture. The decentralized
architecture utilizes the microgrid to integrate and manage the distributed energy
resources, loads, and provides services to improve the overall system performance. The
distributed architecture also requires an extension of the communication network to the
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distribution side and integration with several types of software and computational
technology. This integration raises challenges related to security, scalability,
interoperability, and interaction between the cyber and the physical components.
To address these challenges, the co-design of a scalable communication and control
framework taking into account the interoperability, the security issues, and the physical
system requirements, is required. A new set of tools that simulate and represent the
system as an integrated cyber-physical system to understand the complex system
dynamics and test new ideas in a safe and practical environment is also required.
Investigating the vulnerability and attack surface of this type of integration is also
important in order to provide mitigation mechanisms that take into account the impact on
the physical system operation.
1.8

Research Objective
The concept of the co-design of a security-aware power system is presented in this

dissertation. The idea of the co-design of the cyber-physical system is to consider the
mutual interaction between cyber and physical component from initial design instead of
dealing with the design as a separate stacked layer. Detailed analysis of the physical
system and control requirement should be taken into account during the design of the
communication and cyber layers. On the other side, the impact of the cyber layer should
be considered in the design of the physical and control layers. In the security aware
system, security is an essential component in the design. Security measures must be taken
into account in the design of the component level, as well as system level. Adding the
security as an additional layer in the final system design could interfere with the physical
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system operation and not be feasible in many cases. Once this co-design is achieved, the
proposed design technique will improve the grid resiliency and security. The co-design
process deals with the interaction between cyber and physical components. Therefore, a
hybrid hardware and software testbed environment is developed to accurately represent
the power system as an integrated cyber-physical system. The hybrid modeling
environment utilizes the simulation software packages to simulate large-scale systems
and capture macroscopic details while benefiting from high-resolution details of the
hardware system. Moreover, the testbed environment allows testing developed idea with
real hardware and communication network, in addition to protocol emulation and devices
virtualization.
The main goal of the co-design is to improve the system performance, reliability and
reduce the vulnerability. To achieve this goal, the concept of the co-design is applied to
the design of the microgrid synchronization, islanding detection, distributed DC-DC
converter control, and energy management system. In addition, security mechanisms that
address the cyber security vulnerability in a smart grid standard and customer privacy
issues due physical systems’ characteristics, such as system current and electromagnetic
signatures, are developed.
1.9

Original contribution of this dissertation
The original contribution of this desertion is to develop techniques for co-design of

security aware power distribution systems as a cyber-physical system. To achieve this
goal, a detailed study of the communication requirements for the smart grid to integrate
microgrids and distributed resources in the distribution network is performed. The
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purpose of this study is to address the important issues for proper integration of
microgrids, such as the real-time control requirements, the need for interoperability,
cyber security of the communication infrastructure, and scalability issues. This study
resulted in designing and implementing an interoperability and communication
framework for microgrid control, taking into account its cyber and physical security.
First, the interoperability layer provides a common data bus and a resilient
communication and control environment for seamless integration of microgrids. Then, a
defined data model for the controllers, sensors, and power system components introduced
to enhance the overall system operation and communication resiliency.
In order to improve the current distributed resources, monitoring and management in
the distribution network, an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) was developed and
implemented. This AMI includes smart meters, communication network, head-end, and
meter data management system, and home area network gateway. The developed
infrastructure seamlessly integrated with the developed microgrid communication and
control framework. Moreover, a synchronized measurement network was developed and
implemented to provide real-time monitoring, as well as situational awareness for the
distribution network. This real-time synchronized network provides high-resolution phase
angle measurement along with voltage and current measurements. In the developed
network, the utilized data-centric communication middleware eliminates the need for
using a phasor data concentrator and ensures the delivery of multicast data streams via
the reliable real-time publisher-subscribe (RTPS) protocol.
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To test and verify the developed algorithms and control frameworks, a hybrid
hardware/software testbed environment was developed to represent the microgrid as a
cyber-physical system. The developed platform is utilized to perform different types of
simulation experiments, such as HIL as well as SIL operational control in real-time. The
hardware in the loop platform provides the method of simulating a large power system
network while at the same time interacting with actual hardware components. The
integration between the proposed co-simulation framework and smart grid testbed will
provide a flexible hybrid software/hardware environment for modeling and testing
different smart grid operating scenarios. Finally, the proposed framework provides a
standard and flexible interface to integrate with other testbed facilities from different
domains for multidisciplinary studies. This type of integration provides the scalability to
represent large cyber-physical systems.
The work in this dissertation utilizes communication technologies to enhance the
performance of the distributed DC –DC converters in the microgrid and DC distribution
network. The dissertation extends the application of the GPS synchronization to the DC
microgrid. GPS synchronization has been widely used in PMUs for synchronized
measurements in the AC networks; however, to the best of the author’s knowledge, it has
never been used to enhance the power quality in DC networks. The importance of the
proposed synchronization method is to allow the operation of distributed DC-DC
converters’ modulators as an interleaved converters system. The interleaved operation
reduces the ripple, and therefore, the DC-link capacitor size. In addition to that, the
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synchronization method improves the system electromagnetic compatibility by reducing
interferences from the harmonics.
Along

with

utilizing

the

GPS

signal

for

distributed

DC-DC

converter

synchronization, a new technique was developed to improve the system’s security and
reliability. This technique is proposed as a backup for the GPS synchronization in the DC
microgrid in the case of GPS signal spoofing, jamming, or blocking. The technique is
based on carrier extraction synchronization to maintain the synchronization of the
converters without relying on the GPS signal. To achieve that, a real-time phase angle
optimization technique to minimize the DC bus voltage ripple in the DC microgrid and
DC distribution network is developed.
To address the integration of the microgrid and distributed resources with the utility
system, a new synchronization scheme was developed to improve the synchronization
accuracy and maintain the stability under distorted voltage waveforms and fault
condition. Also, an islanding detection algorithm is implemented to overcome the
problem of SCADA and PMU islanding detection methods. To ensure continuity of
operation in islanding and grid-connected modes, a reconfigurable controller is
developed.
Since the smart grid contains several dispersed microgrids, the work in this
dissertation developed a distributed energy management system that includes online
optimization and takes into account the privacy and security of customer data. The energy
management system represents the application layer on the top of previously developed
physical, communication and control layers. The developed application will collect
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information from AMI, synchronized measurement network and control power
electronics converters, energy storage, and distributed renewable energy source to
optimize the energy usage based on the available renewable energy and real-time prices.
Modern communication and signal processing techniques threaten the customer
privacy. That is, privacy can be exposed by leaking information from the cyber and the
physical components. From the cyber component, information can be leaked through
attacking and/or hacking the communication infrastructure. From the physical
component, the system’s physical characteristics can be used to extract information about
the behavior of the customer. The cyber privacy is address by utilizing proper encryption
and authentication techniques, whereas two techniques were developed to address the
physical privacy issues. The first technique is to hide or change the current signature that
can be used to identify the customer load and operation pattern. Second, the
electromagnetic signatures, which can be utilized to identify the system remotely, are
reduced using the developed online electromagnetic signature monitoring and reduction
technique.
Finally, the work in this dissertation focuses on the cybersecurity issues related to
industrial standards for power system automation. A detailed security and vulnerability
analyses were performed to identify weak points and attack surfaces for the IEC 61850
standard. Based on this study, a security mechanism for IEC 61850 GOOSE messages
was developed to address the security shortcomings in the standard.
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1.10 Dissertation organization
This dissertation is organized in fourteen chapters, including this chapter, which
introduces the general contributions of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 discusses the communication requirement for modern power system and
addresses the scalability and interoperability problems related to message-centric
approaches by implementing a common data bus based on the data-centric approach; and
proposes a hybrid hardware/software infrastructure for microgrid control that seamlessly
integrates communication, software, and physical components. The design of the data
structure and a standard interface for the developed infrastructure are provided.
Chapter 3 presents the development of an AMI that integrates seamlessly with the
microgrid’s communication infrastructure presented in Chapter 2. It also discusses the
modular architecture, hardware and software details of the developed AMI, which
consists of smart meters, a communication interface, and home area network (HAN)
gateway modules. These modules are built based on a custom developed firmware that
allows real-time monitoring, real-time price exchange and interaction with customer
systems through the HAN gateway. This real-time interaction is necessary for the
implementation of microgrid energy management systems, demand-side management and
distributed renewable energy resource integration.
Chapter 4 extends the hybrid software/hardware infrastructure developed in chapter 2
by proposing a synchronized measurement network for the distribution system. The
proposed measurement network supports completely distributed and resilient peer/peer
communication environment. The developed measurement unit can directly measure the
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phase angle, frequency and the magnitude of the voltage and current fundamental
components. The details of the developed hardware and firmware are presented.
Chapter 5 explains the details of the developed hybrid hardware/software-based smart
grid testbed infrastructure to represent the interaction of the cyber and physical
component of the microgrid. The proposed testbed infrastructure provides the necessary
hardware and software environment to perform different types of experiments, such as
HIL, as well as SIL operational control in real-time. It also provides an interface to
integrate with other testbed facilities from different domains for multidisciplinary studies.
The testbed interface enables remote experimental features to perform experiments, test
developed algorithms, and collect data remotely.
Chapter 6 introduces the phasor measurement and GPS synchronization to the DC
microgrid applications. GPS synchronization has been widely used in the PMUs for
synchronized measurements in the AC networks. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
it has never been used to enhance power quality in DC networks. Introducing the GPS
synchronization to the DC networks allows the operation of distributed DC-DC
converters modulators as an interleaved converters system. The interleave operation of
distributed DC-DC converters reduces the ripple and DC-link capacitor size. In addition,
it improves the system electromagnetic compatibility by reducing interferences from
harmonics.
In Chapter 7 a new method for synchronizing PWM modulators of distributed DC-DC
converters is presented. The proposed synchronization method utilizes a carrier extraction
technique to extract the carrier frequency from the DC bus ripple to generate a common
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frequency reference. This method provides a backup or alternative synchronization
method to prevent degradation of system performance in case of GPS signal jamming,
spoofing or blocking. In addition to the carrier extraction synchronization method, a new
phase shift control algorithm inspired from carrier sense multiple access communication
is developed to optimize the carriers’ phase angle. The developed control is completely
distributed and doesn’t require a communication channel between converters.
Chapter 8 introduces an accurate synchronization technique for the microgrid with
distributed energy resources based on the adaptive synchronous reference frame phase
locked loop under unbalanced and distorted voltage condition. The developed
synchronization algorithm is equipped with an islanding detection algorithm that
overcomes the PMU and SCADA system islanding detection problems. In addition to
synchronization and islanding detection methods, this chapter introduces a reconfigurable
grid tie converter controller.

The reconfigurable controller seamlessly switches the

converter operating mode from power control mode during grid connection to voltage
control mode during islanding. The superior performance and unique features of the
developed synchronization, islanding detection, and reconfigurable controller increase the
microgrid stability and reliability.
Chapter 9 introduces a complete scalable energy management system framework for a
small microgrid or nano grid. The energy management system represents the application
layer on the top of previously developed physical, communication and control layers. The
developed application will collect information from AMI, synchronized measurement
network and control power electronics converters, energy storage and distributed
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renewable energy source to optimize the energy usage based on the available renewable
energy and real-time prices. This chapter also addresses the privacy and security issue
related to the AMI and energy management systems.
Chapter 10 addresses the customer privacy and information leakages from customers’
consumption data and current signature. Using this leaked information, a monitoring
entity can reveal private customer behavioral patterns, as well as the type of equipment
used and or owned. To prevent or minimize the information leakage, this chapter
introduces a technique to hide or change the current and consumption signature by
utilizing an active power filter.
Chapter 11 discusses the security threat results from radiated electromagnetic signatures.
The electromagnetic signature for high-current devices can be detected and identified
remotely. Remote identification of equipment’s electromagnetic signature raises privacy
and security concern for some types of power systems, such as a shipboard power system.
Detection of electromagnetic signature remotely represents a threat to military ships. A
new technique to minimize the radiated field from heavy current loads, such as electrical
propulsion motor, is developed in this chapter. The developed method can be
implemented online without a need to revise the construction of the drive or the machine.
Chapter 12 provides an overview and vulnerability analysis for one of the most accepted
standards for data modeling and communication in the modern power system. The IEC
61850 is widely accepted standard in substation automation and microgrid control. The
cyber vulnerability related to the IEC 61850 communication protocols and related
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security standard IEC 62351, as well as the motivation to develop a new security
algorithm for the IEC 61850, is discussed in detail in this chapter.
Chapter 13 focuses on development and implementation of a security mechanism based
on the sequence hopping to secure the IEC 61850 event messages. The developed
security mechanism provides protection and intrusion detection methods to protect
critical substation automation assets from attack while utilizing minimal processing
resources.
Chapter 14 provides a summary of the dissertation outcomes, the significance of this
research as well as recommendations for future work related to its topic.
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Chapter 2
2.1

Microgrid Cyber-Physical Infrastructure

Communication requirements for smart grid
The future utility grid will be characterized by tight integration between power

electronics, sensing, protection, control, communications technologies, and DER. Most
DER will be installed on the distribution network, which, already in its current state,
lacks the proper communication and control network necessary to control the applicable
resources [31]. A communication infrastructure needs to be designed to provide a more
efficient and flexible way to manage the energy flow keeping interoperability in
mind [32][33]. On one hand, this type of integration can dramatically improve the grid
performance and efficiency, but on the other, it can also introduce new types of
vulnerabilities to the grid [34], complicating the system’s analysis and the design
process [35]. Ensuring interoperability between different equipment, software packages,
and protocols is challenging. Real-time operation and data exchange is another challenge.
The communication middleware is a critical component in a smart grid control. The
communication middleware provides an abstraction layer to simplify and manage the
communication between different nodes without being concerned with the complexity of
hardware layers or network details [36],[37][38] Moreover, the middleware should
provide a standard application programming interface (API) to different applications and
controllers. Using a standard API reduces the efforts needed to develop new devices and
applications for the smart grid. Several types of communication middleware are available
and used in different industrial and control applications [33]. The communication
middleware can be categorized into message- and data-centric. Traditionally, message-
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centric protocols are utilized in utility applications. However, the new data-centric
middleware approach has more advantages over the message-centric, as it has more
ability to be expanded.
The work presented in this chapter addresses the scalability and interoperability
problems related to message-centric approaches by implementing a common data bus
based on the data-centric approach; and proposes a hybrid hardware/software
infrastructure that seamlessly integrates communication, software, and physical
components. The design of the data structure and a standard interface for the developed
infrastructure are provided.
2.2

Communication Middleware for Smart Grid Applications

The communication middleware for smart grid applications should consider the
special requirements for real-time control. Microgrids and low inertia generator control
need low data latency to support fast control actions and maintain stability. The
communication middleware should also provide a wide range of quality of service (QoS)
profiles to meet the different needs of controllers and data types [33],[37]. For example,
the measurement data could be discarded in case of a delay when a new sample becomes
available, while the circuit breaker (CB) states should be persistent to ensure its proper
operation. Certain types of data are tolerant to delays, such as smart meters and power
quality measurements, while other data types, such as data related to protection and fault
detection, are sensitive to delay. The middleware should be aware of the data types and
its requirements to provide the correct priority for each data type. Communication
reliability is essential in real-time applications [37]. Therefore, the middleware
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implementation should also avoid a bottleneck and single point of failure in the
communication network [39].
The smart grid implementation involves data exchange between local and remote
nodes. These nodes represent devices manufactured by different vendors and owned by
different entities. The middleware should abstract the complex network details from the
user and provide a simple communication interface without dealing with complex details
about the network topology and nodal information, such as a location or address [40].
One of the main challenges in the smart grid is the dynamic participation of different
devices and systems, ranging from smart appliances to large systems, such as
microgrids [33]. The communication middleware should provide a way to handle
dynamic participant nodes and an auto discovery features for newly joined nodes. The
communication and power network topology should have the capability to be changed
under catastrophic or emergency conditions. An auto discovery and dynamic
participation feature will support the reconfiguration of a distributed control system. The
modern grid is very susceptible for future expansions; thus, the used middleware and
communication infrastructure should be capable of handling these new expansions. An
expansion process should be done without the need to redesign or modify the
implemented protocols. Furthermore, the communication middleware must provide a
standard communication interface to ensure interoperability among different vendors and
devices. To ensure system operation and reliability, the communication network should
be protected by a proper encryption and authentication mechanism. The middleware
should provide the security features embedded in the implementation to secure the data
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exchange and prevent altering data or violating customer privacy [41]. Since most smart
grid controllers and IEDs use low power processors with limited memory and hardware
resources, the middleware implementation must support a small footprint for limited
resource devices [33].
The communication middleware can be categorized into two main categories:
message-centric and data-centric. The differences between both and selection criteria will
be discussed in detail in the following subsection.
2.2.1

Messages-Centric Middleware Approach

The data exchange in the message-centric approach is based on defining a set of
messages and data formats to support the expected data types and usage scenarios. These
messages are predefined and embedded in node applications. In a message-centric
approach, the unit of the information is the message; the message can contain different
types of information. For example, the IEEE C37.118.2 synchrophasor measurement
standard defines four different message types for PMU and phasor data concentrator
(PDC), as below:


Command message
The command message is sent to the data source (PMU/PDC) for control and
configuration.



Data Frame
The data frame is sent from a data source (PMU/PDC) to receiving nodes.
Data frames contain phasor, frequency, analog measurements and digital data
types.
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Configuration message
Configuration message describes the data types, calibration, and meta-data for
the data sent by PMU/PDC.



Header message
The header message is a readable descriptive text information provided by the
user and sent from the PMU or PDC.

The message frame is depicted in Figure 2.1. All message frames consist of SYNC,
FRAMESIZE, IDCODE, SOC, FRASEC, and DATA AND CHK fields. The two bytes
SYNC field is used to identify the beginning of the new message, designate the frame
type and protocol version. The FRAMESIZE field contains the total number of bytes in
the frame, including the CHK field. The IDCODE field is the data stream ID which
identifies the destination for a command frame and the source for other messages. The
time stamp is transmitted in SOC and FRACSEC fields. The SOC field, or second of the
century, is a 32-bit integer number representing the time in seconds starting from
midnight 01-Jan-1970. The FRACSEC field contains the fraction of second and time
quality information. The data field could be an integer or a float data type based on the
device configuration. All message frames end with a CHK field, which contains a cyclic
redundancy check CRC-CCITT for data integrity.

Figure 2.1. C38.118 message frame
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The message frames shall be transmitted in their entirety as they are specified by the
standard. The message frame can be transmitted over RS232 or Ethernet connection.
When frames are transmitted over stacked protocols, such as IP protocols or IEC 61850
manufacturing messaging specification (MMS), the entire frame including SYNC and
CRC-CCITT shall be written into and read from the application layer interface. In this
approach, the communication infrastructure has no information about message contents
or data types, thus the message parsing, data filtering, and integrity check are done on the
application level. Each node is responsible for assuring the correctness of the data types it
receives according to the configuration and tracks the state of the data of interest
locally [42]. Here, any mismatch can cause malfunction of the application. The data field
types and meaning depend on the device configuration. The data frame is not enough to
correctly interpret the data fields. The application also needs to receive the device
configuration.
This approach has several drawbacks. Implementing the message parsing and integrity
checks on the application level put more responsibility on the control application
developer, which makes the development more complex and time-consuming. Filtering
the data of interest at the application layer causes poor network utilization, wasting
bandwidth and adding extra processing overhead on the application’s processor. The
communication infrastructure has no information about the content of the message frame.
All fields have to be interpreted by the application. The application needs to receive,
parse and validate the whole frame, even if it’s interested only in a subset of the data
included in the frame.
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Using a set of predefined messages puts some limitations on the system expandability
when expansion requires defining new data types or operating scenarios [33]. Since the
message handling is done at the application level, any change in the message formats or
data types requires major changes on the application implementation. Increasing the
complexity of the control application by using the message-centric approach can increase
the chance of software bugs and decrease the overall system reliability. The vendordependent implementation of message parsing and handling algorithms could lead to a
wide range of different vulnerabilities, adding more complexity for system
maintenance [42],[43].
2.2.2

Data-Centric Middleware Approach

In the Data-Centric approach, the application is developed to deal with the data types
of interest only without any concern with the message structure or network details. The
message is built by the communication middleware to update a change in the system
state [44]. The fundamental unit in the data-centric communication is the data object. The
message structure is derived directly from the system data model. Since the message is
created by the middleware, the communication infrastructure will be aware of the
message contents and data types. The data-centric infrastructure does all the message
parsing, data filtering, and integrity checks on the middleware level to ensure the delivery
of correct data types and the system state to all nodes.
This approach offers more capabilities over a traditional message-centric approach.
Moving the message processing responsibility from the application to middleware not
only simplifies the application development but also increases the system reliability by
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reducing the number of errors that results from different implementations of message
parsing. Implementing the data filtering on the middleware layer could result in a more
optimum utilization of the network bandwidth [42]. The infrastructure awareness of the
data types makes it possible to assign different QoS profiles, priorities, and security
levels based on the data types instead of the message types, as is the case in the messagecentric approach.
Since the middleware is responsible for all message processing tasks and the
applications are concerned only with the data object, adding new data types will not
require modification of existing applications. This feature is essential for an expandable
system, such as the continuously evolving smart grid. Figure 2.2 depicts both middleware
approaches, where message-centric is on the left and data-centric on the right.

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.2. Middleware approaches: (a) message-centric; and (b) data-centric adapted
from [54]
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Throughout this dissertation, the proposed communication framework utilizes data
distribution service (DDS) standard for the communication middleware. The DDS is a
standard for data-centric communication from the Object Management Group (OMG).
The DDS has unique features which improve the smart grid communication drastically,
as described below:


DDS moves the message construction, message parsing, data filtering, and
validation from the application to the middleware layer. Moving the message
construction process from the application to middleware layer improves the
system scalability and enables adding new types of data for new operation
scenarios without the need to modify existing applications.



DDS utilizes real-time publisher-subscriber protocol, which enables peer-to-peer
communication without a message broker. This communication scheme improves
the smart grid reliability by avoiding a single point of failure. Publisher-subscriber
and peer-to-peer communication provide a more suitable environment for
distributed controllers.



DDS supports automatic discovery of newly-joined devices and their data
structures. This feature allows dynamic participation of network nodes, which are
important, especially for microgrids, where different nodes can join and leave the
microgrid network, such as electric vehicles and smart devices.



Unlike other communication methods that apply quality of service profiles for a
whole data stream or protocols, DDS can apply different QoS for each data type,
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which provides a more flexible communication management and leads to a more
predictable behavior. QoS profiles give the ability to define the allowed latency
budget, data durability for late joining devices, and data lifespan. More
descriptions of QoS and its synergy to the power application will be provided in
the next section.
2.3

Data Distribution Service Infrastructure for Smart Grid Testbed

The communication network infrastructure for the smart grid should provide a flexible
and scalable environment to connect different system components and exchange
information in real-time. There are different types of communication networks. One of
these types is client-server network communication. In this type, the communication is
centrally managed by the server. This central management represents a single point of
failure and a bottleneck, which could affect the reliability of the network. While in pointto-point communication, the communication is established directly between the nodes
without a message broker, which is hard to manage in large networks [39]. To meet the
hard real-time requirement and scalability of the smart grid, the DDS middleware is
chosen for the communication network. The DDS utilizes publisher-subscriber without a
message broker scheme which simplifies the communication between different
nodes [45][46],[47]. Furthermore, the DDS is data-centric middleware, which helps to
maintain the focus on the data model, algorithm and control development rather than
being concerned with communication and data delivery issues [44][46]. The data-centric
approach also allows assigning different QoS profiles to an individual data type instead
of the whole stream.
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2.3.1

System interoperability

Highly motivated by its high reliability and unique features, the DDS found its way to
being used in a wide variety of mission-critical applications. For example, DDS is
implemented by the US Navy and Lockheed Martin in radar and ship management
systems [48]. Furthermore, DDS has been adopted in Air Traffic Control centers in some
European countries [49], large financial firms, automation and SCADA systems for large
projects, including Grand Coulee dam in Washington State (USA) [50], and automotive
applications. The DDS is selected by the smart grid interoperability panel (SGIP) and
Duke Energy for Open field message bus (OpenFMB) implementation to create a
distributed, intelligent platform that supports publisher-subscriber messaging [51].
The real-time publisher-subscriber wire protocol ensures the interoperability [52], realtime performance and automatic discovery of new services. Moreover, the publishersubscriber protocol is utilized by the IEC 61850 protocol and has started to gain more
popularity in IEDs [37]. The DDS has an advantage of covering a wide range of
applications, ranging from non-real-time to extreme real-time application. Figure 2.3
shows a comparison between DDS, Common Object Request Broker Architecture
(CORBA), Real-time CORBA (RT-CORBA) Java messaging system (JMS), the RealTime specification for Java (RTSJ) and message parsing interface (MPI). The comparison
is based on an analysis done by Naval Surface Warfare Center NSWC [53].
The standard API for the DDS middleware provides the necessary tools to integrate
with different simulation and analysis software with support for several programming
languages, such as C, C++, and JAVA. The DDS also supports Java Messaging System
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JMS, which enables integration with JAVA-based multi-agent platform, such as Java
Agent Development Framework (JADE). Since DDS standard focus on the data model
instead of messages, standard data model, such as IEC 61850 and

IEC 61970-301

common information Model (CIM), can be mapped to DDS.

Figure 2.3. DDS applications vs different communication standard
Although other middleware services exist, DDS provide the most reliable
interoperability solution compared. One popular middleware service is OPC or OLE for
Process Control. OPC is a platform independent standard through which various kinds of
systems exchange messages based on a client-server approach, unlike DDS, which
follows a publish-subscribe method. It was introduced as a means to shield client
applications from the details of the automation equipment and providing standardized
interfaces to interact with control hardware and field devices. Applications developed on
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an OPC middleware interact by invoking requests on UA servers, which make them
suffer from a single point of failure (i.e. the server), as shown in figure 2.4. However, in
DDS, applications interact asynchronously and anonymously by reading and/or writing to
a global data space.

Client

Request

Server

Reply

OPC
Publisher

Publisher

Publisher

Subscriber

Global Data Space

DDS

Subscriber

Subscriber

Figure 2.4. DDS vs OPC middleware
Also, a major drawback of OPC is that, unlike DDS, it does not support QoS
specification and therefore lacks message prioritization which is important in microgrid
applications.
Based on the data-centric approach, implementing the DDS needs to define a data
model for the system. This data model defines the structure of the data and its relation

33

amongst physical hardware objects. For experimentation and verification, a data model is
created for a scaled power system in the smart grid testbed at Florida International
University’s Energy Systems Research lab. The physical hardware description of the
scaled power system and the data model are described in the next section
2.4

Physical Setup Description and Data Model

In this section, the physical infrastructure for the smart grid testbed will be discussed.
This testbed represents a hybrid AC/DC power system involving distributed architectures
and multiple microgrids. The architecture of the network emulates a real power system
with microgrids attached to it, utilizing commercial and special purpose power system
components.

Figure 2.5. Schematic diagram for the smart grid testbed
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The microgrids can be used to emulate buildings, commercial facilities or residential
communities. The testbed system is scaled down in terms of power and operating voltage
to enable its utilization in a laboratory environment [54]. Figure 2.5 shows the
architecture of the smart grid testbed implemented at Florida International University
(FIU).
2.4.1

Main Grid

The main AC grid consists of four self-excited AC synchronous generators, two of
which are rated at 13.8 KVA, while the other two are rated at 10.4 KVA. These
generators are driven by different types of motors acting as prime movers. The generators
are rated at three phase 208 V, 60 Hz, and 1800 RPM. Each generator is connected
through an automatic synchronizer to its corresponding switching and measurement bus.
The connectivity of the AC network is realized using various π-section transmission
line/cable emulators. A total of 18 transmission line/cable emulators and 14 buses were
used. The bus and line modules are flexible to vary system network architectures. The
user has full control of transmission line connectivity, system frequency, and the
generator operation modes.
2.4.2 DC Microgrids
Two DC microgrids, namely MG1 and MG2, were connected to the main AC grid. The
first DC microgrid (MG1) includes a photovoltaic (PV) emulator, a wind energy
conversion system (WECS) emulator and battery storage. The PV emulator is connected
to the DC bus through a DC-DC converter. The WECS is cascaded by an uncontrolled
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rectifier followed by a controlled DC-DC converter [55]. The DC bus voltage is 380
VDC.
The second DC microgrid (MG2) includes a 6 kW PV and a 6 kW fuel cell (FC)
emulators. The system includes a 12 kWh backup lead acid battery array that can support
loads deficiencies. A 325 V DC bus is used to integrate the PV, FC, and battery energy to
the system. Controlled DC-DC boost converters are used as power conditioning units
between each of these sources and the DC bus. A 4 kW space vector pulse width
modulation (SVPWM) fully controlled bi-directional AC-DC/DC-AC converter was used
to tie each DC network to the AC grid. A power electronics converter is used to control
active and reactive power flow between AC and DC grids. The converter is also
responsible for voltage regulation on the DC side in grid connected mode, while in
islanded mode, the local controller switches the voltage regulation to one of the DC-DC
converters interfaced with the PV system. This voltage source inverter (VSI) has the
capability of receiving reference values for active as well as reactive power and, hence,
will play a major role in the active/reactive power compensation processes.
2.4.2

System Data Model

In order to build a data model for the smart grid testbed, a data structure was defined
for each object. The structure for each object defines the object type and related data.
Each object has a unique descriptive name and several topics defining the data related to
this object. For example, the data structure for the generators is shown in Figure 2.6 The
structure name represents the object name and each variable represents one of the object
parameters that can be read or modified by the other object. Table 2.2-1 shows a list of

36

objects and related topics. As shown in Table 2.2-1, each row represents a system object
and its related topics. For example, the first row depicts the generator data. G_x is the
object type, where x is the generator ID. In the second column, the related topics are
defined: Ia, Ib, Ic are the three-phase currents, Va, Vb, Vc are the three-phase voltages, f is
the frequency, (P, Q) are the active and reactive power, and sync is the synchronization
signal. In the microgrid case, the object type is MG_x and similar topics, such as the ones
in the G-x, are defined, except the topic “mode”. This topic controls the microgrid
operation mode in either islanded- or grid-connected operation. For the smart meter
object SM_x, the PA, and QA topics represent the accumulated active and reactive
energy, respectively. For the PV emulator PV_Em_x, Ir, and Temp topics represent the
solar irradiance and temperature, respectively. Ws is the wind speed for the wind turbine
emulator object. Figure 2.7 shows the DDS infrastructure for the smart grid testbed. The
measurements from data acquisition (DAQ) and smart meters were collected and
published to a global data space. The DDS DAQ and controller are implemented on an
embedded board based on the Sitara AM35xx chip from TI, which provides a highperformance 32-bit 1 GHz ARM processor and two slave 32-bit 200 MHz programmable
real-time units (PRU) on-chip. The main processor is utilized to run the operating system
and manage the communication. The PRU are utilized to handle hard real-time, fast IO
operation, DAQ, and data pre-processing. Linux, with a real-time kernel, is chosen as the
operating system to manage hardware resources and provide the TCP/IP stack. For DDS
implementation, an open source library provided by real-time innovation (RTI) is used
and compiled to work on the embedded ARM board. The DDS library provides the API
for Java and C++.
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Table 2.2-1. Objects and topics list. Photovoltaic: PV
Objec
Topics

Description

Ia, Ib, Ic, Va, Vb, Vc,

Generator where x

t Type
G_x
f, P, Q, sync, status.

is the generator index.
Circuit breaker (CB)

CB_x

Status
where x is the index.
Load where x is the

L_x

P, Q.
load index
Bus where x is the

Bus_x

Va, Vb, Vc
bus index
Transmission

TL_x

line

Ia, Ib, Ic
where x is the index.
Ia, Ib, Ic, Va, Vb, Vc,

Microgrid where x

MG_x
f, P, Q, Vdc, Idc, mode.
Ia, Ib, Ic, Va, Vb, Vc,

in an index.
Smart meter where

SM_x
PA, QA.

x is an index.

PV_E

PV emulator with
Ir, Temp, P, V, I.

M_x
W_E

index x.
Ws, Ia, Ib, Ic, Va, Vb,
Wind emulator x

M_x

Vc, f, P, Q.
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For this application, the C++ API was chosen to achieve maximum performance and
avoid using a virtual machine. The acquired measurements collected from analog to
digital converters or digital inputs are published to the DDS global data space to be made
available to all applications. The data subscriber receives the control command/references
and digital output status and forwards it to the controllers. The protocol translator, shown
in Figure 2.8, is developed to provide an interoperability layer between the DDS and
generator speed controllers. These speed controllers are controlled via RS-232 or RS-485.
Similar translators can be used for other devices, such as programmable power supplies
or load emulators. The controllers and applications can subscribe to receive measurement
data or publish control commands for load emulators, generation control, or CBs. As
shown in Figure 2.7, the DDS will serve as a common data bus that connects all the
system devices and applications.
After defining the data model for the smart grid testbed, it is very important to define
the QoS that will be used by the infrastructure to exchange the data. Since the DDS is a
content-aware middleware, it allows attaching different QoS policies for each data type
and treats each type in a different way instead of applying the same policy on the whole
data stream. The user can create custom QoS profiles to control the data exchange for
each application. This feature helps to achieve a predictable network behavior with a
large number of nodes and different communication requirements [44][56]. The QoS
policy defines a different set of rules that controls how the data will be sent and handled
by the infrastructure. This set of rules is defined below:
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Gx

G1
Global Data Space
double Ia,Ib,Ic;

G_1{

double Ia,Ib,Ic;

G_X{

double Va,Vb,VC;
double f,P,Q;
Byte sync,status;
};

double Va,Vb,VC;
double f,P,Q;
Byte sync,status;
};

G_1{

double Va,Vb,VC;
};

Voltage
Monitoring

Figure 2.6. Generators data structure and pub/sub example
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Figure 2.7. DDS testbed infrastructure.
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Figure 2.8. The developed data distribution service (DDS) data acquisition (DAQ)
and controller block diagram
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Data Availability

The data availability rule controls the availability of the data for a recently-joined
subscriber. This rule can be set to a volatile or a non-volatile option. If the data
availability is set to volatile, when any publisher publishes or updates any data, all current
subscribers will receive the updated data at the instance of an update. Any subscriber,
who joins the network after the update instance will not be able to receive the last update.
This option is suitable for periodically changing data, such as voltage and current
measurements, where the data are updated frequently and old data loses its importance
after a short period of time.
The non-volatile data option forces the DDS infrastructure to make the data available
for a recently-joined subscriber by storing a local copy of the data. This option is
necessary for certain types of data that represent the system state and topology (e.g., CB
status, generator running state, etc.). This type of information is not updated frequently
and will not lose its importance over time. Late-joined nodes must be able to get this type
of information when they join the network at any time. The length of the old data that
will be made available can also be controlled by the history option. Some applications
could function better if they receive longer historical data, such as energy management
systems (EMS) that consider the load pattern and utilize prediction algorithms. For this
type of application, the DDS can keep longer historical data. For example, late-joined
EMS should be able to receive the power consumption measures for the past 24 h. The
data availability QoS can be configured by setting the durability and history fields in the
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XML file. The durability can be set to volatile, transient or persistence. If the transient
option is set, history data will be available for the late joining subscriber. Transient
durability will allow the late subscribers to receive the history data as long as the data
writer still exists in the network. If the persistence option is chosen, an external
persistence service will be used to record the history data and deliver it to the subscriber.
Late-joined subscribers will be able to receive history data even after disconnection of the
data writer or after a complete system restart. This option is important to restore critical
system status after a device failure. The code below shows the XML configuration for
Transient durability and a history length of 24 samples.
<durability>
<kind>TRANSIENT_DURABILITY_QOS</kind>
<direct_communication>true</direct_communication>
</durability>
<history>
<kind>KEEP_LAST_HISTORY_QOS</kind>
<depth>24</depth>
</history>


Lifespan

The lifespan rule defines how long old data will be valid. The infrastructure will
remove the old non-volatile data that exceed the defined Lifespan. This QoS rule ensures
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that the control application will not interact based on old invalid data. The XML
configuration below is used to set the lifespan for the smart meter data to 24 hours.
<lifespan>
<duration>
<sec>86400</sec>
<nanosec>0</nanosec>
</duration>
</lifespan>


Latency Budget

This rule allows defining the priority of the latency sensitive data, such as real-time
measurement and protection data. The data with a low latency budget will be sent ahead
of the data with a higher latency budget. The protection-related data are always set with
the lowest latency budget. Smart meter measurements, price signals, and environment
data, such as irradiance and wind speed, are set to the highest latency budget. The XML
configuration below is used to configure the lowest possible latency for real-time
measurement and protection data by setting the latency budget to zero.
<latency_budget>
<duration>
<sec>DURATION_ZERO_SEC</sec>
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<nanosec>DURATION_ZERO_NSEC</nanosec>
</duration>
</latency_budget>


Reliability

The reliability QoS rule allows the operator to control how the infrastructure will deal
with samples that were not successfully received. The reliability level can be configuring
to reliable or best effort. If the reliable option is set, the middleware turns on the RTPS
reliability protocol. The RTPS will attempt to repair samples that were not successfully
received. If the reliability level is set to best effort, the middleware will not monitor or
guarantee that the data is received by the data reader. The best effort reliability level is
good for some application, such as data visualization, for other critical data reliable, QoS
profile is used. The below XML code set the reliability level to reliable.
<reliability>
<kind>RELIABLE_RELIABILITY_QOS</kind>
</reliability>


Multicast/Unicast

In the unicast communication, the publisher sends a copy of the data for each
subscriber node, as shown in Figure 2.9a. For example, EMS and demand-side
management systems can subscribe to receive the price and consumption data published
by a smart meter. In this case, two copies of the same data will be sent over the
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network [37]. If a smart appliance subscribes to the same data, a third copy will be sent to
the new subscriber. The bandwidth used to send the data will increase linearly as the
number of the nodes subscribing to the data increases. This method of communication
could be suitable for local high-speed networks and it is simple to configure, but it is not
the ideal method when considering transmitting data over the wide area network (WAN)
or a low-speed communication line in the case of wide area measurements and PMU
data. For the data requested by multiple readers, it is better to use a multicast
communication scheme. In the multicast, the publisher sends only one copy of the data
for the remote subscriber, as shown in Figure 2.9b. The bandwidth is independent on the
number of subscriber nodes. Only one copy will be sent over the WAN communication
line. At the receiving end, the router will forward a copy of the data to each subscriber. In
order to use the multicast communication scheme for certain data, a multicast QoS policy
has to be applied to this data. For automatic transport multicast mapping, the reader QoS
profile is configured, as below.
<multicast><kind>AUTOMATIC_TRANSPORT_MULTICAST_QOS</kind>
<value>
<element>
<receive_port>0</receive_port>
<receive_address></receive_address>
</element>
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</value>
</multicast>

(a)

Subscriber 1
One Multicast data
packet

Data Source

Multicast Data packet
Destination Subscriber 1

Subscriber 2

Router

Destination Subscriber 2
Destination Subscriber 3

Subscriber 3

(b)
Figure 2.9. (a) Unicast communication; and (b) multicast communication
RTI DDS has additional features that address the challenges of low or limited
bandwidth and high latency networks. DDS supports transport priority which enables the
control of priority bandwidth utilization [57]. The RTI DDS allows the application to
control the traffic load by limiting the maximum throughput and peak bursts [57]. The
DDS also gives the application full control over the real-time scheduling policy. DDS
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supports three different types of scheduling policies: round-robin (RR), earliest deadline
first (EDF), and highest priority first (HPF). The RR scheduling distributes the tokens
uniformly across all non-empty destination queues.
In EDF, scheduling the sample deadline is determined by the latency budget and the
time it was written. The priorities are determined by the earliest deadline across all
samples. The EDF distributes the token to destination queues in the order of their
deadline priorities. If two samples have the same priority, the corresponding queues will
be served in an RR fashion. In HPF, scheduling the queues is served based on the
publication priority. If two samples have equal priorities, the queues will be served in an
RR fashion. The EDF scheduler is selected to meet the smart grid real-time application
needs since it can dynamically assign priorities to transmitted samples based on its
latency budget and deadline. In this way, the scheduler will always give the highest
priority to the sample closest to the deadline to avoid violating the latency budget. The
critical data will gain a high priority by assigning a low latency budget. Table 2.2-2
shows a summary of QoS profiles for different data type based on the operation
requirement. For device status data, such as circuit breaker status, generator availability,
and system topology, the status must be available for all controllers and application at
any time. To avoid retransmission of the status of the device, the lifespan is set to infinite.
The history depth is set to keep the last status. The reliability option is configured as a
reliable link to grantee the delivery of status to all subscribers. The latency budget is set
to 10ms, this exceeds the highest update rate for PMU. For metering data, a lifespan of
24h and 24 samples are selected to provide current and historical data for energy
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management systems. The latency budget for smart meter data is relaxed to 100ms since
it’s not sensitive to delay.
Table 2.2-2. Quality of Service
History

status
Measurement
data

Visualization

Periodic

Protection

Control

Metering

Device

Signal

Durability

Latency

Lifespan

Unicast/
Reliability

(samples)

Budget

Multicast

Transient

inf

1

10ms

Reliable

Multicast

Transient

24h

24

100ms

Reliable

Multicast

Transient

inf

1

1ms

Reliable

Unicast

Transient

inf

1

0

Reliable

Unicast

Transient

inf

1

1ms

Reliable

Multicast

Transient

100ms

1

100ms

Best effort

Multicast
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System status and smart meter data usually are received by multiple applications, to
reduce the bandwidth, multicast transmission is chosen for both types of data. Multicast
also reduces the processor overhead on the publisher processor by reducing the number
of data streams managed by the processor.
The control signal usually targets a specific device, unicast transmission with reliable
transmission protocol is used to transmit the control signal with latency budget 1ms, IEC
61850 allows 3ms delay in critical events. For protection data, the latency budget is set to
zero to give the highest priority for protection data over all other types. Reliable QoS is
used to grantee delivery of protection data. Periodic measurement has the same QoS
profile as control data, except unicast. Periodic measurement uses multicast to allow
feeding the data to multiple controllers with reduced bandwidth. Data used in
visualization is not sensitive to packet loss since human eyes have a limited ability to
detect dropped image frame. Best effort QoS with latency budget 100ms is used for this
type of data.
2.5

Network Performance

Real-time control and monitoring require predictive behavior from the communication
network. The communication latency and maximum throughput should be known for
different scenarios. The message size and data rates are dependent on the application and
the data type. Measurements and control commands usually use a small message size,
whereas data logging may use a longer message size. Other applications, such as database
replications and data backups, will use a long message size. A performance test for the
communication infrastructure was performed to benchmark the network performance and
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find out the latency corresponding to different message rates and sizes. The performance
test was executed by transmitting 10,000 messages and measuring the latency for each
message. The test is repeated for unicast and multicast transmission with the best effort
and reliable QoS. By knowing the data rate and message size required by the specific
application, the users can find out the latency budget and make sure it does not violate the
application requirement. Figure 2.10a shows the performance results for the network with
unicast. The horizontal axis represents the message size in bytes while the vertical axis
represents the latency in microseconds. The test was repeated for different message rates,
starting from 50 Msg/s to 1000 Msg/s.
For a message size of 32 bytes, which is more common for measurements and a
message rate of 1000 Msg/s, the average latency was 243 µs with 90% below 269 μs and
a maximum latency of 336 µs. The performance of unicast transmission with reliable,
QoS is shown in Figure 2.10b. The average latency with reliable protocol was 292 µs
with 90% below 435 µs and a maximum latency of 727 µs for the same message size and
update rate. Figure 2.11 shows the performance test for multicast communication. The
performance of best effort is shown in Figure 2.11a. For a message size of 32 bytes with
a message rate of 1000 Msg/s, the average latency was 270 µs, with 90% below 306 μs
and maximum latency 385 µs. The performance of multicast and reliable quality of
service is depicted in Figure 2.11b. The average latency was 255 μs, with maximum
delay 534 μs. The performance results are summarized in Table 2.2-3.
When the DDS uses IP-multicast and a node needs to join the multicast group, the
node first sends an internet group management protocol (IGMP) join message to the
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multicast router. Once the node is joined to the multicast group, the multicast router sends
an IGMP Query message at a regular interval and waits for an IGMP membership report
to confirm the node is still connected to the multicast group. The layer-2 network switch
with IGMP snooping enabled creates a list of ports with nodes interested in joining the
multicast group.
Table 2.2-3. DDS performance for 32 bytes messages size
Unicast/Multicast

QoS

Average

Max

latency (μs)

latency (μs)

90%< t
(μs)

Unicast

Best effort

243

336

269

Unicast

Reliable

292

727

435

Multicast

Best effort

270

385

306

Multicast

Reliable

255

534

278

When a multicast message is sent, the switch replicates the data to all ports in the list.
The process of multicast and data replication may introduce slightly higher latency
compared to unicast. However, multicast is still better than unicast for data requested by
multiple nodes and transmitted over limited bandwidth links. Multicast can dramatically
reduce the bandwidth required for the data transmission, as compared to the unicast
method. The performance test shows that the implemented communication infrastructure
has a high update rate and low latency. The obtained update rate and latency are suitable
for smart grid real-time applications. For example, PMUs have update rates of 30–60
Msg/s, while IEC 61850 substation automation standard has a restriction of maximum 3
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ms delay on critical messages, such as Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
(GOOSE), where the benchmarks show that the DDS can achieve 1000 Msg/s with a
maximum 0.72 ms.

(a)

(b)
Figure 2.10. a-Performance test for DDS unicast and best effort quality of service bPerformance test for DDS unicast and reliable quality of service (QoS)
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(a)

(b)
Figure 2.11. a- Performance test for DDS multicast and best effort QoS. BPerformance test for DDS multicast and reliable QoS
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2.6

Summary
In this chapter, the need for an efficient, scalable and interoperable communication

infrastructure for the smart grid has been discussed. To address these issues, this chapter
proposed the use of a communication middleware service to manage the energy in the
smart grid, keeping interoperability in mind. This is due to the fact that a communication
middleware provides an abstraction layer to simplify and manage the communication
between different nodes without being concerned with the complexity of hardware layers
and network details.
Here, message-centric and data-centric communication paradigms were analyzed. A
comparison between both approaches showed that message-centric communications are
not easily expandable, as required by the dynamic nature of the smart grid and suffer
from a single point of failure. However, in data-centric communications, the fundamental
unit is the data object. The message in this approach is created by the middleware,
therefore, the communication infrastructure will be aware of the message contents and
data types.
As such, the data-centric Data Distribution Service middleware was implemented as a
communication backbone for the smart grid test bed. The physical setup and the data
requirement for each controller, along with explaining the different QoS profiles
supported by the DDS, were presented in this chapter. The design of the data structure
and a standard interface for the developed infrastructure were also provided.
Finally, a performance test for the communication infrastructure was performed to
benchmark the network performance and find out the latency corresponding to different
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message rates and sizes. By knowing the data rate and message size required by the
specific application, the users can find out the latency budget and make sure it does not
violate the application requirement.
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Chapter 3
3.1

Advanced metering infrastructure AMI

Introduction
Advanced metering infrastructure AMI enables two-way communications between

end-customers and the utility Company. The goals from this infrastructure are to improve
the energy management, detect power outage, enable remote load disconnection and
reduce the operation cost by transmitting accurate real-time consumptions data to the
utility, which can be extended down to each smart appliance.
In the other direction, the AMI enables real-time energy pricing, which can be used
for peak load shaving. The price information and control command can be transmitted to
customer appliances and energy management systems EMS through the HAN Gateway.
The customer EMS can utilize this information for managing local loads, energy
resources and storage to reduce the consumption cost. However, the capabilities of this
infrastructure haven’t been utilized in most cases due to:
1- Privacy concern.
Many customers are worried about their privacy and the information that
can be extracted from detailed daily usages of their smart appliances.
2- Security Risk.
To take advantage of the HAN and interaction with a smart meter, strong
security rules must be applied to prevent hackers from attacking such systems
and control the customer appliance or sent wrong information.
3- Integration with the existing appliance.
Most of the existing appliances lack a suitable interface to communicate
with HAN.
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This chapter presents the development of an AMI infrastructure that integrates
seamlessly with the microgrid’s communication infrastructure, which was presented in
Chapter 2. The developed AMI consists of several modules: smart meters, a
communication interface, and HAN gateway. The developed smart meter has a high
sampling rate for increased accuracy and is modular. That is, it supports measuring single
and three-phase electrical quantities. Since microgrids contain their own renewable
resources, the developed smart meter firmware has the capability to track individual sold
and consumed power. The firmware also has the capability to calculate the root mean
square value of voltages and currents, active and reactive power. The smart meter
monitors the power quality by separately evaluating the harmonic components’ active
and reactive power. The smart meter is designed to flexibly integrate with the utility and
microgrids through different communication interfaces. It supports power line
communication, ZigBee, and Wi-Fi. Power line communication and ZigBee can be
utilized to integrate with the utility, whereas Wi-Fi is utilized to integrate with HAN. The
HAN receives the data from the smart meter over an encrypted communication channel
for securing private customer information. To provide an interoperability layer, the HAN
gateway will share this data with the DDS global data space.
3.2

AMI System architecture
The AMI infrastructure is made up of a communication network, hardware and

software components. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the main AMI system
components, which consists of meters, communication network, data concentrators, smart
meter head-end and metering data management system MDMS. These system
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components enable collection, storage, and management of detailed time-based users’
consumption information by the utility companies. The two-way communication network
allows transmitting information, such as real-time price, from the utility company to the
consumers. The details and functionality of each component are discussed in the next
sections.

Figure 3.1: Smart meter infrastructure architecture
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3.2.1

Smart Meter

The smart meter is a digital device installed in the customers’ premises to collect
time-based consumption data, such as electricity, water, and gas consumption. The
electricity smart meter consists of analog front-end, digital processors, and a
communication interface, as shown in Figure 3.2. The analog front-end is comprised of
voltage and current transducers, signal condition, filtering circuits, and analog to digital
interface. The signal condition and filtering circuits isolate the noise from the measured
signal and ensure a proper voltage level before the analog-to-digital conversion stage.
The analog to digital convert measured analog signal to a digital stream to be processed
by the digital processor.

Figure 3.2: Smart meter block diagram
Smart electricity meters usually utilize two different types of digital processors. The
first processor is a dedicated digital signal processor, which is designed to perform
certain types of calculation. This type of the DSP processor is used to calculate active and
reactive energy, harmonic distortion and root mean square voltage and current.
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The IEC 62053 standard limits the measurement error for class 1 meter (meters with
maximum 40A) to 1% of full scale.
The second processor is a general purpose processor or microcontroller. This type of
processor is used to run the smart meter firmware that handles the communication tasks,
user interface and store the accumulated energy consumption.
The communication interfaces allow the smart meter to exchange the information
with the utility or customer HAN. The most common network interfaces with the utility
side are a radio frequency (RF), power line communication, broadband over power line
and cellular networks. For the HAN side communication, Wi-Fi and ZigBee wireless
network are utilized to connect with the customers’ devices and systems.
3.2.2

Communication network

The AMI communication network consists of HAN, Neighbors Area Network (NAN)
and WAN. As shown in Figure 3.1. The HAN is a network owned and operated by the
end customer. Smart appliances, distributed energy resource controllers, energy and
building management systems can exchange information with the smart meter through
the HAN gateway. End-customer can grant the utility to control their appliances
connected to the HAN network. For example, the utility can throttle pool heater or
HVAC systems during peak hours to reduce the load demand. Smart appliances and
systems can control the energy demand based on the real-time pricing information. The
NAN network aggregates the data from a group of smart meters to the data concentrator.
Power line communication or mesh network, such as ZigBee or mesh Wi-Fi, are used to
aggregate the data in the NANs.
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The WAN network is used to aggregate the data from the data concentrators to the
smart meter head-end. The WAN network utilizes power line communication, fiber
optics, digital subscriber line or broadband wireless link as backhaul between data
concentrators and smart meter head-end.
3.2.3

Data concentrator

The data concentrator is a communication node that collects data from smart meters
in the NAN network and aggregates it to the smart meter Head-end. The data
concentrator has two network interfaces, one to communicate with smart meters, for
example, ZigBee interface, and one to communicate with the WAN network, such as
fiber optics or broadband link.
3.2.4

Smart meter Head-end

The smart meter Head-end is a software package that provides a bridge between the
AMI and the utility IT network. The Head-end monitors meters’ status and collects
meters’ readings, events and sends remote connection and disconnection command to
smart meters. The data collected by the Head-end are stored, managed and analyzed by
the MDMS.
3.3

Development of Smart Meter
The developed smart meters are based on the STMPC1 Polyphase energy metering

chip from STMicroelectronics. The digital processor and power line communication are
based on the STEVAL-IPP001V2 Evaluation Kit shown in Figure 3.3. The STEVALIPP001V2 provides the base hardware for the power line modem and 32-bit arm cortex
M4 microcontroller. A custom firmware drivers and application were developed to the
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process the measured data, manage the communication interfaces, energy calculation and
provide the user interface for configuration and calibration. The details of the hardware
and software are discussed in the following sections.

Figure 3.3: smart meter digital processing and communication board
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3.3.1

Voltage and current acquisition

The phase voltage and current are measured using a voltage divider and a current
transformer, respectively. A current transformer with a maximum current 20A and
current ratio 1:2000 is used to measure the phase current. The output current is converted
to a voltage using a shunt resistor. An RC filter is used to filter the noise and limit the
signal bandwidth before the analog conversion stage, as shown in Figure 3.4. The analog
front end and digital conversion are based on the STMPS2 second order sigma delta
modulator with programmable gain amplifier and built-in accurate voltage reference. The
STMPS2 samples the voltage and current input channels simultaneously with 2 MHz
sampling rate per Chanel. Two sigma delta modulators convert the sampled analog
measurement to a stream of bits. The voltage and current bit streams are multiplexed to a
single 4 MHz bit output channel. The STMPS has a 0.5% error over the full scale, which
is below the standard limit. The IEC 62053 class 1 (meters with 40A max current) allows
1% error.

L
Filter
cip
DAT
cin

N
L

vip

N

vin

Filter

STMPS2
CLK

Divider

Figure 3.4: current and voltage transducers connection diagram
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For a polyphase meter, an STMPS2 chip is used for each phase.
3.3.2

Signal processing and power calculation

A dedicated digital signal processor (STMPC1) is used for energy calculations. The
STMPC has four DSP engines that process the measurements from the three phases in
addition to neutral current. The DSP engines check the integrity of the digital streams
produced by the analog front-end and compute the cumulative active and reactive
energies, cumulative active and reactive fundamental energies, RMS values for voltage
and current, and line frequency. The STMPC1 implements a tamper detection algorithm
to detect energy theft. The tamper detection module monitors the sum of the current,
phase sequence, active power direction, and electromagnetic interference. All computed
energies, voltage and current measurements, and internal registers can be accessed by the
application processor through SPI bus. Figure 3.5 shows the connection diagram for the
STMPC1, analog front-end, and the application processor.
To calibrate for the error due to component tolerance and measurement error, the
DSP engines have calibration registers that can adjust the readings by ±12.5%.
Calibration values can be stored temporarily in shadow registers or permanently in onetime programming (OTP) memory. The DSP engine can read the calibration value from
the OTP or temporary memory by setting the RD signal. If the RD signal is set, the
configuration bits will be loaded from shadow registers otherwise, if RD is cleared, the
configuration bits will be loaded from the OTP memory. This allows testing the
configuration before permanent writing to the devices’ OTP memory. However, this
allows the software to load different calibration values to the shadow registers and switch
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the configuration from OTP to shadow registers. During our test, we were able to connect
a small circuit between the application processor and the STMPC1. This circuit simply
loads the wrong calibration value to the shadow registers and switches the RD signal to
load the configuration from the shadow registers. The circuit transparently passes the
reading commands and data between the application processor and the STMPC1. By
modifying the shadow registers, the power consumption can be reduced by 12.5%. To
avoid this type of vulnerability, the DSP engines should allow disabling the shadow
register permanently after writing configuration bits to the OTP memory. Moreover, an
authentication mechanism is required between the application processor and the DSP
engines.

Figure 3.5: Energy computing DSP engine connection diagram
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3.3.3

Communication Modules

Three types of communication modules are used in the developed smart meters. The
first module is a power line communication interface. The power line communication is
based on the ST7580 narrow-band power line networking chip designed to work in
CENELEC A and B band. The ST580 provides a data rate up to 28.8 Kbps with PSK
modulation. The application processor communicates with the power line networking
chip using the universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) port. The data link
layer implemented in the ST580 provides error detection of corrupted frames in addition
to encryption and authentication based on the 128 bit AES encryption algorithm. The
block diagram for the ST580 and connection with the application processor is shown in
Figure 3.6.
ST7580

Data Link layer
UART
PHY Layer

Application Processor

Host interface

Analog Front End

Coupling Filter

Power Line

Figure 3.6: Power line modem block diagram
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The second communication module is the XBee S2C ZigBee module. The S2C
module supports peer-to-peer or wireless mesh network configuration. Mesh network
allows the smart meters to relay the messages from remote meters to the data
concentrator. The ZigBee module can be used as an alternative to power line network to
communicate with the utility or the customer gateway. Communication over ZigBee
wireless network is encrypted using AES 128 bit encryption.
The third communication module is a Wi-Fi module. The Wi-Fi module is
interchangeable with the ZigBee module. If both Wi-Fi and ZigBee modules are required,
the Wi-Fi module can be connected to the isolated RS-232 port using an RS-232/TTL
adapter.
3.3.4

Smart meter firmware

Custom firmware is developed to operate the smart meter. The firmware code is
developed using C language and compiled using a C cross compiler for ARM cortex M4.
The firmware is divided into three different layers, as shown in Figure 3.7. The low-level
layer implements the hardware driver and low-level functions, such as basic input/output
and hardware peripheral initialization. The low-level drivers include the STMPC1 driver,
communication modules drivers, and serial console driver. The middle layer implements
data extraction functions, communication protocols and data structures, calibration and
configuration functions. The top layer represents the application layer, which performs
energy accumulation, energy price exchange, controls smart appliances and remote
disconnection.
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Figure 3.7: Smart meter firmware architecture
3.3.4.1 Developed firmware functions
DSP engine and communication modules are connected to the application processor
through either Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus or UART. Low-level drivers provide
the basic function to initialize, read or write data to the SPI and UART modules. The
initialization functions allow setting the data rate and data length (number of bits). Basic
input/output functions allow sending, receiving and validating single data word.
The STMPC1 driver calls low-level SPI input/output functions to access the STMP1
internal registers. The STMPC_Init() function initializes the connection with the
STMPC1 chip, configures voltage and current transducers types and loads the calibration
data to the shadow registers.
The STMPC1’s data registers are organized in seven different groups[58]. Each group
consists of four 32 bits data records, as shown in Figure 3.8. Each record contains 4 bits
data parity and 28 bits data fields. The data records are described as below:
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Group 0 data records: this group consists of four data records DAP, DRP,
DFP, and PRD. The DAP and DRP records contain the three-phase active and
reactive energy produced by harmonic and fundamental components. In
addition to the energy records, DAP and DRP contain 12 status bits. The DFP
record contains the three-phase energy produced by the fundamental
component. The PRD record contains the time period measured for one cycle
and DC component.



Group 1 data records: this group consists of DMR, DMS, DMT and DMN
data records. The DMR, DMS, and DMT contain the instantaneous
measurement of the three-phase voltages and currents. The DMN data record
contains the sum of the three phase voltages and current.



Group 2 data records: this group consists of DER, DES, DET and DEN data
records. The DER, DES, and DET contain calculated RMS values of the
three-phase voltage and currents, while DEN contains the RMS value of the
neutral current.



Group 3 data records: this group consists of DAR, DAS, DAT and CF0
records. The DAR, DAS and DAT records contain the active energy for
phases R, S, and T, respectively. The CF0 record contains configuration bits.



Group 4 data records: this group is similar to Group3 except that DRR,
DRS and DRT records contain the reactive energy of phases R, S and T,
respectively. The CF1 record contains configuration bits.



Group 5 data records: this group consists of DFR, DFS, DFT and CF 2
records. The DFR, DFS and DFT records contain the fundamental active
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energy for phases R, S, and T,

respectively. The CF2 record contains

configuration bits.


Group 6 data records: this group consists of ACR, ACS, ACT and CF3 data
records. The ACR, ACS and ACT records contain the accumulated Ah for
phases R, S and T, respectively. The CF3 record contains configuration bits.

To simplify reading and interpreting the data records, the developed driver provides a
simple function to read the data records. The Read_Register() function reads the contents
of the seven data records and stores the content in a data structure. The data records
contain digital counts that represent measured voltages, currents, and energies. These
digital counts can be interpreted to voltage, current and energy values based on the
system design parameters, such as the current transformer ratio, programmable amplifier
gain, and configuration bits. The developed driver provides a set of functions to extract
and interpret the records digital counts to real values for voltage, current, and energy.
The data extraction functions are described as below:


“PQ_3phase_Extraction()”: this function processes the data record and
returns the sum of the three phase energy, reactive energy, and fundamental
energy accumulated in the data records. The data records must be read
frequently to avoid data loss due to registers overrun.



“IRMS_Extraction()”: this function returns the RMS values for the threephase currents.



“VRMS_Extraction()”: this function returns the RMS values for the threephase voltages.
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“P_RST_Extraction()”: this function returns the individual accumulated
energy for phase R, S, and T, respectively.



“Q_RST_Extraction()”: this function returns the individual accumulated
reactive energy for phase R, S, and T, respectively.



“Total_energy()”: this function returns the total consumed, supplied and net
energy. The developed smart meter can accumulate the load change with a
minimum load equal to 7.2mw/h.



“Total_reactive_energy()”: this function returns the total reactive energy.



“Total_fundmental_energy()”: this function returns the total consumed,
supplied and net fundamental energy.



“R_energy()”: this function returns the consumed, supplied and net energy for
phase R.



“S_energy()”: this function returns the consumed, supplied and net energy for
phase S.



“T_energy()”: this function returns the consumed, supplied and net energy for
phase T.
Higher level functions are developed to format the data frames, transmit the
data over communication links and respond to Head-end requests. A serial
console is developed to print debugging and status messages. The operator can
use the serial console interface to change the meter and communication
parameters, such as encryption keys, communication speed, and calibration
data.
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Figure 3.8: STMPC1 data record
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3.3.5

Development of data concentrator and smart meter Head-end

To collect and manage the data from multiple smart meters, smart meter Head-end
software is developed based on the NI LabView graphical programming environment
(see Figure 3.9). Each smart meter sends a data frame that contains energy, voltage, and
current data. The message frame contains a unique identification code for each meter.
The head-end software publishes collected data to a DDS domain dedicated to smart
meter data. The published data object contains all consumption and measured data, in
addition to the meter ID. The smart meter GDS domain is monitored by a database
service that stores all published data object to a database. The head-end software can send
a price signal and control command to the smart meter.

Figure 3.9: smart meter head-end interface
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3.3.6

Development of HAN Gateway

To exchange information with the HAN, a gateway is developed using the
BeagleBone single board Computer (SBC). The SBC runs an embedded Linux operation
system and the HAN gateway software. The gateway software is developed using C
programming language. The software periodically polls the consumption and price
information from the smart meter using a WiFi communication link and publishes this
information to the microgrid domain. The published information is accessible by the
microgrid applications and devices, such as the energy management system. Separate
smart meters domains and data flow are shown in Figure 3.10.

Figure 3.10: Data flow between customer and utility domains
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3.4

Summary
In this chapter, an AMI infrastructure is developed and integrated with the smart grid

testbed. The developed AMI has a flexible communication interfaces that allow
connections with ZigBee, WiFi, and powerline communication networks. Unlike the
commercially available meters with proprietary software, development of custom
firmware and application allows modification, implementations and testing new
algorithms and ideas. The developed AMI is seamlessly integrated with the developed
communication infrastructure.

76

Chapter 4
4.1

Synchronized measurement network

Introduction
Electric power systems are undergoing profound and radical changes triggered by

the advent of new technologies not only in generation and storage, but also in power
electronics, sensing, control, computing, and communications. Specifically, they are
evolving toward more flexible Microgrids infrastructures. Modern grids encounter high
penetration of renewable energy and distributed resources. Most of these will be installed
on the distribution networks. Current distributions networks are designed as radial
networks for unidirectional power flow. With passive customers (i.e. customer only
consumes power), the designer only considers the maximum limits, such as maximum
loads and short circuit current, rather than real-time sensing the operating conditions [59].
With the high penetration of renewable energies, energy storage, and plug-in electric
vehicles, it's necessary to continuously monitor the magnitude and phase angle of the
voltages and current to control the power flow, damp power oscillation and maintain
distributed sources synchronization. Direct measurements of the voltage and phase angle
can be achieved by utilizing phasor measurement units and GPS time reference. Phasor
measurement units are usually deployed in transmission networks. The phase difference
in the distribution network is much smaller compared to the phase difference in
transmission systems. Phase measurement in the distribution network requires higher
resolution measurements units. Micro-Synchrophasor is developed with a higher
resolution for distribution network installation [60]. In this chapter, a development of
low-cost high-angle resolution synchronized measurement unit will be introduced. The
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proposed measurement unit utilizes the DDS communication middleware to support
completely distributed and resilient peer/peer communication environment. The
measurement unit can directly measure the phase angle, frequency and the magnitude of
the voltage and current fundamental components.
4.2

Synchrophasor measurements
Synchrophasor units provide time-stamped measurements with high accuracy time

reference in order to compare different measurements from different sites or locations.
Time-stamped measurements make it possible to directly measure the phase angles
between bus bars or feeders voltages. The block diagram of the synchrophasor
measurement unit is depicted in Figure 4.1. First, the analog measurements are filtered
using low pass filter before the analog to digital conversion. An antialiasing filter with a
bandwidth equal to half of the sampling frequency is used to limit the signal bandwidth
and prevent aliasing. A global positioning system (GPS) receiver provides a common
time reference for the system. The GPS time reference has low frequency, typically 1 Hz.
A higher rate clock is produced from the GPS 1 Hz reference using Phase Locked Loop
(PLL). This clock drives the ADC sampling rate and synchronizes the microprocessor
instruction execution. In addition to the 1Hz time reference, the GPS provides the current
universal time (UTC) using serial or IRIG protocols. The digital processor time stamps
the collected samples with the GPS time and calculates the phase angle relative to the
cosine function at the nominal system frequency synchronized to the UTC clock. Timestamped data are transmitted using the network interface to the phasor data concentrator
PDC. The PDC collects the data from multiple phasor measurements units, correlates the
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data by the time tag and retransmit it to the higher level application or supper PDC,
which collect the data from multiple PDC. Phasor data are exchanged using IEEE
C37.118.2 or IEC 61850-90-5. The IEC 61850-90-5 standard uses a UDP multicast to
deliver the phasor data to the subscriber.

Figure 4.1: Phasor measurement unit general block diagram
The developed measurement unit consists of three different Modules, analog module,
digital module, and a communication module. The construction and operation details of
the three modules are described in the next sections.
4.3

Analog interface module
The analog interface module consists of six analog filters and six analog comparators.

The analog filters are an identical low-pass filter that limits the bandwidth of the
measured voltage and current signals, see Figure 4.2. Since we are interested in the
fundamental component phase angle only, the low pass filter is designed to pass the
frequency from 10 to 140 Hz. This bandwidth is suitable for both 50Hz and 60Hz system.
The frequency response of the low-pass filters is shown in Figure 4.3. As depicted from
the figure, the filter has a unity gain in the passband region. The filter attenuates the third

79

and fifth harmonics order with 40db and 70db, respectively. The filtered signals are
connected to six analog comparators (see Figure 4.4: Analog comparators). The analog
comparator converts the sinusoidal waveform to a square waveform. The leading edge of
the square wave is synced with the positive zero crossing of the sinusoidal signal. To
minimize the phase error between the sinusoidal signal and generated square wave, an
ultrafast 4.5 Nanosecond analog comparator is used. High slew rate makes it possible to
generate a sharp edge square wave with neglected phase delay relative to the sinusoidal
signal. The slew rate for the analog comparator will produce maximum phase error equal
to 9.72e-05 degree.
4.4

Digital processing modules
The digital processing board consists of ARM cortex M4 32 bit microcontroller,

phase measurement circuits, GPS receiver and Phase locked loop. The block diagram for
the digital processing board is shown in
Figure 4.5. The phase locked loop is adjusted to generate 60Hz output frequency for
the 60Hz supply system and 50Hz output for 50 Hz supply system. The phase locked
loop output is synchronized with the GPS 1 Hz time reference output. The phase angles
between the comparators’ square wave outputs and the phase locked loop output
represent the relative phase angles between measured signals and GPS clock. To measure
these phase angles, a XOR gate is used. The XOR gate inputs are connected to the phase
locked loop clock output and the square wave from the comparator. The output pulse
duration shown in Figure 4.6 represents the phase angle. As depicted from the figure,
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when GPS and the input signal has the same phase shift, the duty cycle of the output is
0%, while the output duty cycle is 100% in case of 180-degree phase shift.

Figure 4.2: analog filter schematic diagram
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Figure 4.3: analog filter frequency response.

Figure 4.4: Analog comparators
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Figure 4.5: Digital processing board block diagram
The XOR output pulse duration accurately represents the phase angle magnitude;
however, it doesn’t contain information regarding the angle direction. For example,
positive and negative 90-degree phase angle will produce the same pulse width output.
To detect the angle direction, another circuit is implemented. The direction detection
circuit consists of edge triggered D-type flip. The GPS clock reference is connected to the
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Figure 4.6: Phase comparison with the GPS reference (a) zero degree phase shift, (b) 180
phase shift, (c) 90-degree phase shift
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flip-flop clock input while the signal square wave is connected to the D input. If the
square signal lags the GPS reference, the GPS clock will always latch zero output while
the output will be high if the square signal leads the GPS reference. Figure 4.7 shows the
timing diagram for the lead/lag phase detection circuit. The filtered analog signals, phase
angle magnitude signals, and phase direction signals are connected to the ARM cortex
microcontroller running at the 168MHz clock. The microcontroller converts the voltage
and current to a digital form using the built-in analog to digital converter with 12-bit
resolution and 10k sample/s. After converting the measured signal to digital form, the
microcontroller calculates the voltage and current root mean square values. To read the
phase magnitude, a pulse width captured module is used to measure the pulse width and
convert it to a digital count. The built-in capture module consists of a 16 bit counter and
programmable clock source. The programmable counter can be configured to count the
number of the pulse between rising edge, trailing edge and both. To measure the pulse
width that represents the phase angle, the modules are configured to count the pulses
from the programmable clock sources between rising and trailing edge instances. The
clock source is programmed to divide the processor 168MHz clock by 32 to produce 5.25
MHz clock.
With 16 bit counter resolution and 5.25 MHz clock, the pulse capture module can
measures an angle from zero to 269.63 degree with 0.0041degree resolution. The
microcontroller firmware adds a fixed phase angle to compensate for the phase angle
results from the low-pass filter. In addition to pulse width measurement, the pulse
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capture module can measure the frequency of the input signal. One capture module is
configured to measure the frequency of phase A voltage signal to represent the system
frequency. After calculating the phase angle, root mean square voltages and currents, and
system frequency, the microcontroller firmware transmit calculated data with the time
stamp to the communication module over the high-speed serial interface.

Figure 4.7: Phase detection timing diagram, (a) lag signal, (b) lead signal
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4.5

Communication Module
The communication module is based on a SBC with Ethernet, and USB interface. The

SBC runs embedded Linux with real-time extension. The embedded Linux provides the
necessary hardware drivers for the Ethernet, Wi-Fi and serial interface in addition to the
networking TCP/IP stack. The SBC runs a custom-developed software application that
collects the measurement from the digital processing board and publishes it to the
network using a publisher/subscriber communication scheme.
The developed software utilizes the DDS library from RTI to implement the
publisher/ subscriber communication. To minimize the bandwidth required to exchange
the information, the software uses UDP multicast messages to deliver the synchronized
measurement like the IEC 61850-90-5. The DDS library supports two different quality of
service for the message delivery over the UDP packets, best efforts, and reliable
communication. In the reliable communication, the RTPS protocol ensures the delivery
of the UDP packets to all subscribers. In addition to the UDP multicast, TCP
communication is also supported. TCP communication is necessary when passing the
data packets over a network that blocks UDP packets, such as communication over
internet and cloud communication. In addition, the software supports push oriented and
pull-oriented operating modes.
The published data objects are stamped with a current time stamp at the publisher
side. Another time stamp is added at the subscriber side when the data is received. The
middleware can be configured to arrange received data objects based on the transmission
or received time stamp. To eliminate the need for data concentrator to arrange the data
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object in the correct timing order, the middleware is configured to arrange the data
packets based on the transmission time stamp. The test setup and transmitted data are
shown in Figure 4.8. In the test setup, the digital processing board was able to measure
the frequency with 0.004Hz accuracy and the phase angle with error 0.01 degree.

Figure 4.8: Synchronized measurement test setup
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4.6

Summary
In this chapter, a low-cost development and implementation of high-resolution

synchronized measurement units for distribution network are presented. The developed
unit utilizes a publisher-subscriber peer-to-peer communication scheme to construct
synchronized measurement networks. All measurement units are synchronized and
measure the phase angle relative to the GPS time reference. The DDS eliminates the need
for the phasor data concentrator and provides a reliable communication network.
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Chapter 5
5.1

Smart Grid Modeling and Simulation

Introduction
The challenge of maintaining reliable control and operation of the grid with a number

of subsystems increases the level of uncertainty, not only on the demand side but also in
terms of generation availability. These subsystems integrate a wide variety of resources
that are governed by different regulations and owned by different entities. Deep
integration between intelligent measurement nodes, communication systems, IT
technology, artificial intelligence, power electronics and physical power system
components is needed to manage the modern smart grid resources. The dynamic behavior
of such a complex system is dependent on a wide range of factors distributed between
cyber and physical components. Understanding the dynamic behavior and expected
performance of such complex cyber-physical systems (CPS) is challenging.
To study the complete system behavior, a new set of tools for modeling and analysis
of the complex cyber-physical system is required. The currently available simulation
tools, emulation tools, and test beds focus only on the physical or the cyber part. The
expected capabilities of simulation and physical testbeds differ significantly. Simulation
is typically used to evaluate the overall system performance in order to obtain the big
picture. Physical test-beds, on the other hand, offer the important capability of being able
to operate a real system that produces detailed responses. Physical test-beds provide the
real operation of the micro-grids, which can be used to evaluate the actual behaviors and
impacts of embedded systems, software and physical component on power system
operation and stability. Because of resource limitations, however, physical testbeds
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cannot represent all elements of the entire large-scale cyber-physical system. Conversely,
simulation offers greater flexibility and scalability, but cannot provide the operational
realism. A hybrid hardware/software-based smart grid testbed infrastructure [36] is
required to represent the interaction of the cyber and physical components to understand
the system dynamics and evaluate new designs [35].
The testbed should provide the necessary hardware and software environments to
perform different types of experiments, such as HIL, as well as SIL operational control in
real-time. Real-time embedded systems have different dynamic behaviors based on
processor speed, communication channels, memories and embedded firmware. The
modern power system network heavily depends on real-time embedded systems.
Components such as PMUS, Protection Relays etc. are examples of critical real-time
systems that exist in the modern grid. Hardware in the loop simulation platform is
required to evaluate the effect of actual behaviors of these embedded systems in power
systems operation and stability. The hardware in the loop platform provides the method
of simulating large power system network while at the same time interacting with actual
hardware components. Since these hardware components communicate using different
protocols, providing a communication interface with interoperability with simulation
platforms is challenging. The integration between the proposed co-simulation framework
and smart grid testbed will provide a flexible hybrid software/hardware environment for
modeling and testing different smart grid operating scenarios.
Since The CPS is a multidisciplinary system, the testbed should provide a standard
and flexible interface to integrate with other testbed facilities from different domains for
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multidisciplinary studies. This type of integration provides the scalability to represent
large cyber-physical systems [61] and enable cooperation between researchers from
multidisciplinary fields for a better understanding of different domain interactions.
Several smart grid and CPS testbeds have been developed to represent the cyberphysical interaction in the smart grid. However, none of them provide the tools and
interface to integrate several testing platforms into a scalable system that can also be
expanded to accommodate new types of services, components, and operation
scenarios [62]-[64].
The proposed testbed infrastructure not only allows for integration with other
testbeds, but also enables remote experimental features to perform experiments, test
developed algorithms, and collect data remotely. Figure 5.1 shows the block diagram for
the proposed hybrid smart grid testbed. The testbed consists of three different layers.
The first layer is the physical layer, which represents a scaled model for smart power
systems, including generators, transmission lines, circuit breakers, PMU, loads emulators,
embedded controllers, and remote terminal units (RTU) for supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA).
The second layer is the communication layer. The DDS serves as backbone and
interoperability layer between all components is the testbed. DDS shares all information,
measurements, and control command through a unified global data space (GDS) using a
publisher-subscriber communication scheme. Data from different devices and protocols
are translated and shared through the developing DDS gateway.
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The top layer is the software layer. In this layer, three different types of software
modeling and simulation, data visualization, and protocol emulation are integrated with
the testbed. The modeling and simulation software is used to model, test, and verify a
new control algorithm using HIL technology. After testing the modeled controller, actual
implementation code can be verified with real hardware using the SIL simulation
technique. The simulation environment can be used to model and simulate large-scale
power systems. The simulation model can exchange the information with actual devices,
such as PMUs and protection relays, through the communication and interoperability
layer. A toolbox is developed to integrate the MATLAB/SIMULINK modeling and
simulation software package with smart grid testbed. The developed toolbox is described
in the next section.
Data visualization runs a well-designed interface on a user front-end machine for
experiment specification, configuration, visualization, control, and analysis. It allows the
user to easily specify the experiments, visualize the system configurations, change the
model parameters, inspect or modify the system state for the experiments, and allows for
on-line monitoring and steering of the experiments. A graphical user interface and online
monitoring are developed using LABVIEW. The LABVIEW interface shown in
Figure 5.2 allows online monitoring for all measurements and override control command
from controllers. The user can also visualize all data of interest in real time using
MATLAB graphs and SIMULINK scopes.
Modern smart grid utilizes different types of protocols; the protocol emulation is used
to integrate several protocols with the testbed, communicate with real devices or
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investigate the security and vulnerability in a safe environment. To investigate the
security and vulnerability, virtual IEDs are created on a virtual or embedded platform.
Virtual IEDs can communicate with real IEDs using protocol emulation and simulation
software using the DDS backbone. Protocol emulation will be described in section 5.3.

Figure 5.1: Hybrid Smart Grid Testbed Block Diagram
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Figure 5.2: Testbed LabVIEW Interface
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5.2

Hybrid simulation toolbox
Based on a defined data structure for the testbed objects, a Simulink toolbox was

developed to provide an interface between Matlab/Simulink and testbed hardware. The
toolbox utilizes the DDS middleware and MATLAB support package to integrate
MATLAB, DDS, and physical hardware. This toolbox allows users to perform an
experiment, control testbed hardware in real-time and collect data through an Ethernet
network. A routing service can be used to allow remote access and experimentation
through a high-speed virtual private network (VPN) connection. The main blocks for the
main objects of the testbed are defined as the following:
5.2.1

Domain Creator block

The domain creator block shown in Figure 5.3 creates and initiates the domain for the
DDS where all the publishers and subscribers share the data in a global data space. Each
domain has a unique integer ID number. Simulation objects must join the same domain to
communicate to each other. A simulation model can be a part of multiple domains by
using multiple domain creators with multiple IDs, as shown in Figure 5.4. The user needs
to set the domain ID in the block parameter. The domain creator block has two output
ports: Sub port and Pub port. The Sub port should be connected to any simulation object
that needs to read data from the GDS. Pub port should be connected to any simulation
object that needs to write data to the GDS. Domain can be used to isolate different tests
running in the testbed at the same time or group multiple objects which belong to the
same system such as two different microgrids. If the domain already exists with the same
ID the domain creator participates to the existing domain.
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Figure 5.3: Domain Creator.
Domain (1) Application

Domain (0) Application

Domain (1)
participant

Domain (0)
participant

GDS
Domain (1)

GDS
Domain (0)

Domain (1)
participant

Domain (0)
participant

Higher Level Application

Figure 5.4: Multiple Domain Creators with Multiple IDs
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5.2.2 Generator control Block
A control Block was defined for the generators, as shown in Figure 5.5. The generator
Block publishes the control command, speed/torque reference, start/stop control and
synchronization command to the GDS. The actual measurement of the generator current,
voltage, active and reactive power, and frequency are returned to the simulation by
subscribing to measurement topics in the GDS. The user can set the QoS profile for an
individual topic in the generator block, as shown in Figure 5.6. Each generator block
contains two inputs for the publisher and subscriber configuration. These two inputs
should be connected to the corresponding outputs of the domain creator block. Two types
of generator blocks are defined based on the control mode, either speed control for a
slack generator or power control for other generators in the system.

Figure 5.5: Generator Control Block
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Figure 5.6: Generator Control Block Parameters
The physical generation stations receive the control command through an RS-485
serial interface. In order to pass the data topics from Ethernet-based network to RS-485
serial communication network, an interface board shown in Figure 5.7 is designed.

4 ports USB/Serial

Programmable
Drives (RS485/422/
232)

Figure 5.7: Serial Interface Board
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Top Layer

Power line module

Bottom Layer

Embedded
Microcontroller

The interface board has four programmable serial ports, USB, and a power line
communication (PLC) modem port. Each individual serial port can be programmed to
work as RS-485, RS-422 or RS-232. Three serial ports can be accessed directly from a
computer or an embedded host using a USB communication device class driver (CDC).
The fourth serial port can be configured as a PLC port or regular serial, as shown in
Figure 5.8.

Figure 5.8: Interface Board Block Diagram
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In the case of PLC port configuration, the built-in microcontroller performs the hardreal-time tasks for power line communication in addition to controlling serial ports
modes. The Microcontroller Firmware can be updated over USB communication. The
same interface board can be used to pass the data from PMU C37.118 serial protocol to
the DDS global data space.
A. Circuit Breaker
The block controlling the CB is shown in Figure 5.9. This block receives the CB
control signal and controls the actual CB. The user can set the QoS for the control signal,
as shown in Generator’s control block.

Figure 5.9: Circuit Breaker Block Diagram
B.

Load

Four different programmable loads are controlled by the load control block in
Figure 5.10. Load controllers can control active and reactive power for each load to
represent load patterns. The control block must be connected to Domain creator Pub port.
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Figure 5.10: Load Control Block
C. Busbar
The Busbar block is shown in Figure 5.11 monitors the three phase voltage for the
Busbar of interest. The user can choose the Busbar number and assign the QoS profile
for the measurement data.

Figure 5.11: Busbar Block
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D. Transmission Line
The transmission line block depicted in Figure 5.12 is used to monitor the
transmission line current. The block has one input port for subscriber connection and
three output ports for three phase current output. The user can choose the transmission
line and QoS profile from Block parameter.

Figure 5.12: Transmission Line Block
E. Microgrid
An inverter based hybrid microgrid can be controlled from the simulation
environment using the developed toolbox. The hybrid microgrid showed in Figure 5.13
consists of PV emulator and wind turbine emulator connected to a common DC bus. The
energy is transferred from the DC side to AC side or vice versa through a bidirectional
power electronics converter. The microgrid can work in two different modes, gridconnected, and islanding mode. In grid-connected mode, the converter is controlled to
regulate the current injected to the utility. The microgrid controller receives a reference
for active and reactive power and regulates the current to inject the required energy
amount to the main grid. In islanding mode, the microgrid controller regulates the output
voltage of the power electronics converter to maintain constant AC voltage at the load
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terminal. The microgrid is represented in the Toolbox by the control block shown in
Figure 5.14. The control block has several inputs to control the microgrid’s operation
mode, voltage, power and reactive power references. Furthermore, it reads all the AC
and DC voltage and current measurements from the hardware. The microgrid control
algorithm is running by the real-time embedded controller dSPACE DS11013. The data
are exchanged between the host computer and the controller using the developed serial
interface board.

Common DC bus

AC/DC converter
DC
AC
Wind Turbine
Emulator

Three phase inverter
DC/DC converter

3 phase AC
AC

DC

DC

DC
PV emulator
DC/DC converter
DC
DC
Energy storage

Local Controller
dSpace 1103

Figure 5.13: Hybrid Microgrid Block Diagram
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Figure 5.14: Microgrid Control Block
F. Smart Meter
The smart meter block is shown in Figure 5.15. This block receives the total
accumulated active and reactive power consumption from the physical smart meter over
the last hour, as well as power consumption every minute. In addition, it receives the
RMS values for voltages and currents.

Vabc
Iabc
Acc P
Sub

Acc Q
P/min
P/hour

Figure 5.15: Smart Meter Block
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G. Energy Storage
The physical energy storage is controlled through the block shown in Figure 5.16. This
block receives the voltage and current measurements and the calculated State of Charge
(SoC) from the energy storage controller. In addition, it sends a current reference to
control the charging and discharging of the energy storage array. Some types of energy
storage, such as lithium-ion, are temperature sensitive. Thus, this block is flexible for
additions, as other parameters can be added depending on the energy storage type.

Figure 5.16: Energy Storage Control Block
H. Database Service
A real-time subscriber service can be configured to monitor the data from the GDS
and store it in a database server for later analysis, as well as publish stored data from the
database server. This data can represent a real load, solar irradiance, or a wind speed
pattern. The publisher-subscriber configuration defines the data rate, object, topic name,
and data tables. The integration with the database server simplifies the data logging
during experiments and utilizes historically collected data for testing new algorithms.

106

Each block in the toolbox allows defining a QoS profile individually for each topic. The
settings for QoS profiles are defined in an XML file. Preset QoS profiles were created to
provide the necessary QoS settings for each type of data. The QoS profile for CB signals
is configured to provide the minimum possible latency with a durability option set to
store and deliver the data to a late or newly created subscriber. This setting ensures the
delivery of a CB control signal and correct initializations when joining the network, even
if the subscriber created it after transmitting the control command. For measurement
signals, each sample is time-stamped two times. The first time is stamped by the sender at
the transmission instant and then stamped at the receiver at the receiving instant. To
ensure synchronization and a correct order of samples, the QoS profile for measurement
signals were set to deliver the data ordered by the sender timestamp.
The implementation of the HIL is depicted in Figure 5.17. It can be seen that the
control algorithm is simulated in the Matlab/Simulink environment. The control
command is transmitted to the real hardware using the developed interface toolbox over
the network using the DDS middleware and specified QoS. Real-time feedback from the
physical measurement points is transmitted back to the Simulink model. The generator
block in the HIL model replaces the regular Simulink simulation model for a
synchronous machine with the actual machine. This capability makes it possible to
consider the real behavior and dynamics of the physical system in control design. In
addition, the HIL model represents the system as an integrated CPS by taking into
account the effect of the communication network behavior. The impact of different
communication topologies and QoS profiles on the performance of the system can be
investigated.
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Figure 5.17: HIL implementation using DDS and the developed interface library
To simplify the initialization and startup of the testbed, an automated startup and
initialization procedure was developed using a state machine. These startup and
automation controllers abstract the procedure of initializing the testbed physical
components by performing all the necessary steps to run the testbed. The startup
controllers set up the system frequency, startup and synchronize the generators, configure
the network topology, and connect the different loads. The shutdown procedure ensures a
correct shutdown sequence to prevent component damage. The user can utilize this
controller as it is or use it as a base template to build his own controller. The hierarchy of
the automatic controller is shown in Figure 5.18, where it can be seen that the control is
divided into two levels. The low level consists mainly of three state machine controllers.
The state machine for the first controller is shown in Figure 5.19, which is responsible for
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starting up and shutting down the slack generator. In the startup state, the controller sets
the speed of the generator at the required value depending on the required operating
frequency. Then, it changes the status of the generator to the “on” state. When the output
voltage and frequency reach the nominal values, the controller generates a ready signal to
indicate that the slack generator is ready. While the slack generator is in a shutdown state,
the controller sends a turn-off signal to the generator and resets the generator ready signal
to zero. Figure 5.20 shows a connection example of the slack generator and state machine
controller.

Figure 5.18: The hierarchy of the developed automatic controller for the smart grid
testbed

Figure 5.19: Slack generator control
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Figure 5.20: Slack generator control connection
The state machine for the second controller shown in Figure 5.22 is responsible for
the startup/shutting down of the power controlled generators in the system. In the startup
state, the first step is to send a start signal to the generator, then start the synchronization
process shown in Figure 5.21. After the synchronization process has completed, the
controller closes the generator CB to connect the generator to the testbed. After that, it
generates a ready signal to indicate the successful completeness of the starting-up
process. In the shutting down state, the controller opens the generator CB and sends a
shutdown signal to the generator. Figure 5.23 shows a connection example of the PQ
generator and a state machine controller.

Figure 5.21: Synchronization Controller
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Figure 5.22: Power controlled generator control

Figure 5.23: PQ generator controller connection.
The high-level controller is responsible for coordinating the operation of the lowlevel generator startup controllers and configuring the testbed network topology by
connecting necessary transmission lines, busbars, and loads. As shown in Figure 5.24, the
main controller consists of two main states: namely, startup and shutdown. In the startup
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state, the controller calls the generator startup algorithms in the required order and
monitors the generator status. Then, it connects the CBs to configure the testbed topology
and connect the loads. Once all the generators are running and the topology configuration
is done, it generates a ready signal for the entire testbed. This signal can be used to enable
starting up a certain experimentation procedure. In the shutdown state, the controller
shuts down the generators in the correct order by shutting down the power controlled
generators one-by-one while disconnecting any connected loads to avoid overloading the
remaining generators. Finally, after shutting down all the power controlled generators, the
slack generator is disconnected and all circuit statuses are reset to an open state.

Figure 5.24: Main automation and startup controller
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5.3

Protocol Emulation
A software layer running in a virtual environment or an embedded host is used to

emulate standard communications protocols utilized in power system operation. The
emulation layer allows interaction between the simulation environment and commercial
IEDs, such as protection relays and PMUs. The interaction between simulation and actual
IEDs is necessary for testing new algorithms and the performance of actual devices with
different firmware versions in a safe environment. The emulation layer consists of a
number of virtual IEDs that communicate with real IEDs with emulated protocols and
maps all data to the DDS global data space. Figure 5.25 show the block diagram for
emulating IEC 61850. The emulation process is done through three layers, the first layer
is the real IEC 61850 devices connected to an Ethernet-based network.

Figure 5.25: Block Diagram for IEC 61850
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The second layer is the virtual IEC61850 devices running in a virtual environment
and connected to the same Ethernet network. Virtual IEDs represent a bridge between
the IEC61850 network and DDS global data space by receiving different types of
messages and mapping them to DDS data topics and vice versa. The third layer is the
DDS backbone in which all data topics are shared with the simulation environment and
system monitoring.
To create a virtual IED, the data model for the device should be defined, then
emulation code for the IEC 61850 and DDS publisher/subscriber functions is generated,
as shown in Figure 5.26.

Figure 5.26: IEC 61850 and DDS publisher/subscriber functions
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The data model can be generated from IED Capability Description (ICD) file. The
ICD file is supplied by the manufacturer or can be generated using the automatic
discovery feature. Once the device data model is obtained, it can be mapped to DDS data
topics and generate a pub/sub C code. Pub/sub code is generated using automatic code
generation supported by the RTI DDS library. The IEC61850 emulation code is created
based on the libiec61850 open source library. Libiec61850 provides open source
implementation for different types of IEC-61850 messages, such as MMS, Generic
GOOSE and Sampled Measured Values (SMV). The API of libIEC61850 gives the user
full control to modify message data field while preventing modification of other fields,
such as timestamp, Sequence number, and status number. In regular cases, the user
doesn’t need to modify those fields. The timestamp and sequence number fields are
automatically generated by the Library based on current system time and previous
message sequence number. For testing vulnerability analysis, the user needs to have full
access to modify and override any message field value. The library is modified to allow
this type of modification. The modified library will be utilized for protocol vulnerability
analysis and implementation of a security solution for GOOSE message in the next
chapters.
After generating IEC61850 emulation code and DDS pub/sub code, both codes are
merged and compiled to an executable application. The final virtual IED code is
compiled using the GNU C compiler and is run under a LINUX OS.
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5.4

Remote connection and Micro Grid Intercommunication
The developed testbed toolbox can be used to access the testbed resources and

perform experiment remotely. A remote user can test a new algorithm, collect data and
exchange information between different systems located at the testbed and remote
location. Figure 5.27 shows the complete configuration for the testbed with remote
connection capability. To connect to the testbed, a VPN connection is established over a
WAN or the internet. Once the connection is established, the remote user can use the
developed toolbox to interact with the testbed resources through the DDS global data
space.
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Figure 5.27: complete configuration for the testbed with remote connection capability
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To control the data flow between testbed and remote sites and ensure system security,
four different domains are created, as shown in
Figure 5.28. The data exchange between the different domains is controlled by a
routing service, data filtering, and the Resource Management and Protection (RMP)
module.

Figure 5.28: Testbed remote access domains
Domain (0) is the GDS domain for the testbed. All the data and control commands
generated by testbed equipment are available in this domain. External data from the other
domain can be passed to Domain (0) only through the RMP module. The RMP module
performs two functions. First, it ensures the remote user only has access to allowed
resources. The testbed operator can select which resources are allowed to be accessed
remotely. Second, the RMP checks all incoming signals against predefined physical rules
to prevent system damage due to a wrong control signal from the remote user. For
example, if the testbed operator allows a remote user to control certain generators,
connecting non-synchronized generators by mistake to an energized bus could damage
the generators. To prevent this damage the RMP will not pass the control signal to close
the generator circuit breaker unless the synchronization status is true. In order to perform
RMP functions, an intermediate domain is created, Domain (1), as shown in Figure 5.29.
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All data coming from the routing service is published first to the intermediate domain.
The intermediate domain is a memory shared domain used to exchange information
between the routing service and the RMP located on the same machine. Only applications
physically located on the same machine can access the memory shared domain. RMP
checks all received data against permission and-and physical rules. When the permission
and physical rules are matched, the RMP enables the publisher and subscriber to the
testbed domain (Domain 0).

Figure 5.29 Routing service intermediate domain
The routing service is used to route the DDS TCP and UDP communication between
two different domains over WAN using only TCP communication. Only data with a
remote subscriber are routed over the WAN connection. The routing service allows
applying data filtering for data transmitted over WAN. A remote user may be interested
in the certain type of data when it matches a certain condition. An example is a protection
system interested in current measurements when the current magnitude is greater than
certain limits. If the data filter is applied, the current subscriber will not receive any data
until the current magnitude reaches the defined threshold. The remote site routing service
exchanges the data between WAN domain, Domain (2), and remote site domain, Domain
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(3). Unicast and multicast communication can be used in Domain (0), Domain (1), and
Domain (3). Domain (2) is a unicast domain only. The remote VPN connection is
protected by a password. Transport Layer Security (TLS) can also be used to encrypt the
data over WAN. The firewall allows only TCP communication over specified ports used
by the routing service. All other ports are blocked.
5.5

Experimental Results
The functionality of the developed communication infrastructure, controllers, and the

remote interface toolbox was verified experimentally on the smart grid testbed. For the
testbed layout, please refer to Figure 2.5. In order to show the capabilities of the
developed framework, three experiments were carried out with different operation
scenarios and scales. The first case shows the synchronization process for multiple
generators in detail. The second case depicts the load sharing amongst four generators,
while the third one shows how the developed framework is used for topology
reconfiguration.
5.5.1

Case 1: Generator Synchronization

In this experiment, the capability of implementing a closed-loop high-speed controller
using the proposed framework is shown. The synchronization process requires a high
sampling rate for frequency and phase angle estimation and low latency feedback. The
sequence of automatic system operation starts by starting generator 1 (slack), as shown in
Figure 5.24. During this step, a starting signal is sent to the prime mover along with the
frequency reference value. The generators’ prime movers are controlled using the RS-485
protocol. The protocol translator, shown in Figure 2.8, is used to provide interoperability
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between the DDS network and serial protocols. When the slack generator frequency
reaches 60 Hz, the automation controller connects transmission lines TL 1-2 and TL 1-8
and then connects load 1. In this scenario, load 1 is set at 600 W. Then, generator 2 is
started and synchronized to the slack generator.
The results of the carried out experiments are depicted in Figure 5.30 and
Figure 5.31. Figure 5.30a shows the generator 1 frequency at time 4 s when the
startup signal is sent to generator 1. The frequency ramps up until a frequency of 60 Hz is
reached. The frequency measured before the generator startup is noise because of the lack
of a generator output voltage. At time 9 s, generator 1 is connected and the voltage is
stabilized around 115 V, as shown in Figure 5.30d. The load is connected at time 16s, as
shown in Figure 5.30e. Figure 5.30b shows the generator 2 startup at time 34 s. It is
worth mentioning that the generator 2 frequency was shown as 60 Hz even before the
generator startup due to leakage across the solid state switches. This leads to reading a
frequency of generator 1 when generator 2 is not connected. Figure 5.30c shows the
phase angle difference between generator 1 and 2 voltages. Frequency fluctuations can be
seen before the synchronization, but these fluctuations go to zero as soon as the process
completes.
Figure 5.31 shows a zoom in on time frame 130–250 s to further illustrate the
synchronization process. It is clear that the framework successfully performs an accurate
synchronization and frequency stabilization in real-time. Figure 5.30e shows that the
slack generator fed all the load while, after synchronization, the load is shared between
the two generators.
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Figure 5.30: Experimental results, voltage, frequency and synchronization switch
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Figure 5.31: Synchronization Process
5.5.2

Case 2: Load Sharing

This case shows the scalability of the developed framework, since four generators, six
transmission lines, and two loads are involved. The main focus of this case is to configure
the required network topology and control power flow to share the load amongst different
sources automatically. The experiment starts by starting generator 1 and connecting it to
the load bus through TL 1-8 and to the generator 2 bus through TL 1-2. After that,
generator 2 is started and synchronized to the slack generator. Generator 2 is then
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connected to the network through transmission lines (TL 2-5). Similarly, generators 3 and
4 are started and synchronized. Then, TL 5-6 and TL 1-6 are connected. The entire
startup process is handled by the developed startup and automation controller. During the
experiment, loads 2 and 4 were disconnected. Generators 2 and 3 were working in the
power control mode with a reference power of 300W. Generator 4 was synchronized and
running under no load to represent a spinning reserve. Load 3 was fixed to a value of 300
W while load 1 was varying to emulate a certain load pattern. The control command to
the loads was sent over a wireless link. The maximum output power of generator 1 was
set to 700 W.
The results of the carried-out test are shown in Figure 18, where the total demand
(load 1 + load 3) is shown in Figure 5.32a. The output of the four generators (1–4) is
shown in Figure 5.32b–e, respectively. When the total demand changes from 900 W to
1200 W at time equal 65 s, the slack generator output changes from 300 W to 600 W,
while the rest of the load is supplied by generators 2 and 3. At time 115 s, the load
increased to 1500 W and consequently, the slack generator output is increased to 900 W,
which exceeds the preset maximum limit. The controller commands generator 4 to inject
power to reduce the slack generator power below the limit. At time 215 s, the load
demand decreased to 900 W. In this case, due to low demand, generator 4 returns to
reserve mode. An intentional outage of generator 3 is created at time 293 s, where the
slack generator output is increased to compensate for the lost generation power.
However, the slack generator output is still below the critical limit, hence the controller
did not initiate a power injection from generator 4. For this scenario, it can be seen that
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the developed framework was able to efficiently exchange data from multiple sources and

w

controllers in real-time to maintain a power balance between load and generation.
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Figure 5.32: Case 2, load sharing. Power of (a) load; (b) generator 1; (c) generator 2;
(d) generator 3; and (e) generator 4
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5.5.3

Case 3: Topology Reconfiguration

This experiment shows the capability of dynamic reconfiguration of the physical
network topology. For this purpose, the radial power transmission network consists of
generators 1 and 2, transmission lines TL 1-2, TL 2-5, TL 4-5, TL 5-6, and TL 6-7 and
loads 3 and 4 (refer to Figure 1 for the network topology). During high demand, the
network topology will be reconfigured to a ring by connecting TL 1-6 to improve the
voltage profile. During this experiment, load 3 is used as a constant load of 300 W, while
load 4 is emulating a variable load pattern from 500 W to 1700 W with a minimum
allowed voltage of 114 V, as shown in Figure 5.33b. Generator 3 is set to inject 300 W
during the operation.
After starting and synchronizing generators 1 and 2, the transmission network is
configured to feed loads 3 and 4, as described above. A variable load pattern is applied by
controlling load 4 while monitoring the load voltage. When the load reaches 1700 W at
time 92 s, the load voltage drops to 113 V. Violating the allowed voltage limit triggers a
topology reconfiguration from radial to ring by connecting transmission line TL 1-6 at
time 104 s. This reconfiguration improves the load voltage profile from 113 V to 115 V,
as shown in Figure 5.33c.
The control software for all experiments was completely modeled using
Matlab/Simulink. The developed interface toolbox established the communication
between the Matlab model and the real hardware components by utilizing the DDS
middleware. The entire model is converted to C code and run in real-time. During the
operation, the model received measured data at a message rate of 100 Msg/s. The

125

2000

W

1500

G1
G2

1000
500
0
0

50

100

150

200

150

200

(a)
2000

W

1500
1000
500
0
0

50

100

(b)
120

V

115
110
Topology
reconfiguration

105
100
0

50

100

150

200

(c)
Time (Sec)

Figure 5.33: Case 3, topology reconfiguration. (a) Output power of generators 1 and
2; (b) load 4 power; and (c) load 4 voltage
experimental results proved the efficiency and reliability of the developed control and
communication infrastructure for managing and collecting real-time data from the smart
grid testbed. The integration between the modeling and analysis software, and the smart
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grid testbed hardware components provides a hybrid hardware-software environment for
prototyping and testing developed control and real hardware devices. Fully-automated
operation without human intervention was reached using the developed infrastructure. It
is worth mentioning that the system is scalable. i.e., it can be expanded to larger systems
with a higher number of units and distributed control models run on distributed network
resources. Furthermore, the implemented testbed infrastructure allows remote users to
connect and perform experiments.
5.6

Summary
In this chapter, the design and implementation of a scalable HIL infrastructure for a

smart grid testbed are presented. The developed infrastructure provides the capability of
integrating different types of systems and components inside the testbed and connecting
several testbeds to study the behavior of complex CPS. The proposed system is based on
the DDS standard to provide the low latency communication required for smart grid
applications. The used publisher-subscriber scheme provides reliable and flexible
communication while eliminating the bottlenecks and a single point of failure. The data
structure for the system signals and a Matlab toolbox were developed to allow integration
with modeling software, remote monitoring, and control through a computer network.
The performance of the developed infrastructure was tested and validated experimentally.
The security aspect is addressed by encrypting remote communication using TLS and
checks all remote command against physical rules before passing it to testbed devices.
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Chapter 6

GPS Based Synchronization Scheme for Distributed DC-DC
Converters for Micro Grid application

6.1

Introduction
The new trend in the future in the smart grid network is developing toward

Distributed Generations and microgrid. In the microgrid architecture, the energy
resources are located close to energy consumers and large units are substituted by smaller
ones [65],[66]. The integration of the distributed generation, energy Storage Systems, and
consumers’ loads through the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) is called a microgrid. A
microgrid can be configured into DC and AC microgrid based on the power electronics
interface circuits that will be used [67]. Recently, there has been a great interest in
utilizing the DC microgrids to integrate distributed resources such as solar panels and
energy storage. Since solar panels and energy storage such as batteries and fuel cells
generate DC current, DC microgrid provides a flexible and efficient way to integrate
these types of resources. Moreover, full converter variable speed wind turbine generation
systems usually have an intermediate DC link in the conversion system.
In the DC microgrids, a DC-DC boost converter is a key element to interface
distributed generation to the microgrid’s DC bus. Various DC-DC boost converters
topologies have been studied in [68]-[73]. DC microgrids, along with their DC-DC boost
converters, still faces numerous challenges such as ripple contents of the DC bus voltage
and current [74]. Indeed, voltage and current ripple are among the various phenomena
that contribute to a reduction in lifespan of power sources and energy storage devices
interfaced to the DC bus [75],[76].
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To overcome this problem, multi-phase interleaved boost converters are used to
reduce current and voltage ripple without increasing the switching frequency [77]. The
Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) signals of this converter should be generated based on
multiple carriers with the same frequency and a different phase shift to reduce the DCDC converter output voltage ripple. The interleaving technique can be applied to
multiphases in a single DC-DC converter or to multiple converters connected in parallel
to reduce the voltage ripple and increase efficiency.
The generation and synchronization of the PWM carriers for multiphase converters
are quite easy since all the PWM modulators are driven from the same controller and
hence the same oscillator. However, in distributed resources interfaced with DC-DC
converters, each converter has its own controller and hence its own oscillator, which
makes the PWM signals synchronization for multiple DC-DC converters a big challenge.
The challenge is related to the frequency drift of each DG’s oscillator due to
temperature and component tolerance. This drift will create a continuous change in the
phase shift angle between PWM carriers of each DC-DC converter [78],[79].
To ensure the most accurate synchronization, it should be taken into account clock
drift and oscillator’s start latency using hardware-assisted software over software only
synchronization. IEEE 1588 time synchronization protocol delivers sub-microsecond
synchronization accuracy with hardware assisted [80]. This method can provide very
accurate and stable clock signal for all DC-DC converters. However, it assumes that all
controllers are connected to a communication network and requires special hardware
assisted network switches. Hardware-assisted time synchronization adds extra costs to the
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control network, which could be inadequate for small systems. For large distributed
system, connecting all controllers to the synchronization network may be infeasible [81].
To solve this problem, a common time reference should be defined and used to adjust the
oscillators’ frequency. In this chapter, a GPS-based synchronization method is proposed
to generate a common time reference to synchronize distributed PWM modulators.
Although GPS synchronization has been widely used in the PMUs for synchronized
measurements in the AC networks, to the best of the author’s knowledge, it has never
been used to enhance power quality in DC networks. The proposed method does not need
special communication networks between distributed converters for the synchronization
process. This synchronization allows the operation of distributed DC-DC converters
modulators as interleaved converters system. The interleave operation reduces the ripple
and DC-link capacitor size. In addition, it improves the system electromagnetic
compatibility by reducing interferences from the ripple.
6.2

DCMG SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The schematic diagram of DC microgrid and control hierarchy is depicted in

Figure 6.1. The microgrid under consideration has three conventional DC-DC boost
converters connected in parallel to interface three different energy sources to the common
DC bus. One converter will be considered as the master converter and will work in
voltage control mode. The main role of this converter is to regulate the DC bus voltage.
The other two converters will work in current control mode. Each DC-DC power
converter should receive PWM signals from its corresponding local controllers in order to
control power flow.
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In this work, the local control of each converter should have two types of
algorithms. The first algorithm, voltage, and current control algorithm is responsible for
controlling the duty cycle of its converter based on the reference power values, which are
sent by the energy management system EMS. The EMS should deliver these values
taking into account certain criteria, such the energy cost. The detailed operation of the
EMS will be discussed in chapter 9.
The second algorithm is the synchronization and carrier generation algorithm. This
algorithm will generate a carrier synchronized with the GPS time reference. The phase
angle for the generated carrier will be controllable through adjusted offset input.

Figure 6.1: Distributed DC-DC converters connected to common DC bus
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6.3

DC Microgrid voltage and current control.
Three DC voltage control sources are chosen to emulate the distributed generation in

the DC microgrid. These sources are interfaced to the DC bus through a distributed DCDC boost converter as shown in Figure 6.1. The DC-DC converters parameters are
mentioned in Table 6-1. It is assumed that all converters will be controlled
simultaneously.
Table 6-1: DC-DC boost converters parameters
Parameters
Inductance
Inductor resistance
Capacitance (C)
Capacitor
DC Bus voltage
DC source 1
DC source 2
DC source 3
Load resistance
Switching

Value
750µ
20
312
0.575
50V
25V
22V
20V
4Ω
2 kHz

The local control of each converter is implemented to control the converter’s duty
ratio and its PWM carriers. To control the duty cycle of the master DC-DC converter, the
voltage and current controllers based on an advanced lead-lag controller (ALLC) are
employed during transient and steady-state conditions as shown in shown in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: ALLC voltage and current control scheme
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The current controller based on ALLC is employed for the current controlled
converters as shown in Figure 6.3[82][83].

Figure 6.3: ALLC current control scheme
The ALLC controllers are designed based on the Small Signal Model (SSM) using
frequency response techniques where

is the voltage compensator and

is the

current compensator that assures cancellation of the static error and high bandwidth. d is
the duty cycle ratio that will be compared with PWM carriers to generate the required
PWM signal.

,

are the current and voltage transfer functions of the

conventional DC/DC boost converters, which shown in equations (6.1) and (6.2).

(6.1)

(6.2)

The double pole frequency ω depends on the input voltage (

) and the nominal

output voltage ( ) as well as inductance ( ) and output capacitance ( ). It is also
important to note that ω depends on the load resistance (

), the internal resistance of

the inductor ( ) and the internal resistance of the capacitor (
equation (6.3)
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), which shown in

(6.3)

The system damped ratio for both transfer functions is given by equation (6.4).

(6.4)

Where

is the nominal duty ratio,

is the number of phases, and

is the number of

parallel switches per each phase which their values are equal to one for the conventional
boost converters shown in Figure 6.2.
6.4

Synchronization and carrier generation algorithm
The GPS is a navigation system that consists of 24 satellite positioned in six orbital

planes [84]. Each satellite has an onboard atomic clock that provides a precise time
reference. The GPS satellites broadcast a microwave signal that received by the GPS
receiver on the earth surface. The GPS receiver processes the signal from three or more
satellites and computes the position and current time with high accuracy. The receiver
output the calculated time in the form of a serial stream or one pulse per second (1PPS).
The one pulse per second output is derived from the satellite atomic clock and has the
accuracy to few tens of nanoseconds. A synchronized signal with higher frequency for
carrier generation can be generated from the 1 Hz GPS clock reference using frequency
multiplier. The standard frequency multiplier consists of phase locked loop PLL and a
frequency divider in the loop as shown in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Frequency multiplier using PLL
The 1 Hz frequency reference is compared with the voltage controlled oscillator
(VCO) frequency output after dividing by the N counter using phase detector. The phase
detector output is filtered and then used to control the VCO output frequency. The phase
detector filtered output will accelerate or decelerate the VCO based on the phase between
the reference signal and the counter output. When the counter output has the same
frequency and looked with the reference signal, the phase detector output will hold the
voltage that produces this frequency. The phase angle between the output signal and the
reference signal can range from 0 to 90 degree based on the phase detector type.
Generating high-frequency clock from very low-frequency reference (1 Hz in the case of
GPS reference) requires high division factor in the loop. For example, generating 100,000
KHz requires 1/100,000 divider in the loop. The high dividing factor introduces a long
delay, which makes it difficult to stabilize the PLL frequency output.
A digital PLL (DPLL) is used to multiply the 1 Hz frequency reference and overcome
the stabilization problem. The proposed DPLL is shown in Figure 6.5.
A positive-edge-triggered phase comparator is used to compare the 1PPS signal with
the signal generated from the VCO divided by the digital counter. The phase comparator
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output pulse width represents the phase between the GPS reference signal and the VCO
output frequency. The pulse width is converted to a stream of high-frequency pulses by
gating a high-speed oscillator output with AND gate. This pulses stream is converted to
digital counts by a digital counter. An edge detector generates a pulse that latches the
digital count in a data latches each cycle. The latch output is converted to analog voltage
and connected to the VCO frequency control input. The analog voltage level will change
depending on the phase angle between VCO and GPS reference signal. The VCO is
designed to generate the required output frequency at voltage level equivalent to 180degree phase angle. Since the counter output is inverted, the signal output will be in
phase with the GPS reference. A fail-safe logic constantly monitors the counter output to
determine the lock status of the PLL. If the PLL fails to lock with due to the absence of
the reference signal, the fail-safe logic switches the VCO control to a stable frequency
reference.

Figure 6.5: Digital phase locked loop DPLL
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To test the performance of the proposed frequency multiplier based on the DPLL, a
simulation model is built using Matlab/SIMULINK simulation software. The block
diagram for the simulation model is shown in Figure 6.6.

Figure 6.6: DPLL SIMULINK Simulation Block Diagram
The performance of the proposed DPLL is depicted in Figure 6.7. At the beginning of
the simulation, the frequency divider output frequency was lower than GPS reference and
has a large phase difference, as shown in Figure 6.7-b. Due to the existence of the large
phase shift, the VCO voltage increases and leads to the higher output frequency, as
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shown in Figure 6.7-c. As a result of increasing the VCO frequency, the phase shift starts
to decrease between generated signal and the GPS reference signal. After 5 cycles, the
generated signal is locked with the GPS reference signal and has the same frequency and
phase angle, as shown in Figure 6.7- a and Figure 6.7-b. Figure 6.7-c shows the 100Khz
frequency generated by the VCO. This high-frequency output will be used as a
synchronized clock for the carrier generation module.

GPS time ref

1.5
1
0.5
0
0

1

2

3
(a)

4

5

6

0

1

2

3
(b)

4

5

6

0

1

2

3
(c)

4

5

6

0

1

2

3
(d)
Time (s)

4

5

6

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5

VCO control (V)

Counter Output)

-0.5

1

0.5

0

VCO output

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5

Figure 6.7: Propose DPLL simulation performance
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6.5

PWM carrier generation
In this stage, a synchronized saw-tooth carrier will be generated. The carrier

generation module will receive three inputs, carrier clock, 1PPS from the GPS and
adjustable offset. A digital counter will be incremented at the positive edge of the
carrier clock. When the counter reaches the peak value, reset logic will reset the counter
to zero to generate the saw-tooth signal. To ensure the saw-tooth signal is synchronized
with the edge of the 1PPS GPS reference, the counter’s initial value will be set at the
positive edge of the 1PPS signal. The generated saw-tooth signal phase is adjusted
through the offset input. Each time the user adjusts the phase angle the difference
between current offset and previous offset is calculated and added to the counter. To
maintain a fixed phase angle the offset value is loaded as an initial value at the positive
edge of the 1PPS signal. A simulation model is built using Matlab/SIMULINK to test
the carrier generation module.

Figure 6.8: Synchronized PWM carrier generation
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Figure 6.9: Phase adjustment simulation model
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Figure 6.10: carrier phase adjustment performance
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The simulation model for the carrier generation is shown in Figure 6.9. Two carrier
modules were simulated. The phase offset for the first module is set to zero to maintain
zero phase angles with respect to the GPS signal. The second carrier’s phase angle is
incremented from zero to 180 degree. The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.10.
The phase offset for carrier module 2 is shown in Figure 6.10-a. Figure 6.10-b shows the
phase angle for both carrier modules.

The simulation starts with zero phase angle

between the two carriers. At time equal to 0.005 sec, the phase offset increment gradually
from zero to 180 degree. As depicted from Figure 6.10-b, the second carrier phase angle
follows the phase offset input and shifted with respect to carrier 1. When the phase offset
is set back to zero, the two carriers are locked in phase. The phase offset between carriers
can be controlled manually or through automatic search algorithm to optimize the DC bus
voltage ripple. The automatic adjustment of the phase offset will be discussed in detail in
the next chapter.
6.6

Simulation results

A simulation model for three parallel converters connected to a common DC bus built
based on MATLAB/SIMULINK® to test and validate the robustness of the proposed
GPS-based synchronization methods. The converters connection topology and parameters
are shown in Figure 6.1 and Table 6-1. One of the converters controllers is designed to
operate in voltage control mode, while two controllers are designed as a current controller
as discussed earlier. The load current is shared equally between the three converters. To
evaluate the performance of the synchronization algorithm and its impact on the DC bus
voltage ripple, first, the simulation is started with zero phase offset between the three
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converters carriers. After a short period, the second converter’s carrier phase is adjusted
to 120 degrees with respect to the reference signal. Then, the third converter carrier phase
is adjusted to 240 degree. The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.11. At time equal
to 1 sec, the angle for the second converter carrier is set to 120 degrees, as result of
changing the phase angle, the DC bus ripple is reduced from 1.72 V RMS to 1.063 V
RMS. At time equal to 2 sec, the angle for the third converter carrier is set to 240
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Figure 6.11: Multiple converters synchronization performances (a) DC bus voltage, (b)
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6.7

Hardware verification and experimental result

In order to implement the GPS synchronized carrier generation for distributed DC-DC
converters in real-time, an experimental test bench has been designed. In this
implementation, a GPS time reference module based on Venus838LPx_T GPS receiver
shown in Figure 6.12 is used.
Error! Reference source not found. GPS timing Module
The Venus838LPx_T is a single chip GPS receiver that can generate 1 PPS reference
time signal with 6 ns accuracy. The GPS can generate a time reference with one satellite
in view. Moreover, the module has a built-in programmable PLL that produces variable
frequency output ranging from 1 to 10 MHz, in this setup, the PLL is programmed to
produce 100 KHz clock frequency. The output frequency is controlled using the control
panel shown in Error! Reference source not found.. The phase angle between the 1PPS
time reference and programmed PLL output is shown in Figure 6.14. As depicted from
the, figure the module produces a high-frequency clock locked with the GPS 1PPS.

Figure 6.12: the GPS software control panel
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Figure 6.13: 1PPS and high-frequency output signal
The PLL output and the 1PPS are connected to an ARM Cortex M4 Microcontroller.
The ARM microcontroller is used to implement the functions of the carrier generation
and PWM. This control layer performs fast computation for the proposed algorithms and
hard-real-time input/output function to control the DC-DC converters semiconductor
switches. The high-speed PLL output is connected to the microcontroller interrupt input.
The interrupt subroutine is executed 100K times/ s. Each interrupt call, the subroutine
reads the offset angle, samples the 1PPS input and increments the counter to generate the
saw-tooth carrier. Each saw-tooth cycle, the Microcontroller compares the carrier with
the reference received from the dSpace 1004 to generate the PWM output. The
STM32f407vgt6 32 Bit ARM cortex M4 processor running at 160MHz was used for the
embedded implementation of the proposed algorithm.
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Figure 6.14: Hardware setup for the GPS carrier synchronization
The embedded firmware is generated from Simulink model and compiled using GNU
C cross-compiler for ARM. The voltage and current control loops are implemented in a
dSpace 1104 embedded controller. The duty cycle reference is transferred from the dSpace to the
ARM processor as an analog reference.

The power circuit consists of three converters connected to 4 Ohm load and 40 V
common DC bus. The controllers for the three converters are adjusted to equally share
the load current.
Figure 6.15 shows the DC bus voltage ripple before and after carrier phase angle
adjustment, respectively. At time equal to zero, all carriers were synchronized with zero
phase angle and the ripple was at the maximum value. At time equal 3. 5 s, the second
converter carrier phase is adjusted to 120 phase angle with respect to the first converter.
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At time equal to 4.8 s, the third converter carrier phase is adjusted to 240 degrees. As
depicted from Figure 6.15, the phase adjustment reduces the ripple magnitude from 4 V to
1.6 V with adjusted carrier phase angle.
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Figure 6.15: DC bus voltage with adjustable carrier phase angles
6.8

Summary

In this chapter, a synchronization method based on the GPS common time reference
for PWM carriers of DC-DC is proposed. The GPS synchronization is well known in the
AC network; however, the proposed technique extends the application of GPS
synchronization to DC microgrid. The proposed method does not need special
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communication networks between distributed converters or hardware assisted network
switches such as IEEE 1548 precision time Protocol. The proposed synchronization and
carrier generation algorithm allows the operation of distributed DC-DC converters
modulators as one interleaved converter. The interleaved operation of the multiple
converters improves the power quality without increasing the size of passive element
filters or the switching frequency. The simulation results and experimental verification
show the success of the proposed synchronization method in minimizing the DC bus
voltage ripple.
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Chapter 7

Carrier Extraction Based Synchronization Scheme for Distributed
DC-DC converters

7.1

Introduction
GPS provide an excellent time reference for synchronization and phasor

measurement, however, GPS signal is prone to jamming, spoofing and blocking.
Sensitive systems should have a backup or alternative synchronization method to prevent
degradation of system performance. In this chapter, a new method for synchronizing
PWM modulators of distributed DC-DC converters is presented. The proposed
synchronization method utilizes the ripple on the DC bus as a common frequency
reference. In this scheme, one converter will be chosen to regulate the carrier frequency
of the DC bus. The other converters in the system will extract the carrier frequency
components from the DC ripple and synchronize their local oscillators with the master
carrier. To adjust the carrier phase angle for each converter to an optimum value, a new
Phase Shift Control Algorithm (PSCA) is developed. The PSCA is inspired from carrier
sense multiple access communication (CSMA) media access control protocol. The PSCA
is completely distributed and doesn’t require a communication channel between
converters
7.2

Carrier frequency and angle extraction
Power electronics converters use pulse width modulation PWM to control output

voltage or current. The modulated output voltage is composed of the average DC value
and voltage ripple. The AC voltage ripple consists of dominant frequency components
equal to the carrier frequency used by the PWM modulator and multiple harmonics.
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Figure 7.1 shows the harmonics contents of the DC-DC boost converter output voltage at
different carrier frequencies. As depicted from the figure, the dominant frequency content
is always equal to the carrier frequency, with 8% and 4% relative to DC magnitude at
switching frequency equal 2 KHz and 4 KHz, respectively. If one converter is selected to
operate as a DC bus master and regulate the carrier frequency, this frequency component
can be extracted and utilized as a common frequency reference for other converters
connected to the same DC bus.

(a)

(b)
Figure 7.1: Harmonics content of DC-DC boost converter output. (a) 2 KHz
switching frequency, (b) 4 KHz switching frequency
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To extract the carrier frequency from DC bus voltage ripple, each converter controller
will run the extraction algorithm shown in Figure 7.2. The algorithm uses a band pass
filter (BPF) to isolate the ripple component associated with the carrier frequency from the
measured DC voltage. The BPF will be tuned to pass only carrier frequency and reject all
other harmonics. This is necessary to reject any harmonics produced by nonlinear loads.
The filter output will have the same master converter switching frequency and fixed
phase angle with respect to the master carrier. The upper and lower bands of the BPF are
defined based on the allowed switching frequency range. The output of the BPF will be
considered as the DC bus’s carrier frequency reference (

).

For algorithm verifications, the DC bus voltage for boost converter with 2 KHz
switching frequency shown in Figure 7.3 (a) is fed into the BPF. The BPF isolated the
AC carrier component of the signal, as shown in Figure 7.3 (b). Next, the AC carrier was
fed into a PLL algorithm which, in its turn, accurately estimated the AC carrier’s
frequency, shown in Figure 7.3 (c), and phase angle, shown in Figure 7.3 (d). Then, a
peak detector estimates the magnitude of the DC voltage ripple, which is shown in
Figure 7.3 €. Finally, we notice a fixed phase angle difference between the AC carrier
and the master carrier shown in Figure 7.3 (f). This is because of the delay imposed by
the filter. This phase shift will not impact the final synchronization or optimization
process since it is fixed and the search algorithm will adjust the final phase angle.
For fail-safe operation, the PLL internal oscillator is designed to operate in the
allowed switching frequency band only; if slave converters lost the synchronization
signal, the PLL oscillator will continue to produce switching frequency within the
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allowed band. Since the carrier frequency has the highest magnitude of the DC bus
voltage ripple, a peak detector is used to detect the magnitude of the BPF output each
switching cycle. The output of the peak detector is averaged to suppress measurement
noise and used as an indicator for the DC bus’s ripple magnitude

.

Figure 7.2: DC bus carrier frequency and magnitude extraction algorithm block
diagram
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Figure 7.3: Phase locked loop and peak detector output. (a) DC bus voltage, (b)
bandpass filter output, (c) estimated frequency, (d) carrier phase angle, (e) master carrier
7.3

PWM carrier generation
In this step, each converter controller will run a local software oscillator. The

software oscillator will receive
local carrier (

and

_

Ɵ

from local PLL to generate its

) as shown in Figure 7.4. The carrier generator integrates the
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estimated frequency and generates a saw tooth with 2π peak value. The phase angle of the
saw tooth signal is adjusted to match the angle of the master carrier. This step is essential
synchronized to the DC bus’s carrier frequency. Then the saw

in order to keep

tooth signal is converted to a carrier signal with a triangle shape.
each local oscillator carrier
_

Ɵ.

_

Ɵ will

The phase angle of

have the same angel as the

An offset angle Ɵ can be added to control the desired phase shift. The

phase angle offset will be controlled by the search algorithm. As a result, all slave
converters PWM carriers will have a frequency value equal to
angle equal to

_

Ɵ.

Figure 7.4: PWM carrier generation block diagram
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Figure 7.5: synchronized carrier generation. (a) Master carrier, (b) master carrier
phase angle, (c) converter’s 2 carrier, (d) converter’s 3 carrier
Figure 7.5 shows the generated synchronized carriers. Master carrier and extracted
phase angle are shown in Figure 7.5 (a) and (b) generated synchronized carriers for two
different converters are shown in Figure 7.5(c) and (d). As depicted in Figure 7.5, the
proposed algorithm succeeds to generate synchronized carrier with fixed phase angle
with respect to the master carrier. The fixed phase shift can be compensated by adding
phase offset to cancel the filter delay.
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7.4

Phase angle control algorithm
Each converter will have a local controller that consists of carrier extraction and

synchronization module, PSCA module, pulse width modulator, voltage and current
controller, as shown in
Figure 7.6. Following the synchronization process, the PSCA will work to minimize
DC bus ripple magnitude by adjusting the phase offset for each converter carrier.

Figure 7.6: Multiple converters with carrier extraction and PSCA block diagram
The PSCA operation is inspired from CSMA MAC protocol. All converters
connected to the DC bus will use PSCA to control the local oscillator phase angle except
the master converter. The PSCA should increment the phase angle while monitoring the
ripple magnitude until reaching the optimal phase angle that produces a minimum ripple.
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Since multiple converters will be connected to the same DC bus and search for the
optimal angle, it is possible for two or more converter to change their phase angle at the
same time. Changing the angle for more than one carrier simultaneously could disturb the
PSCA.
To avoid disturbing the PSCA by changing the phase angle of multiple carriers
simultaneously, the PSCA utilize the same technique used by CSMA. CSMA detects
whether another transmission is in progress by detecting the presence of a carrier. If a
carrier is present, the transmitter waits for a random time before trying to initiate
transmission again. In the same manner, PSCA monitors the carrier magnitude before
initiating phase control algorithm. If a change in the carrier magnitude is detected, the
PSCA will set a flag to indicate detection of another converter and wait a random time
before trying to modify the phase angle, as shown in Figure 7.7. To avoid the impact of
noise and load change on the carrier magnitude, the PSCA will ignore magnitude changes
less than a predefined threshold. If there is no activity detected, PSCA will start searching
for the optimum angle using the perturb and observe technique. The PSCA will increment
the phase angle by a small step and observe the effect on the ripple magnitude if the
ripple is reduced the PSCA will continue incrementing the phase angle until the ripple
starts to increase again. Perturb and observation algorithm will oscillate around the
optimum phase angle. To stop oscillation, the PSCA monitors the oscillation in the phase
angle and terminates the perturb and observe algorithm when oscillation is detected. The
PSCA will allow the perturbation in one direction only to prevent oscillation in the
harmonic vectors. Here, the perturb and observe algorithm can be stuck in a local
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minimum phase angle and fails to reach the global optimum angle. Figure 7.8 shows all
possible combinations of phase angles for three converters. The first converter is a master
carrier and two synchronized converters. The phase angle of converter two and three
shown in Figure 7.8 (a) and (b), respectively, are incremented by a 30-degree step with a
different sample time to cover all the search space. The change in the ripple magnitude is
shown in Figure 7.8 (c).

Figure 7.7: Search algorithm state machine
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As depicted from Figure 7.8 to avoid stuck at the local minimum value, the initial
perturbation should greater than or equal
adjust the increment step to

then increment with small step. PSCA will

when the new flag is set and then change it to a regular

Ripple Magnitude (V)

θ 1(degree)

θ 2 (degree)

increment step.

Figure 7.8: Perturb and observation search space
7.5

Simulation results
A model for three parallel converters, synchronization algorithm, and PSCA is built

based on MATLAB/SIMULINK® to test and validate the robustness of the proposed
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methods. The converters connection topology and parameters are shown in Figure 6.1 and
Table 6-1in the previous chapter. All voltage and current controllers are identical to the
controllers used with the GPS synchronization algorithm.
Two cases were simulated to validate the proposed methods under different
operation conditions. The first case is for equal sharing load. In this case, 4 Ohm load
was fed equally from the three converters with DC bus regulated at 40V and load current
10 A. However, in the second case, the master converter supplies 50% of the load
demands while the two slave converters supply 25% of the load demands each.
7.5.1

Case one result

The simulation result for case 1 is shown in Figure 7.9. Figure 7.9-a, b, c, and d show
the DC bus voltage, the ripple magnitude, converter 2 phase offset, and converter 3 phase
offset, respectively. Initially, until around the first second, all converters start with a zero
phase angle for the carriers. At t = 1.1 sec, the PSCA for converter 2 starts to search for
the optimum phase angle and reaches 180 degrees. At this point, the PSCA detects a
phase oscillation and terminates the search. During this period, the PSCA for converter 3
is sensing an amplitude change in the voltage ripple and thus remains idle. After the DC
voltage ripple amplitude reaches its constant state, the PSCA for converter 3 starts to
search for the optimal phase angle at t = 2 seconds. The PSCA for converter three stops
its search when the perturb and observation algorithm reverses the perturbing direction to
prevent oscillation in the harmonic vector and reaches phase angle equal to 30 degrees.
Similarly, during the second period, the PSCA for converter 2 remains idle till the
magnitude of the DC voltage ripple stabilizes again. After a random time period, the
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PSCA for converter 2 repeats the same steps and stops at a 240 degrees phase shift,
whereas the PSCA for converter 3 stops at 120 degrees. During the entire process, the
PSCA are commanded to terminate the search algorithm when the DC voltage ripple falls
below 0.5 V. In this simulation, the DC voltage ripple reached a minimum of 0.47 V.
Figure 7.10-a, b, c, and d shows the phase angle between carriers during the search
periods.
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Figure 7.9: Case1 simulation results for Equal load sharing. (a) DC bus voltage ripple,
(b) Ripple Magnitude, (c) Phase offset1, (d) Phase offset 2
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(a)

(b)
Figure 7.11: harmonics analysis for case 1. (a) Harmonics magnitude before PSCA,
(b) Harmonics magnitude after PSCA
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Harmonic analyses were performed for the DC voltage before and after applying
the PSCA algorithm and the results are shown in Figure 7.11-a and b, respectively. As can
be appreciated from the figure, the ripple component with the same frequency as the
switching frequency (2000 Hz) was reduced significantly from 6.07% to 0.47%. The
ripple for the 4000 Hz and 6000 Hz decreased in their turn from 0.29% to 0.01% and
from 0.71% to 0.67%, respectively.
7.5.2

Case two: none equal Load sharing.

The simulation result for case 2 is shown in Figure 7.12. Figure 7.12 (a), (b), (c), and (d)
show the DC bus voltage, the ripple magnitude, converter 2 phase offset, and converter 3
phase offset, respectively. Initially, until around the first half second, all converters start
with a zero phase angle for the carriers. At t = 0.6 sec, the PSCA for converter 2 starts to
search for the optimum phase angle and reaches 180 degrees. At this point, the PSCA
detects a phase oscillation and terminates the search. During this period, the PSCA for
converter 3 is sensing an amplitude change in the voltage ripple and thus remains idle.
After the DC voltage ripple amplitude reaches its constant state, the PSCA for converter
3 starts to search for the optimal phase angle at t = 1.5 seconds. The PSCA for converter
2 stops at a 240 degrees phase shift. During the entire process, the PSCA are commanded
to terminate the search algorithm when the DC voltage ripple falls below 0.5 V. In this
simulation, the DC voltage ripple reached a minimum of 0.36 V. Figure 7.13 (a), (b), (c),
and (d) shows the phase angle between carriers during the search period. Harmonic
analyses were performed for the DC voltage before and after applying the PSCA
algorithm and the results are shown in Figure 7.14 (a) and (b), respectively.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 7.14: harmonic analysis for case 2. (a) Harmonics magnitude before PSCA,
(b) Harmonics magnitude after PSCA
As can be appreciated from the figure, the ripple component with the same
frequency as the switching frequency (2000 Hz) was reduced significantly from 6.33% to
0.36%. The ripple for the 4000 Hz and 6000 Hz decreased in their turn from 0.31% to
0.14% and from 0.73% to 0.14%, respectively.
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7.6

Hardware verification and experimental result

In order to implement the proposed algorithm in real-time, an experimental test bench,
shown in Figure 7.15, has been designed. In this implementation, the ARM Cortex M4
Microcontroller is used to implement the functions of the carrier extraction, PSCA, and
PWM. This control layer performs fast computation for the proposed algorithms and
hard-real-time input/output function to control the DC-DC converters’ semiconductor
switches. The DSP extension for the ARM Cortex M4 assists in the fast computation of
the control output. The built-in dedicated analog to digital converters with direct memory
access makes it possible to acquire analog feedback signals with a fast sampling rate
(100K sample /s). The STM32f407vgt6 32 Bit ARM cortex M4 processor running at
160MHz was used for the embedded implementation of the proposed algorithm.

Figure 7.15: Hardware setup for carrier extraction and PSCA verification
To reduce the processing overhead and reach the sampling time of 1e-5 second, the
PLL was replaced by frequency and phase estimator shown in Figure 7.16. The estimator
calculates the frequency from the measured period between two zero crossing instances.
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A digital integrator is used to calculate the phase angle from the frequency value. The
digital oscillator is synchronized with the positive zero crossing signal to ensure that the
calculated phase angle is synchronized with the carrier phase angle. The embedded
firmware is generated from the Simulink model and compiled using the GNU C crosscompiler for ARM.

Figure 7.16: Low processing overhead frequency and phase estimator
The voltage and current control loops are implemented in dSpace 1104 embedded
controller. The duty cycle reference is transferred from dSpace to the ARM processor as an
analog reference. The embedded code in the ARM processor compares received duty cycle with
the internal carrier and generates PWM digital output to drive the DC-DC boost converter. The
power circuits for the three converters have the same parameter and topology used in chapter 7
experiment. The three converters are connected to the 4 Ohm load and 40 V common DC bus.
The controllers for the three converters are adjusted to equally share the load current.

Figure 7.17 and Figure 7.18 show the DC bus voltage during PSCA search and finale
carrier phase angle, respectively. As depicted from figure 17, the proposed algorithm
reduces the ripple magnitude from 3 V to 0.75 V with optimized carrier phase angle.
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Figure 7.17: DC bus voltage with PSCA.

Figure 7.18: Three converter carriers after PSCA
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7

7.7

Summary

In this chapter, a new synchronization and PSCA for PWM carriers of DC-DC
converters based on carrier extraction is proposed. The advantage of this synchronization
method is that it does not require a GPS time reference. Therefore, it eliminates the risk
of GPS spoofing attacks. Simulation results on a multiple converter system showed the
success of the proposed synchronization method in minimizing the DC bus voltage ripple
to below 0.5 V. Finally, experimental results showed the excellent performance of the
proposed method.
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Chapter 8
8.1

Microgrid Inverter Based Synchronization and Islanding Detection

Introduction
The increased adoption of new energy sources and distributed generation (DG) is

contributing to the continuous evolution of grid interconnection requirements towards a
better control of generated power and enhanced contribution of distributed power
generation systems to the overall power system stability. There is a great requirement for
the ability of DG units to stay connected during short grid disturbances. In addition, this
is needed to provide active/reactive power control at the point of common coupling[85].
Most renewable DG systems are connected to the grid through power electronics
converters. The synchronization mechanism used to synchronize the power converter to
the AC grid play a vital role in the performance of such systems during faults and
transient conditions [85], [86]. The ability to stay connected under unbalanced or fault
conditions and the sensitivity to voltage sag, voltage dip and harmonics are dependent on
the synchronization mechanism[85].
The classical synchronization technique using zero crossing detection or charge pump
phase locked loop (CP-PLL) fails under distorted voltage conditions [85], Synchronous
Reference Frame phase locked loop (SFR-PLL) with low bandwidth shows good
performance under distorted voltage conditions but it has slow response during transient
and is sensitive to frequency fluctuation and unbalanced voltage [87].
For unbalanced condition, some PLL uses an all-pass filter (APF) to detect and isolate
the negative sequence [88]. Most PLL techniques fail to provide stable frequency after
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losing the grid frequency reference due to a grid disconnection. Maintaining stable
frequency after a grid disconnection is very important for microgrid to continue its
operation in islanding mode and feed the local AC loads. Implementation of islanding
detection is imperative for the microgrid. Failure to detect islanding condition could
cause safety hazards to the utility workers and equipment damage. Several techniques
were introduced to detect islanding condition using active, passive and remote detection
methods [89]. Passive islanding methods monitor voltage, the active and reactive power
to detect an islanding condition. Passive detection fails when local load and energy
produced by the microgrid are balanced. Active methods inject small signals, such as
high frequency or negative sequence components, into the line and detect signal
changes [89]. The active detection method provides a robust islanding detection solution
but it uses complex algorithms for current injection and detection of changes. The
Remote detection method solution relies on communication signals, such as power line
carriers PLC communication, remote disconnect signals, and SCADA systems in addition
to PMU- based islanding detection[90]. The remote detection method is prone to
communication failure problems. Losses of PLC carrier or communication with the
SCADA system could lead to false islanding detection and disconnection of the
microgrid.
In this chapter, an accurate synchronization technique based on adaptive SRF-PLL
(ASRF-PLL) under unbalanced and distorted voltage condition is introduced moreover
the proposed ASRF-PLL is able to detect islanding condition and switch to stable
frequency during standalone operation and automatic resynchronization with the grid
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when it became available. The islanding detection signal from ASRF-PLL can be used to
reconfigure the grid tie converter control to work in voltage control mode during
standalone operation or power control mode during grid connection. The proposed
ASRF-PLL is completely software based, which can be implemented in digital processors
which eliminate the errors caused by component drift in hardware based solutions. The
superior performance and unique features of the proposed PLL increase the Microgrid
stability and reliability. A reconfigurable controller for the grid-connected converter was
also introduced to work in conjunction with the PLL to ensure proper operation in
islanding mode.
8.2

Conventional SRF-PLL

The SRF-PLL concept is based on aligning the output frequency of the controlled
oscillator with the d axis in the dq frame by forcing the q component to be zero using a PI
controller. Refer to Figure 8.1, which shows the basic structure of the SRF-PLL.

Figure 8.1: Conventional SRF-PLL
The three-phase voltages V , V , V , are transferred to synchronous reference frame using
Park’s transform and estimated phase angle θ equation (8.1).
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Now, the PI controller forces the v component to become zero to align the PLL output
with the d axis. When the PLL output becomes in phase with the supply voltage, the PI
output will be equal to the angular frequency ω and θ can be obtained by integrating the
PI output. Assuming clean and balanced voltage, a DC component only will exist in the
dq axis; the PI controller will force this DC value to become Zero in the q axis. In the
case of the unbalanced voltage, an AC component with a frequency equal to twice the
supply frequency will exist in the dq axis. This AC component will cause oscillation in
the estimated frequency and phase angle. This error in estimating phase angle can lead to
injecting a harmonic current to the supply system and power oscillation. Harmonic
voltage also causes an AC component in the dq axis with orders equal (n-1), where n is
the harmonics order in the abc frame. Figure 8.2 shows the effects of unbalanced voltage
on the stability of SRF-PLL. Unbalanced voltage due to external fault could lead to large
oscillation in the SRF-PLL output frequency. The frequency oscillation could force the
protection system to disconnect the microgrid from the utility. Disconnecting microgrids
during faults will increase the stress on the utility due to losses of DG resources. The
impact of harmonic on the SRF frequency estimation is shown in Figure 8.3. The
presence of the fifth harmonic with 5% magnitude causes an oscillation in the SRF_PLL
frequency output.
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Figure 8.2: SRF-PLL Phase angle and estimated frequency under unbalanced voltage
condition. (a) Three phase voltage. (b) Phase angle. (c) Estimated frequency
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Figure 8.3: SRF-PLL Phase angle and estimated frequency under distorted voltage
condition. (a) Three phase voltage. (b) Phase angle. (c) Estimated frequency
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8.3

Adaptive SRF-PLL

To improve the performance of the conventional SRF-PLL, the AC component associated
with the harmonic and unbalanced condition must be rejected. To reject the AC
component in the dq synchronous frame, a traditional low-pass filter with cut-off
frequency < 2ω is used. A high order filter is also required to obtain high attenuation for
the AC components. This type of filter will lead to a poor transient response. The
proposed technique uses an adaptive moving average filter to reject the AC components
resulting from harmonics and unbalanced voltage without affecting the transient
performance of the PLL.

Figure 8.4: Moving average filter frequency response
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Moving average filter is a type of finite impulse response filter (FIR), which creates a
series of averages of sampled signals over a defined window. If the moving average filter
runs with a window size of 1/120 sec, it will be able to reject the signal with 120 Hz and
its integral [91]. Since the AC components in the dq frame are always even and always
integral of 120Hz in a 60Hz supply system and are also an integral of 100Hz in a 50Hz
supply system, then the moving average filter will be able to reject all ripples resulting
from harmonics and unbalanced voltage. Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 shows a frequency
response comparison between the moving average filter with average window equal
1/120 sec and second-order Butterworth low-pass filter with cutoff frequency 12Hz.

Figure 8.5: Butterworth low pass filter frequency response
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Both moving average filter with 1/120 sec window and Butterworth low-pass filter
with cutoff frequency of 12Hz have attenuation equal to 40dB at 120 Hz. The
Butterworth filter has a phase margin equal to -135 degree at 20Hz and -164 deg at 60
Hz. However, the moving average filter has -45 degree at 20Hz and -90 deg at 60Hz.
Also, the Butterworth low-pass attenuates all the frequency components with a frequency
greater than 120 Hz, which slow down the PLL response, while the moving average filter
attenuates only the component with a frequency equal to multiple of 120Hz.
In the weak grid that has multiple small generations with low inertia, the frequency
might deviate from the nominal value. In this case, the performance of PLL with moving
average filter tuned at fixed window will degrade due to change in the operating
frequency. If the moving average filter has an adaptive window size that changed
automatically according to the supply frequency, the filter will have the same attenuation
for the AC component at the new operating points. The PLL will then be able to follow
the frequency drift without any degraded performance. Figure 8.6 shows the SIMULINK
model for proposed PLL with adaptive window size. The window size will always be
equal to

∗

, where f is the estimated supply frequency to ensure the attenuation of all

AC component results from unbalanced and harmonics voltage
The performance of the ASRF-PLL is depicted in Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8. The proposed
method greatly improved frequency and phase estimation under distorted and unbalanced
voltage condition. The moving average filter damps the frequency oscillation and
improves phase detection accuracy.
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Figure 8.6 Proposed ASRF-PLL with an adaptive moving average filter simulation model
In Figure 8.7 an unbalanced voltage condition occurs at a time equal to 0.06 sec. The
ASRF-PLL output frequency slightly fluctuated and restored back to 60 Hz in less than a
quarter cycle. The estimated frequency is fixed at 60 Hz with no oscillation. The Same
performance is obtained with distorted voltage condition. In Figure 8.8, at time equal 0.06
sec, 5% fifth harmonic is injected to the phase voltage. The ASRF-PLL succeeds to reject
the harmonic frequency and produce stable frequency and phase angle references. It’s
worth to noting that the conventional SRF has 120 Hz overshoot during startup while the
proposed method has 85 Hz overshoot.
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Figure 8.7: ASRF-PLL Phase angle and estimated frequency under unbalanced
voltage condition. (a) Three phase voltage. (b) Phase angle. (c) Estimated frequency
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Figure 8.8: ASRF-PLL Phase angle and estimated frequency under distorted voltage
condition. (a) Three phase voltage. (b) Phase angle. (c) Estimated frequency

182

8.4

Islanding detection and standalone operation

Most PLL techniques fail to maintain the frequency stability after sudden grid
disconnection and introduce large frequency drift in the absence of the grid frequency
reference in the Microgrid applications. It is necessary to maintain the frequency stability
in islanding mode to prevent interruption of service and continue to feed the local loads
with available power from the local distributed generation. To achieve this goal, a small
error is introduced to the PLL center frequency. This error will be compensated by the PI
controller in the presence of the grid frequency reference. In absence of grid frequency
reference, the error will be accumulated and cause frequency drift in the PLL output. An
islanding detection algorithm is implemented inside the PLL to detect the frequency drift
in the PLL output after grid disconnection. The trip signal from the detection algorithm is
used to trigger three important functions in the microgrid control system. First, the trip
signal triggers the PLL to switch to internal frequency reference to maintain fixed and
stable frequency. The second function of the trip signal is triggering the grid converter
control to change the control mode from power control mode to voltage control mode.
The last function of the trip signal is to trip the circuit breaker between the microgrid and
the main grid. A reset signal from a voltage detector can be used to reset the PLL to
switch back from internal reference and resynchronize with the grid when the main grid
becomes available. Figure 8.9 shows the SIMULINK model for the proposed islanding
detection algorithm. If the frequency drift becomes greater than the defined threshold for
the defined time period the detection algorithm will trigger the trip signal. Figure 8.10
shows the proposed ASRF-PLL complete with adaptive moving average filter and
islanding detection.
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Figure 8.9: SIMULINK model for islanding detection algorithm.

Figure 8.10: SIMULINK model for proposed ASRF-PLL with islanding detection
algorithm and internal frequency reference
8.5

Microgrid control reconfiguration

Most distributed generation units in the microgrid are usually connected to the main
grid using power electronics converters. In normal mode, the converters’ controls are
working in power control mode to control the power flow between the microgrid and the
main grid. The voltage at the point of common coupling is regulated by the main grid. If
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the grid is disconnected and the converter continues to work in power control mode, the
voltage at the converter terminals will become unregulated. Feeding constant power after
grid disconnection could lead to over voltage in the case when injected power exceeds the
local load's demands. This situation can cause severe conditions to the Microgrid and
interrupt the microgrid service. To improve the microgrid reliability and maintain
continues service, the converter control must be automatically reconfigured for voltage
control mode when islanding is detected, to regulate the voltage and continue feeding the
local load. The reconfiguration process is triggered by the trip signal from islanding
detection algorithm. Figure 8.11 shows the block diagram for the proposed
reconfigurable converter control algorithm.

Figure 8.11: Reconfigurable converter control
The proposed controller consists of two sub-controllers. The first controller is power
controller, which is implemented in the dq frame to control the active power. The power
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reference is subtracted from the measured power and the error signal is fed to a PI
controller to generate the reference current I in the dq frame. The I is transferred to the
abc frame and fed to a hysteresis current controller to control the injected current to the
grid. The second controller consists of regular sample PWM controller to control the
voltage terminal. The trip signal from the islanding detection algorithm selects which
controller will be in service according to the main grid status. To evaluate the
performance of the proposed synchronization mechanism and converter controller a
simulation model for the microgrid consists of a fuel cell emulator, three phase inverter,
wind turbine emulator and local AC loads, as shown in Figure 8.12. The microgrid model
was tested under various grid conditions with proposed ASRF-PLL and reconfigurable
controller techniques and with the conventional SRF-PLL synchronization technique for
comparison.

Figure 8.12: Microgrid Block diagram
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8.6

Simulation results
The simulation results for the microgrid control with conventional SRF-PLL are

shown in Figure 8.13. It is clear that the SRF-PLL produce large frequency oscillation in
presence of voltage harmonics. This frequency oscillation increases significantly in the
presence of unbalanced voltage at time equal 0.15 second. Moreover, the SRF-PLL
completely fails to maintain constant frequency after the grid disconnection at time equal
0.2 seconds. Figure 8.14 shows the simulation results for the proposed ASRF-PLL
technique. The simulation results show that the proposed PLL has excellent performance
under distorted and unbalanced voltage; it also maintains a constant frequency and
accurate phase angle detection under various conditions. This leads to reduction of the
current total harmonics distortion from 7.04% with SRF-PLL to 3.22% with the proposed
ASRF-PLL. On the other hand, the islanding detection mechanism detects the grid
disconnection. The PLL automatically switched to an internal reference, maintaining
constant output frequency. The inverter controller successfully changed to voltage control
mode and regulates the output voltage.
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8.7

Experimental results

The proposed ASRF-PLL and reconfigurable inverter controller were implemented
using real-time digital controller dSPACE 1103. The experimental test bed shown in
Figure 8.15 consists of a 6 kW fuel cell emulator, wind turbine emulator, three phase
inverter and an AC grid consisting of four generators.
The experimental result for the SRF-PLL is shown in Figure 8.16. The SRF-PLL has
large phase error in presence of voltage distortion and the output frequency is oscillating
around 60Hz. Figure 8.17 shows the frequency response for the proposed ASRF-PLL.
The results show that the proposed ASRF-PLL performance is excellent under distorted
voltage conditions. The phase angle tracking is accurate and the estimated frequency is
stable. The islanding detection performance and control reconfiguration are depicted in
Figure 8.18. An islanding situation occurs at a time equal to 0.5 Sec. The islanding
detection algorithm detects the frequency drift and switches to internal frequency
reference. The trip signal initiates control reconfiguration from power control to voltage
control mode, which results in stable voltage and frequency.

Figure 8.15: Microgrid test bed.
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Figure 8.16: Conventional SRF-PLL experimental results. (a) phase voltage, (b)
Phase angle, (c) frequency
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Figure 8.17: Proposed ASRF-PLL experimental results
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8.8

Summary
In this chapter, an improved adaptive synchronous reference frame phase locked loop

ASRF-PLL with islanding detection is introduced. The proposed technique shows an
excellent performance under unbalanced and distorted voltage conditions. In the
islanding mode, the detection algorithm succeeds to detect grid disconnection and switch
to internal frequency reference. A reconfigurable inverter control is also proposed to
maintain stable operation in the grid connection and stand-alone operation modes. The
proposed method ensures islanding detection and stable operation of the microgrid when
remote islanding detection and SCADA system fails.

Both simulation and experimental

results prove that the proposed techniques improved the microgrid’s performance and
stability, and reduce the chance of microgrid service interruption.
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Chapter 9
9.1

Microgrid Energy Management System

Introduction
The smart grid is seen as a power system with real-time communication and control

capabilities between the consumer and the utility. This modern power system model
allows facilities to adopt new technologies and consumers to perceive new services.
Utilizing communication technologies, the smart grid topology allows optimization of
energy usage based on several factors including environmental, price preferences, and
system technical issues. Therefore, the smart grid will be integrated with a smart
infrastructure such as smart meters and intelligent controllable devices with advanced
two-way communication channels. The latter will facilitate the adoption of distributed
EMS [92],[93]. The concept behind energy management is to utilize this two-way
communication technology in order to achieve more resilient and sustainable power grids
by properly adjusting the power flow from and to the main grid based on present and
forecasted pricing, generations, and load information. This is to meet certain operational
objectives such as cost minimization [93],[94]. The EMS enables energy consumers to
change their consumption patterns by providing them with incentives in a strategy
referred to as real-time pricing where utilities vary the energy price in accordance to realtime generation cost [95]. Consumers’ bills are thus reduced while achieving flat demand
peaks [96].
There have been significant efforts in recent literature on EMS dealing with different
points of view and utilizing different modeling and implementation techniques. In the
energy trade decision-making processes, most developed EMS models rely on data from
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current and forecasted observations. One of the main contributions of this work is the
utilization of history, present, and forecasted future data to design an EMS with finetuned energy trade decisions. That is, the developed EMS controller makes its decision
based on current and forecasted observations, while its parameters are being adapted and
optimized by running exploration simulation scenarios based on highly correlated shortterm history data. The work presented in this chapter develops a complete EMS
framework for small microgrids or nanogrids, which is practical and scalable. The EMS
represents the application layer on the top of previously developed physical,
communication and control layers. The EMS application will collect information from
AMI, sensor network and control power electronics converters, energy storage and
distributed renewable energy source to optimize the energy usage and reduce the cost.
As the expertise and manpower present in large utility systems is not always available
for operating small microgrids, the communication requirements for EMS in small
microgrids are more stringent. Such EMS must be designed for ease of installation,
support, and maintenance. This requires a robust, resilient, and distributed
communication infrastructure with failover mechanisms. Therefore, the DDS
infrastructure is utilized as the communication backbone for all involved entities in the
developed EMS as shown in Figure 9.1. Some of the recent work in the literature
proposed the utilization of IEC 61850 as the communication framework for EMS for
interoperability purposes. However, such implementation utilizes MMS protocol for
high-level control applications, GOOSE protocol for event triggered signals, SMV
protocol for sensor measurements. The drawback of this is that MMS messages are based

196

on client-server communications making the EMS not fully distributed. The GOOSE and
SMV messages, on the other hand, are non-routable and have a lot of security issues
because they are unencrypted broadcast messages. More details on IEC 61850 security
will be discussed in chapter xx. It is noteworthy to mention that the DDS middleware is
expandable and provides a standard API, which allows its integration with different
systems. This allows mapping standard data models such as IEC 61850 into DDS.
The developed EMS was tested on load consumption data for residential areas and
solar energy patterns in Miami, Florida, USA for the year 2014 [97] applied on emulated
microgrids models on hybrid hardware/software simulation environment. The developed
control modules were built in SIMULINK simulation environment, converted into a C
code and were run in real time. To account for practical networking issues, software
modules were integrated with a DDS communication middleware to exchange the data
over a real Ethernet network [98]. Additionally, an appropriate QoS profile was set for
each application as will be explained later. The hybrid modeling environment allows
accurate emulation of the proposed EMS as an integrated cyber-physical system. Realtime pricing and time-of-use price schemes were adopted in different case studies for
months in winter and summer seasons. The results showed that the developed EMS was
successful in providing significant savings in the microgrids power consumption cost
and, in some cases, achieved profit.
9.2

Real-time communication infrastructure for microgrid control
Microgrid distributed control requires data exchange between different components

and applications for efficient energy management and economic operation.
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Figure 9.1: Proposed DDS Network and Microgrid Logical Control Hierarchy
For instance, during its decision-making process, an energy management control
system requires information exchange with smart meters, energy forecasting systems,
energy storage, and other entities to decide on an appropriate energy transaction. Also, a
demand side management application needs to exchange information pertaining load
priorities and price information to send appropriate control commands to smart loads.
Embedded controllers for power electronics converters, which manage the direction and
amount of power flow, need to receive real-time control commands and send feedback
signals to the control system as well. Moreover, the balancing between loads and
generation in small microgrids with variable renewable energy sources and/or low inertia
generators relies on fast communication and data exchange to maintain the overall system
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stability. Each of the aforementioned applications and components has different
communication requirements and require different security levels. The data and events
were exchanged among different EMS modules using the developed DDS network
utilizing peer-peer communication scheme. Figure 9.1 shows the proposed DDS network
structure and the logical relations between various publishers and subscribers. In this
chapter, the communication requirements for each type of application and component
was analyzed to determine the updating data rate and quality of service required for each
one. Redundancy paths and failover mechanisms to ensure operation continuity under
communication failure or cyber-attack incidents were also studied.
9.3

Intelligent microgrid control
The intelligent control of the microgrid relies on seamless integration between

multiple modules, such as load forecaster, energy management controller, renewable
energy controller, energy storage and AMI. These modules will be discussed in detail in
the following sections.
9.3.1

Energy management system

The system under study in this work is composed of an electric power utility and a
scalable set of N microgrids as shown in Figure 9.2. Each microgrid has its own
renewable energy generation resources, energy storage devices, and local loads. At all
times, it is assumed that the microgrids are operating in grid-connected mode via a
bidirectional grid-tied inverter. Two scenarios arise here: the first is when the microgrid
has excess energy and needs to sell power to the utility, and the second is when the
microgrid has deficient energy and needs to buy power from the utility. As can be seen in
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Figure 9.2, the migration between the two modes of operation is decided upon by the
control signal, Direction of Power Flow, coming into the grid-tied inverter. Moreover, not
only does the controller decide on the direction of the power flow, but also it decides on
the percentage of the power to be sold to or bought from the grid. That is, in the excess
energy case, and after covering the microgrid’s local load, the controller outputs a power
reference signal, which dictates what percentage of excess energy is to be stored in local
energy storage devices and what percentage is to be sold to the utility. Contrary to this, in
the energy deficiency case, the controller checks how much power is needed to cover the
local load and purchases that amount from the utility. The controller presented is based
on a set of fuzzy logic rules and takes its decision based on several input parameters
which will be detailed in the section 9.3.3.
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Figure 9.2: Overall System Topology
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N Microgrids

Utility Bus

9.3.2

Advanced Metering Infrastructure and Energy Pricing Mechanism

Advanced Metering Infrastructure allows bi-directional information exchange
between smart meters and utility control centers. Smart meters send consumption
information usually on an hourly basis and receive price information and control
commands from the smart meter head-end. The main target of an AMI implementation is
to allow demand side management and cost management [99]. To achieve this goal the
AMI standard allows exchanging information between smart meters and customer
devices and systems through the customer gateway. The smart meter sends small data
packets for basic power consumption information [99]. The transmission rate of the
formal could be defined per minute or per hour depending on the application need.
Usually, the sensitivity of smart meter information exchange to communication delays
inside a microgrid control network is relatively low; however smart meter data requires a
high level of availability. Some applications utilizing smart meter data such as load and
price forecasting depends on current and previous data to be persistent. Data persistence
can affect the performance of such applications, especially in the case of losing and
restoring communication. From a cyber-security point of view, smart meter data needs a
high level of confidentiality to ensure customer privacy and data authentication to prevent
replay and false data injection attacks. To secure the smart meter data on the GDS, DDS
persistence and encryption features can be used to protect the data confidentiality and
maintain last transmitted samples for newly joined devices.
Two pricing mechanisms were adopted in our case studies. The first is a real-time
pricing scheme, whereas the second is a time-of-use (TOU) pricing scheme. For real-time
pricing, the energy management system will receive hourly pricing via AMI.
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Figure 9.3: Real-Time Pricing Algorithm
The utility company will change the energy price based on forecasted load and
generation status. The utility controller takes generators statuses and total forecasted load
as inputs and outputs the current and next hour energy price (CP and NHP respectively).
The price of electricity is decided upon on hourly basis by a state flow control logic
shown in Figure 9.3 and is divided into two categories: Low (10 cents/Kwh) and High
(14 cents/Kwh). Here, a gateway is utilized to exchange pricing information between the
energy management system and the smart meters. This gateway receives the real-time
pricing from smart meters over a ZigBee wireless link and publishes it using
publisher/subscriber protocol. The published price is available on the Global Data Space
(GDS) for all interested applications such as the EMS and forecasting modules shown in
Figure 9.1. Since the price signal has a low update rate, a persistence QoS feature has
been enabled for it. This QoS ensures delivery of the last price to newly joined devices
without periodically retransmitting the data. To prevent fake data injection attack on the
price signal, which impacts the customer consumption cost, Price signal can be
authenticated with the digital signature algorithm. For the time-of-use pricing scheme, a
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predefined price schedule is set for on-peak and off-peak energy consumption hours. The
adopted profile is that set by Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) with two sets of
prices. One for on-peak hours with a positive rate of 9.154 c/Kwh and another for offpeak hours with a negative price rate of -4.072 c/Kwh [100]. For this pricing scheme, no
communication is required since the pricing profile is predefined for a long period of
time.
9.3.3

EMS Fuzzy Logic Controller

The microgrid controller is a fuzzy controller based on the Sugeno-like model. The
controller takes the batteries state-of-charge (SOC), current price (CP), next hour price
(NHP), available energy (AE) and forecasted local load demand (FLD) as inputs and
) as output as shown in equation (9.1).

produces the microgrid’s reference power (
,

,

,

,

(9.1)

By this method, the fuzzy logic controller decision is based on current and future
observations of the microgrid state. The decision of the fuzzy controller is based on a rule
surface composed of a set of 90 logic rules. Each of the five inputs (SOC, CP, NHP, AE,
and FLD) are passed through trapezoidal membership functions spanning the complete
range of their corresponding inputs. The firing strength of each rule is then evaluated and
a crisp value of the output is calculated using the weighted average defuzzification
method.
The controller output is used to control the direction and amount of power flow
through the grid-tied inverter. Therefore, the charge control signal for the energy storage
devices, CC, is defined in equation (9.2) as:
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(9.2)
This means that the battery will be charging either from the renewable energy sources
in the case of

0 indicating a reverse power

or from the utility when

flow from the AC side to the DC side on the grid-tied inverter. The SOC of the energy
storage devices depends on the total amount of energy transferred to the storage devices
minus the losses due to devices’ efficiency as in equations (9.3) and (9.4).
100
1
Where

(9.3)
∆ ɳ

(9.4)

is energy storage capacity, and ɳ is the

is the total energy stored is,

energy storage efficiency. The net power sold to or purchased from the utility is
expressed in equation (9.5) as:
(9.5)
Where a positive
negative

indicates purchasing energy from the utility, while a

indicates selling energy back to the utility. The energy transaction logic

is shown in Figure 9.4.
9.3.4

Forecasting

A feed forward neural network trained using the Levenberg – Marquardt back
propagation algorithm was used in order to forecast the hourly load demand and the
anticipated power generated from the renewable energy sources in the microgrid. In most
applications, neural networks are trained offline using bulk data sets to obtain a fixed set
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of weights and biases, which are used afterward over the entire forecasting horizon. This
strategy will be fine if applied to a simple problem or if the forecasting is done over a
small-time scale.
However, in the case of individual load demands for small microgrids, especially in
the era of information security, a large amount of customer data for training could put
customers’ privacy at risk if disclosed. For that, this work used an adaptive training
technique entailing online update of the neural network’s weights and biases over short
time periods. The neural network receives information about current load demand,
previous hour load, weekday, day number, time and the day type (Normal day or holiday)
and forecasts the next hour’s demand. In the adopted online training technique, the load
of each next hour is compared with its forecasted value and the error is back propagated
to fine tune the weights and biases as mentioned earlier. The load forecasting module
receives data from the GDS shown in Figure 9.1. Since the forecasting algorithm
depends on current and previous data samples, communication loss could impact the
forecasting performance drastically. The DDS QoS could minimize the impact of
communication loss on the forecasting algorithm by keeping N history samples. These
samples will be delivered instantly to the corresponding subscribers upon communication
restoration. Figure 9.5, shows the performance of the forecasting module upon losing
samples 12 and 13. In Error! Reference source not found. (a), a historical length (N =
2) is defined, whereas in Error! Reference source not found. (a) and (b) this QoS
feature was not activated. As can be appreciated from the figure, the forecasting module
was immediately able to catch up after the communication was restored, while in case of
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Error! Reference source not found.(b), it took the forecasting module 2 samples to
catch up.
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Figure 9.4: Energy Transactions Logic
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Figure 9.5: Performance of neural network (a) with persistence QoS (b) without
persistence QoS
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9.4

Real Time Online Optimization of Controller Parameters
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the energy management system is shifting peak

loads of individual microgrids from high energy price periods to lower energy price
periods. In order to ensure minimal expenditure and maximal profit for the microgrid, an
online parameter optimization scheme based on Particle swarm optimization (PSO) for
the fuzzy logic controller parameters was developed.
The optimization process proposed in this work is periodic with a period of 1 day.
That is, at the beginning of each day, the collected data are fed into the optimizer and the
optimization process is initiated to come up with new optimized controller parameters for
that day. Figure 9.6 shows the chronological order of the optimization process. It can be
seen that the optimization process requires some time to finish and this depends on the
adopted processor’s speed. In this study, the maximum optimization time recorded was
23 mins on an Intel core i7 processor (3.50 GHz). This time could be further reduced by
implementing parallel processing utilizing multiple processor cores simultaneously. It is
worth noting that the optimization process in this work falls into the category of
exploration simulation. That is, during the second day, while the system is up and
running, the optimization process is being executed in the background on a simulated
microgrid model to explore the performance of the new optimized parameters. Once the
process is finalized, the controller’s parameters are updated online without any
disturbance to the overall system operation. Consider the three-day period shown in
Figure 9.6. During the past 24 hrs, measurement units in the microgrid are continuously
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collecting data about available energy, local load demand, current price, next hour price,
and state-of-charge of the microgrid’s energy storage devices.

Optimization
Time

Moving 24 hr window

Day (N‐1)

Day (N+1)
Update controller
parameters

Day (N)

Figure 9.6: Optimization Process
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Figure 9.7: Constrained Search Space for Trapezoidal Membership Functions
All collected data for the past 24 hrs window are stored in a temporary database. At
the end of the first day, the optimization process initiates. First, a search space is
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randomly generated by defining a population of varying combinations of membership
functions. The population generation process is bounded by a vector of lower bounds
(LB) and upper bounds (UB) for each of the vertices of the membership functions. The
Proper definition of the lower and upper bounds is critical for the success of the
optimization process Figure 9.7, shows the search space for a given trapezoidal
membership function. In order to ensure proper operation of the fuzzy controller, the
condition that A < B < C < D must be met. Also, assume that red membership function
corresponds to a low SOC and the green membership function corresponds to a high
SOC. It is important, thus, that the green membership function remains to the right of the
red one. All these conditions have been taken into account in the setting of the lower
bounds and the upper bounds vectors. The objective function to be minimized is shown in
equation (9.6).
∑

(9.6)

In a unique exploration simulation approach for fitness function evaluation, a
software model of the physical microgrid with its controller was developed and used to
simulate the response of the microgrid to the various particles in the swarm and evaluate
the profits and expenditures. In all situations, the optimization process is bound by the
constraints of checking that the microgrid is covering its base load and that the energy
storage devices are maintained at a proper state of charge that does not deteriorate them.
For example, lead-acid battery life could be extended significantly if its SOC does not
fall below 40% [101]. The optimization process is repeated until the combination of
membership functions that results in better utilization of the microgrids energy storage to
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shift peak loads to low price periods is achieved. Once the optimum membership
functions are obtained and verified in the background simulation, the real time controller
is updated with the new functions. Repeated optimization process allows the system to
adapt to change on the customer behavior and price pattern.
The microgrids, EMS algorithm, energy storage, renewable energy and load
controllers are developed on SIMULINK MATLAB and converted to a C code to run in
real time. Instead of having all the modules exchange data internally within the
MATLAB environment, the developed modules are integrated with a DDS
communication middleware to exchange the data over a real Ethernet network. This
approach was adopted in order to account for networking issues such as packet drop,
latency, and QoS. An appropriate QoS profile was set for each application as explained
earlier. The merging of real network, hardware and simulation software creates a hybrid
modeling environment that allows accurate emulation of the proposed EMS as an
integrated cyber-physical system. Finally, a software module representing a smart meter
head end collects all consumption measurements, feeds the data to the utility pricing
module, and publishes back the real-time energy prices.
9.5

Security and failover
It is important to highlight several features in regards to the security of the proposed

energy management framework. First, as explained earlier, the proposed EMS is
composed of several distributed nodes each serving its purpose. For that, a redundancy
scheme has been introduced for each distributed controller. This is achieved by the
failover mechanism provided by DDS. Figure 9.8, shows a primary controller (A) and a
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redundant controller (B) both having the same feedback and issuing the same control
command. However, the owner strength of the primary controller’s command is higher.
Controller B comes in game when controller A fails.

Figure 9.8: Failover Mechanism
Second, along with flattening peak loads, the EMS will ensure the privacy of the
customer’s data by camouflaging his load demand profile. This is feasible by the
utilization of renewable resources along with energy storage devices. This is emphasized
in the results in the next section where the shape of the utility power curve is a
camouflage of the actual customer load demand curve. Therefore, the customer’s
behavior is secured and cannot be inferred even if such curves were disclosed.
Finally, all communication are encrypted and all joining nodes are authenticated
using DDS Secure.

9.6

Results and Discussion
In this section the results of applying the proposed Energy Management System with

and without online optimization on the collected load and solar irradiance measurements
from Miami, Florida, USA in winter and summer seasons. The month of January has
been selected to represent the winter season, whereas the month of August was selected
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to represent the summer season. Additionally, each case was repeated with two pricing
profiles as explained before. The first is a real-time pricing scheme, while the other is a
TOU scheme with values collected from FPL Company.
9.6.1

EMS performance with real-time pricing scheme

Figure 9.9 and Figure 9.10 show the result of applying the proposed energy
management algorithm with real-time pricing scheme, first without using optimized
parameters and second with using the daily optimized parameters in the winter season.
Looking at the zoomed parts in Figure 9.9, the original load profile had peaks during high
energy prices periods. The proposed EMS fuzzy controller without optimization was
successful in reducing these peak values by managing the consumption from energy
storage and renewable resources. In the winter season, the peak load at time t = 6.8 days,
which corresponds to a high price period, was reduced from 3600 W to 2571.3 W.
Figure 9.10 emphasizes the importance of the proposed online optimization technique by
further reducing the amount of consumed power during high prices to 0 W. This because
the optimized EMS has better utilization of the energy storage devices in the microgrid.
Looking at the SOC profile, one notices that the SOC with optimization ranges between
60-100%, whereas with optimization it ranges between 40-100%. These results are also
asserted in the summer season as shown in Figure 9.11and Figure 9.12 where the peak
load at t = 7 days dropped from 3600 W to 2628.3 W without optimization and further
reduced to 0 W with optimization. Similarly, the SOC with optimization ranges between
60-100%, whereas with optimization it ranges between 40-100%.
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9.6.2

EMS performance with TOU pricing scheme

Figure 9.13 and Figure 9.14 show the result of applying the proposed energy
management algorithm with TOU pricing scheme, first without using optimized
parameters and second with using the daily optimized parameters in winter season
Looking at the zoomed part in the Figure 9.13, during the on-peak period starting from t
= 6.75 days to 6.917 days in winter season, the peak consumption was reduced from 2506
W to 1790 W. Here, the customer was still purchasing power from the grid. However,
with the optimization algorithm, during this period, the consumer was selling 716.1 W to
the utility as shown in Figure 9.14. Again, this is due to an optimum decision of charging
and discharging time of energy storage. Figure 9.15 and Figure 9.16 show that during the
summer season with TOU pricing scheme, the original EMS controller parameters
performed so well that the optimization scheme showed negligible improvements on the
overall performance.
Table 9-1 reflects the overall monthly cost of the proposed system for all case studies.
For real-time pricing, the overall savings with optimization in the winter and summer
seasons was 14.86% and 18.56%, respectively. For the TOU pricing scheme, the total
savings were 107.5% and 915.30% for winter and summer seasons, respectively.
Percentages higher than 100% means that the customer is making a profit.
Table 9-1: Total Savings
Pricing

Season

RTP

Winter
Summer
Winter
Summer

TOU

Total Cost Without
EMS
$ 145.74
$ 90.81
$ 55.77
$ 2.94

213

Total Cost with
EMS
$ 134.76
$ 84.12
$ 17.16
$ -23.94

Total Cost with
Optimized EMS
$ 124.08
$ 73.95
$ -4.2
$ -23.97
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Figure 9.9: Winter Real-time Pricing without Optimized Parameters
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Figure 9.10: Winter Real-time Pricing with Optimized Parameters
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Figure 9.11: Summer Real-time Pricing without Optimized Parameters
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Figure 9.12: Summer Real-time Pricing with Optimized Parameter
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Figure 9.13: Winter TOU Pricing without Optimized Parameters
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Figure 9.14: Winter TOU Pricing with Optimized Parameters
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Figure 9.15: Summer TOU Pricing without Optimized Parameters
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Figure 9.16: Summer TOU Pricing with Optimized Parameters
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9.7

Summary
In this chapter, an energy management system for microgrids with an online

optimization module accounting for history, current, and future system observations was
developed and tested. The communication requirement for each module of the developed
EMS (smart meters, load forecasting, controller, etc.) was studied and the required QoS
profiles were defined accordingly. The DDS middleware was selected as the
communication backbone for the proposed framework for its robust failover mechanisms
and a rich set of QoS profiles. A hybrid exploration simulation framework, which
exchanges data over a real Ethernet network, was developed to study the sensitivity of the
system to networking issues, such as transmission delays, data availability, and reliability
among other factors. The EMS was exposed to actual residential energy consumption and
irradiance data from Miami, Florida and proved its effectiveness in reducing consumers’
bills and achieving flat peak load profiles.
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Chapter 10

Load Signature and Customer Privacy

10.1 Introduction
The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and other communication technologies
will improve the operation of the smart grid. However, this will introduce privacy
concerns to customers[102]-[106]. The AMI collects accurate load consumption data
from users in a timely manner. This data could reveal some private information about the
customer behavior to an observing entity. For instance, by observing the load
consumption for a certain period, one could infer and interpret the patterns in a
customer’s behavior. The energy management system discussed earlier could mitigate
this by modifying the load consumption patterns through utilization of energy storage and
local energy sources. However, the camouflage in the load pattern provided by the energy
management system will not hide all the information that can be used to predict the
customer’s behavior. For instance, most modern appliances and industrial loads are
interfaced with power electronic switching devices. The power electronic interface of
these devices creates a voltage and current harmonic signature for each load. These
signatures will remain in the load current even after implementing the energy
management system. Non-intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM) techniques can track the
operation of individual devices by analyzing voltage and current waveforms for these
signatures[103].
The NILM is categorized based on the sampling frequency to low and high sampling
devices. The low-frequency type samples the power consumption at 1 Hz or lower
frequency then maps the changes in the
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ΔP-ΔQ Plane to extract the power

signature[103][104]. The high sampling NILM type samples the voltage and current at a
relatively high sampling rate to capture the harmonic contents of the load current then the
captured data was analyzed to identify the harmonic signature for each appliance. An
artificial intelligent technique such, as artificial neural network, can be used to extract the
harmonic signature [105].
Using the devices’ harmonic signature, NILM can construct a database[106] that
includes different types of loads and devices operating at the customer’s end. Specific
operation periods of each load type can therefore be deduced, revealing private customer
behavioral patterns as well as the type of equipment used and or owned. For residential
customers, one could infer from this data the time in which the customer was in his/her
home and operates exactly which appliance (e.g. TV, washing machine …). For industrial
facilities, NILM can lead to information leakage about specific types of machines used in
production and their operation time. A deep analysis of this information could lead to
predicting the production capacity of this company and type of product manufactured.
This is critical information in current competitive markets. Finally, NILM is quite a huge
concern for military bases located in foreign lands and connected to their utilities. NILM
could leak private information about the activities of these military bases and equipment
owned by them. As such, compensating for harmonics and reactive power is not only
important for the power quality enhancement, but also for ensuring customer privacy.
Changing harmonics and power signature can improve the customer’s privacy and
prevent NILM techniques from revealing private information from consumption
measurement. Different approaches were developed to compensate for reactive power
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and reduce harmonics [107]-[113]. Changing the harmonic signature for multiple
appliances requires online analysis for the current and automatic compensation for
harmonics. In this chapter, the shunt Active Power Filter (APF) control algorithm will be
proposed to change the load signature and improve the power quality for a group of
connected loads. Moreover, the proposed APF control algorithm can inject a fake
signature to disturb NILM.

Figure 10.1: shunt active power filter block diagram
APF can be connected in shunt or series. Shunt APF provides the capability to
compensate for harmonics and reactive power simultaneously [114]. Moreover, the
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proposed active power filter can also compensate for unbalanced loads. Compensation for
unbalanced load current makes it difficult for NILM to distinguish between single-phase
and three-phase loads. The APF controller analyzes the load current in real-time to
extract a reference current that represents the harmonics and reactive current components
and injects an opposite current to cancel unwanted components from the source current,
as shown in Figure 10.1.
The performance of the active filter is mainly dependent on the accuracy of the used
method to extract undesired harmonic component and the current controller that inject the
current with opposite the direction to cancel the unwanted component. The Synchronous
Reference Frame (SRF) method was used to extract the undesired current in three-phase
balanced systems, but it fails with an unbalanced system. While instantaneous power
theory is usually used in the three-phase four-wire unbalanced systems, the disadvantage
of instantaneous power theory is that it requires measuring the voltage and current for the
three phases and requires more computations, which are reflected in the costs of
implementation. The harmonic extraction methods and current controller will be
discussed in detail in the next sections
10.2 Harmonic and reactive current extraction
The first stage in the APF control is the generation of a reference current that represents
harmonics and reactive current contents. Calculating the reference current is either based
on frequency or time domain. The frequency domain compensation is based on Fourier
analysis of the distorted signal to extract the harmonics, which leads to high computation
burden and slow response. The time domain compensations are based on the
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instantaneous derivation of the compensating signals from the distorted ones. Most of the
time domain compensation techniques are based on the synchronous reference frame and
instantaneous power theory.
10.2.1 Synchronous Reference Frame Current Reference Generation Method
The synchronous reference frame compensation method uses the Park’s transform to
represent the distorted signal in the d-q plane, as depicted in equation (10.1). With this
transformation, the fundamental component will be represented by a DC value in the d-q
plane. The harmonic component will be represented by an AC component with a
frequency of 120 Hz and/or other multiples of 60 Hz. The active power, in this case,
corresponds to the component of the current in the d-axis, while the reactive power
corresponds to the other component. The harmonic compensation current can be
extracted from the d-axis current using a high-pass filter as shown in Figure 10.2. In the
case of a three-phase unbalanced system, when applying Park’s transform, an AC
component appears in the d-q plane with a frequency of 120 Hz in 60 Hz networks due to
unbalancing. This AC component is equal to the AC component produced by the third
harmonics[115] which leads to injection of 3rd harmonic to the grid.
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Figure 10.2: Block diagram of synchronous reference frame reference generation
method
10.2.2 Instantaneous Power Theory reference generation method.
To overcome third harmonic injection due to the unbalanced condition, the harmonic
component can be extracted using the instantaneous power theory proposed by
Akagi [116],[117]. This method is based on Clark’s transformation of the three-phase
voltages and currents from the ABC coordinates to the αβ0 coordinates. The AC and DC
components of the power can be obtained from the instantaneous values using high-pass
and low-pass filters, respectively, as depicted in Figure 10.3. The instantaneous power
theory can be applied to three-phase four-wire balanced and unbalanced systems. It can
also be applied to a system with voltage harmonics [118]Error! Reference source not
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found.. However, there are some disadvantages of the instantaneous power theory
technique; they involve complex hardware implementation due to the requirement of
measuring voltages and line currents, and extra calculations to transform voltage and
current to αβ0 coordinates.

Figure 10.3: Block diagram of Instantaneous Power Theory reference generation
method
10.2.3 Proposed current Reference Generator
In the proposed method, the harmonic current was extracted from the measured load
current through the use of a modified synchronous-reference frame-based method. The
synchronous reference frame method requires measuring the three-phase load currents
only rather than the three-phase currents and voltages in the instantaneous power theorybased method. The disadvantage of the synchronous reference frame-based method is that
it is only suitable for a three-phase balanced system. Accordingly, some modification will
be presented herein to make it suitable for three-phase, four wires, balanced and
unbalanced systems. Figure 10.4 shows the block diagram of the modified synchronous
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reference current generator. The direct current id is being calculated from the three-phase
current using Park’s transformation.

Figure 10.4: A block diagram of the reference current generator
The calculated id contains a DC component that represents the fundamental active
component current, while the AC component represents the harmonic components. The
AC component frequency will be 120 Hz in an AC 60 Hz network and 100Hz in an AC
50 Hz network. To obtain the DC component, id passes through a low-pass filter with a
cutoff frequency of 75 Hz. The output of the low pass filter will represent the
fundamental active current component. The filtered id will be used to obtain the
sinusoidal fundamental component existing in the load current by using inverse Park’s
transform. iq and i0 will be set to zero since we need to obtain the active fundamental
component only. Consequently, the calculated sinusoidal component is subtracted from
the load current. The obtained component is a reference current that represents all
harmonics and reactive components existing in the load current. By this method, we can
manage to overcome the problem of the AC component that exists in the id current due to
the unbalanced load, since calculations in this scheme depend on calculating the
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fundamental component existing in the load current. Hence, it is being subtracted from
the load current to obtain the distorted component instead of calculating it directly. To
calculate the Park’s transform, the supply phase angle must be known. A PLL was used
to track the supply voltage phase angle in order to calculate sin(θ) and cos(θ) [119]. In
some cases, a frequency drift of the fundamental component can occur. The adopted
ASRF-PLL has the capability to accurately track the frequency and compensate for this
drift.
10.2.4 Active power filter current controller.
After extracting the harmonic and generating reference current for the unwanted
component, the next stage is to inject this component with opposite direction to the
supply system. Three-phase voltage source converter with self-supported DC bus will be
used as a power amplifier to inject the harmonic current, as shown in Figure 10.5 To
operate the voltage source converter in current control mode, a hysteresis current
controller was used to regulate the injected current.
Hysteresis control provides good harmonic suppression. However, as a disadvantage of
such a technique, its switching frequency is not fixed. The power losses in
semiconductors increase with increasing the switching frequency, therefore, it is very
important to limit the switching frequency in high-power applications to minimize the
power losses and increase the efficiency[120].
To overcome the variable switching frequency problem, a modified version of the
hysteresis current controller was developed and adopted. In the regular hysteresis
controller, the error function is centered in a fixed pre-set hysteresis band. When the error
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exceeds the upper or lower hysteresis limits, the hysteresis controller makes an
appropriate switching decision to control the error within the pre-defined band. To limit
the maximum switching frequency, another limiting stage was added to the controller.

Figure 10.5: Voltage source inverter with self-supported DC bus
This limiting stage consists of an edge triggered flip-flop and a controlled oscillator.
Figure 10.6 shows a block diagram of the developed hysteresis controller. When the
switching frequency exceeds the maximum limit, the flip-flops and oscillator override the
controller command and limit the output frequency; this will lead to increasing the
hysteresis band in accordance with limited switching frequency. As shown in Fig. 6, i* is
the reference current calculated by the reference current generator and iinv is the actual
current injected by the voltage source inverter. The fmax signal fed from an oscillator with
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a frequency that equals the desired maximum switching frequency.

Figure 10.6: A block diagram of the developed hysteresis controller
10.3 Case studies
To investigate the efficiency and ability of the proposed control technique to change
the load signature, APF was tested with four different operation cases. The first test case
involves dynamic inductive load to test the ability to hide the reactive power signature
with sudden load change. The second test case involves unbalanced load to demonstrate
the ability to hide the signature of a single-phase load connected to three-phase networks.
The third test case shows the change in the harmonic signature for the nonlinear load. The
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fourth test case demonstrates the ability of the APF to inject harmonic that emulates
nonlinear load signature. The control of the APF filter was deployed using a dSPACE1104 embedded controller. The power circuit for the APF was implemented using a
three-phase power electronics converter, shown in Figure 10.7. The converter was
connected to the grid through 24mH inductors. The hysteresis current controller was
limited to 20 KHz switching frequency.

Figure 10.7: APF hardware setup
10.3.1

Case Study one: Three phase dynamic inductive load.

In this case, three-phase load consumes 900W active power and 300VAR reactive
power is connected to the three-phase supply. The APF was connected in parallel with
the load to compensate for reactive current, as shown in Figure 10.8. At time equal to 0.1,
sec the load changes to 1200W and 300VAR. The APF smooths the sharp change in the
supply current results from sudden load change, as shown in Figure 10.9. Sharp changes
are necessary for NILM meters to detect the start and stop instances of appliances.
Smoothing these edges reduce the ability of NILM to detect the starting of new devices.
To hide the reactive power signature, the APF succeeds to maintain unity power factor
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during steady state and load transient. Figure 10.10 shows the phase angle between the
supply voltage, the load current and supply current. The load current has a phase delay
with respect to the supply voltage while the supply current maintains a zero phase angle
during the test period.

Figure 10.8: Three phase dynamic load with shunt APF connection diagram
10.3.2 Case Study two: Three phase unbalanced inductive load.
To demonstrate the APF compensation for the unbalanced current, the three-phase
unbalanced load was connected parallel to the APF. The balanced load draws 300W from
phase a, and 420W from phase b and c. All phases are loaded with 100VAR reactive
power. Figure 10.11 -a and 11-b shows the supply voltage and unbalanced load current,
respectively. As depicted from figure 11-c, the APF distributes the consumed energy
between the three phases and the supply current becomes balanced. Also, the APF
maintains a zero-phase angle between the supply voltage and current, as depicted in
Figure 10.12.
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10.3.3 Case Study three: Three phase nonlinear load with harmonic current.
In this case, the APF will be connected in parallel with the group of loads. The loads
consist of three-phase inductive load and unbalanced load demonstrated in the previous
case. Additional three-phase rectifier with RL load is connected in parallel. It is known
that due to the uncontrolled operation of the diodes, the uncontrolled rectifier injects
harmonics to the system. Figure 10.13 (a), (b), and c show the supply voltage, load
current and supply current, respectively. The load current shown in figure 13 (b) has 5th
and 7th harmonic with 6.51% and 4.46%, respectively. As depicted from figure 13 (c),
the proposed APF control algorithm succeeds to compensate for the unbalance and
harmonic current. The supply current has 5th and 7th harmonic with 1.27% for both
harmonic components. Another merit of the proposed technique is the compensation for
reactive power, as shown in Figure 10.14. As depicted from figure 14 (b) and 14 (c), the
proposed algorithm compensates for the reactive power and maintains a zero-phase angle
for the supply current.
10.3.4 Case Study four: Emulating a nonlinear load current signature.
In addition to removing load current signature, APF can emulate harmonic and reactive
power signature for a nonlinear load. By emulation load signature, the APF can deceive
the NILM to detect non-existing loads. In this case, a three-phase load with 900W and
300VAr was connected to the three-phase supply. The shunt active power filter was used
to emulate the harmonic signature for a three-phase rectifier feeding RL load. The APF
current reference generator was programmed to inject 5th and 7th harmonic. The supply
voltage, load current and supply current are shown in Figure 10.15 (a), 15 (b) and 15 (c),
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respectively. As depicted from Figure 10.15 (b), the load current was pure sinusoidal with
no harmonic content. The supply current shown in Figure 10.15 (c) has 5th and 7th
harmonic orders with 6.85% and 4.17%, respectively. The injected harmonics current
mimic the signature of the uncontrolled rectifier used in the previous case. It is worth to
note that, the harmonic injected by the APF to emulate a load signature should not exceed
the limits specified by the standard.
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10.4 Summary
In this chapter, a synchronous reference frame-based controller was modified to be
adequate to operate with balanced and unbalanced loads. This controller was used to
control APF to compensate for current signature and different power quality issues for
both balanced and unbalanced non-linear loads. Also, a modified version of the hysteresis
controller was presented to overcome the problem of variable switching frequency and to
appropriately control the switching frequency. The proposed control algorithm was
experimentally tested to verify the effectiveness of the system. Different loading
conditions were tested to verify the effectiveness of the system. The loading conditions
were selected to represent different types of load signature. The test results show that the
controller deals automatically and successfully change the load current signature, which
improves the customer privacy by deceiving NILM. The proposed controller requires less
computation compared to instantaneous power theory and regular synchronous reference
frame methods. Combining the proposed active power filter control with energy the
management system improves the customer privacy, in addition to reducing the energy
cost and improves the power quality.
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Chapter 11

Electromagnetic Signatures

11.1 Introduction
Modern control and design technologies dictate the use of power electronics in
various stages of the power system. The electrical systems are becoming increasingly
complex, as they are composed of microprocessor circuits, communication circuits,
snubber circuits, sensors, among other components. Power electronics interfaces produce
voltage and current harmonics; these harmonics radiate a stray electromagnetic field
around controlled equipment. A Radiated field can cause electromagnetic interference
problems to nearby devices. Moreover, the electromagnetic signature for controlled
devices can be detected and identified remotely. Remote identification of equipment’s
electromagnetic signature raises privacy and security concern for some types of power
systems, such as shipboard power system. Shipboard power system represents a
microgrid with multiple generators, distribution network, and heavy loads. Detection of
electromagnetic signature remotely represents a threat to military ships. The stray field
can activate naval mines and reveal location information. Several sources contribute to
the ship electromagnetic signature, such as structural ferromagnetic material, cathodic
protection and stray field from onboard equipment. The stray electromagnetic field is
radiated from heavy current equipment, such as electric propulsion system drive and
generators. The stray field can radiate through the ship hull into the surrounding
environment and water, which can be detected at a distance. Shielding techniques are
used to reduce the electromagnetic signature. By reducing the harmonic component that
generates the stray field, especially from motor drives, the shield size can be reduced.
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Many valuable strategies are proposed to reduce the harmonics content, ranging from
modifying the rotor design [121] to torque reduction [122], revising the control algorithm
of the converter [123], [124], and multilevel converters among others. Some researchers
utilized artificial intelligence techniques, such as genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic and
others in optimizing the performance of multilevel converters, such as in [125], [126],
and [127]. In [125], the genetic algorithm optimization was applied to the multilevel
inverter to determine optimum switching angle for cascaded multilevel converters. The
intention was decreasing higher order harmonic while maintaining the fundamental
harmonic. The process of calculating the optimized switching angle is offline. In [127],
the authors utilize a hybrid real-coded genetic algorithm for finding the optimal solution
to the nonlinear equation system with fast and guaranteed convergence. Different
operating points for both five- and seven-level converters, including single- and threephase patterns, were studied. However, the modulation index range does not change
significantly and remains within a region between 0.7 and 1 p.u. In addition to the
numerical techniques, the modulation strategies were also developed to decrease the
higher-order harmonics of the converter. For example, in [128], the combined switching
strategy for the matrix converter was proposed, in which some of the harmonics of the
input and output currents and the output voltage near the fundamental can be eliminated.
A new active harmonic suppression technique was recently introduced to the line
frequency method aimed at eliminating the higher-order of harmonics by creating the
opposite of the harmonics to cancel them [129], [130]. However, the disadvantage is in
using a high switching frequency to eliminate higher-order harmonics. Other methods
have also been reported, including one where the harmonic elimination is combined with
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a programmed method [131], and where multilevel pulse width modulation (PWM)
defined by the well-known multicarrier phase-shifted PWM was proposed in [132]
and [133]. The modulation index in this algorithm states the distribution of the switching
angles, and then the problem of PWM harmonic elimination is applied to a particular
operating point aiming to obtain the optimum position of these switching transitions that
offer elimination to a selected order of harmonics. A generalized formulation for multilevel PWM converters with the nonequal dc source was also reported in [134].
All of these studies in addition to many others have merit because they improve the
output voltage waveform. However, some of the modifications need to be implemented
offline and some others would be applicable in a specific range of modulation index or
with a specific switching technique. All of these methods were successful in reducing the
harmonic distortion; however, some need a sensor installed inside the drive, while others
need a revision for the machine or even require the machine to be dismantled, which is
costly. Moreover, utilizing the drive’s current in the feedback loop and generating the
error signal would not be helpful when an unbalanced voltage occurs in the system. The
unbalanced voltage causes the frequency response of the current to have inter-harmonics,
which are not easily recognizable from the specific inter-harmonics of the control
algorithms [135], [136].
The frequency response of the stray electromagnetic fields demonstrates the main
harmonics orders and inter-harmonics. These inter-harmonics and disruptive harmonics
decrease the power quality and cause derating of the drives. Moreover, the
electromagnetic interference (EMI) of the drive would infect other adjacent components.

247

By monitoring these fields and utilizing them in designing the controller, the
electromagnetic signature that results from the stray field could be reduced and the
overall efficiency will be improved. In this chapter, a method to reduce stray field
generated by a certain harmonic component is proposed. The idea is to use the radiated
electromagnetic field as feedback input for the drive controller to inject negative
components that cancel unwanted a stray field. The proposed method can be
implemented online without a need to revise the construction of the drive. Unlike the
passive filters method that reduces the radiated field from the distribution network only,
the proposed method reduces the radiated field from the electric machine itself.
11.2 Harmonic Reductions of Electric Drives
There are several basic methods for reducing harmonic voltage and current distortion
from nonlinear distribution loads, such as adjustable frequency drives. Prior to discussing
the proposed method, the previous and existing methods are reviewed.
11.2.1 Hardware Solutions (Filters):
The adjustable frequency drive can be connected to the motor without any additional
elements to control the speed. The advantage of this is low cost, ease of packaging,
selling and applying; however, the disadvantage is a high level of harmonic current and
voltage distortion. Many filter-based components, such as reactors, dc chokes, harmonic
shunt filters, and broadband filters, were utilized. The advantage of some of these
methods is low cost, providing increased input protection for the drive, flexibility in the
range of impedance and being able to provide a moderate reduction in voltage and current
harmonics [137]. The disadvantage of some of these methods is the requirement to be
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mounted separately, as well as they may not be able to reduce the harmonic level below
the IEEE 519 guidelines. Moreover, the 12 and 18 pulse converters were also utilized,
which show a great reduction of harmonics of up to 85%. However, the impedance
matching of phase-shifted sources is critical to the performance and the transformer often
requires separate mounting. A filter based solution can reduce the stray field emitted
from the distribution network connected to a high current drive system by preventing the
high harmonic order from propagating to the network. However, the filter will not
improve the radiated stray field from the machine. High harmonic orders and interharmonic will exist in the machine stray field even with the filter installed.
11.2.2 PWM Modifications:
In addition to the hardware solution, several PWM methods have been developed in
order to reduce the harmonic content by controlling the drive without adding additional
components. Selective harmonic elimination solves the transcendental equations
characterizing harmonics, so that appropriate switching angles are computed for the
elimination of specific harmonics at the output [138], [139]. These methods can provide a
lower harmonic content, but the solution of these equations requires huge computation
time; hence, online implementation is difficult. Switching angles are calculated
offline [127], [140], or the equations are linearized before they are solved [141], [142], or
an approximate solution is sought where the topology permits it [143]. Other strategies
embrace modification of the carrier signal [144], [145] or the reference sine wave [146].
All of them are open-loop control schemes that assume an absolutely constant dc supply
(i.e., all the harmonics produced into the grid by an inductive supply area unit are
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ignored) and disregard the prevailing harmonic content of the grid voltage or the
distortion caused by the load. In simple terms, they try to scale back the harmonics
created by the PWM itself instead of improving the emitted stray field.
The proposed method is actually based on the modification of PWM methods through
observing the magnetic stray field of the machine, not the converter. However, the
converter would affect the stray fields of the machine. The behavior of the stray magnetic
field of the drive is explained in the following section.
11.3 Harmonic Behaviors of Stray Fields
The stray field waveform may be characterized by a series of sinusoidal components
at harmonic frequencies and sinusoidal components between the main orders of
harmonics. In this section, the harmonic and inter-harmonic of the field that strayed from
a drive connected to the electric motor are studied. The schematic of the proposed
converter connected to the machine is shown in Figure 11.1. The common feature of such
a double energy conversion system is that it contains an AC–DC rectifier and a DC–AC
inverter.

Figure 11.1: Schematic of the test setup (PWM VSI drive)
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The rectifier and inverter are coupled through a dc-link filter. If the reactor or the
capacitor has an infinite value, there will be no ripples on the dc side, and consequently,
the ideal rectifier will only generate the characteristic harmonics (fh−R)
fh−R = (kn ± 1)f

(11.1)

where k is the pulse number of the rectifier, n is an integer, and f is the power frequency.
However, the reactor or the capacitor values are finite in practice and the ripples at the dc
side are inevitable. As a consequence of not having a flat DC-link current, its AC side
will be modulated by the dc ripple and the inter-harmonics could be produced. For
example, for a six-pulse rectifier, based on equation (11.1), its characteristic frequencies
are the 1st, 5th, 7th, 11th, 13th, and so on, in terms of harmonic orders. However, if the
dc side has a ripple of, for example, 165 Hz, the ac-side current will be modulated as (1st,
5th, 7th, 11th, 13th . . . ) ±165 Hz. These are inter-harmonic components.
Contrasting current source converters, voltage source converters needed more
complex formulas to determine the dc ripple generated by the inverter [2]. In the case of
the sinusoidal PWM modulation technique (SPWM), the harmonic frequencies generated
by the inverter are evaluated as follows:

fripple(mf , i, j) = |mf i ± j| · foutput

(11.2)

where mf is the modulation ratio with i and j as the integers depending on the modulation
ratio. The foutput is the output frequency. The dependence of mf is related to the
switching strategy adopted. When mf is not triple and odd, by having even or odd i, the j
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would be even or odd, respectively. On the other hand, while mf is triple and odd, by
having even or odd i, the j would be even triple or odd triple, respectively. However, if mf
is even, j can be even or odd, and triple for triplemf [147]. Note that the frequencies
generated by inverters revealed in equation (11.2) will modulate with the rectifier’s
characteristic harmonic of equation (11.1) and subsequently the supply-side frequencies
will be generated
fss = fh−R ± fripple

(3)

The supply-side frequencies fss are actually the interharmonics of the power
frequency as long as fripple is not synchronous with f. As discussed, the harmonics and
inter-harmonics appear in the frequency response of the radiated magnetic fields.
11.4 Control and Optimization Procedure
The electromagnetic reduction strategy is based on the harmonics and inter-harmonics
of the converter connected to the machine since the main harmonic contents are
originating from the converter switching and affecting the performance of the machine.
Based on the discussion in previouse section, the control algorithm is designed and
discussed here in this section. The structure of the proposed controller is composed of
three blocks: a) sensor and conditioner; b) spectrum computation; and c) main control.
These blocks are shown in Figure 11.2.
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Figure 11.2: The procedure of the controller
a) Sensor and Conditioner Block
The magnetic fields of the drive are measured using the magnetic coil antenna. (The
details of the antenna and other components are mentioned in the next section.) The
measured signal first buffered and amplified using a low noise amplifier. The amplified
signal is then passed through a low-pass filter (LPF) before the analog to digital
conversion stage.
b) Spectrum Computation Block
The spectrum calculation is based on the heterodyne receiver. Heterodyning is a radio
signal processing technique in which new frequencies are created by combining or
mixing two frequencies[147]. Heterodyning is useful for frequency shifting signals into a
new frequency range and is also involved in the processes of modulation and
demodulation. The two frequencies are combined in a nonlinear signal processing device,

253

such as a vacuum tube, transistor, or diode, usually called a mixer. The most important
and widely used application of the heterodyne technique is in the superheterodyne
receiver. In this circuit, the incoming radio frequency signal from the antenna is mixed
with a signal from a local oscillator and converted by the heterodyne technique to a fixed
frequency signal called the intermediate frequency (IF). The resulting IF signal is filtered
by a narrow band LPF to isolate the desired frequency spectrum. The output magnetic
fields spectrum would be transmitted to the main controller. This receiver is composed of
three basic components: 1) variable sinusoidal wave generator, which is programmed
through a direct digital synthesizer (DS); 2) LPF; and 3) a multiplier, as shown in
Figure 11.2.
1) Variable Sinusoidal Wave Generator: In this system, the heterodyne receiver
multiplies the amplified signals with two quadrature sinusoidal signals generated by a
direct digital synthesizer (DS), which generates a variable frequency sinusoidal signal.
The DS is a type of frequency synthesizer used for creating arbitrary waveforms from a
single, fixed-frequency reference clock. The heterodyne receiver was implemented
digitally inside the microprocessor. The DS was implemented using a digital oscillator
for increasing the oscillator stability and simplifying the frequency control. The modified
coupled form of the oscillator shown in Figure 11.3 is used to produce a high purity
sinusoidal wave while using low processor resources [148]. Only two multiplies and two
summation operations need to be performed for each sample output. The oscillator
frequency can be changed dynamically by changing ε, where ε = ω/π. The oscillator
outputs x[n], y[n] represent two near quadrature sinusoidal signals, being off by one-half
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sample. The quadrature sinusoidal outputs are digitally multiplied by captured signals
from the antenna after amplification.

Figure 11.3: Digital oscillator scheme
2) LPF and Multiplier: A narrow-band low-pass FIR filter was used to isolate the
spectrum magnitude, as shown in Figure 11.4. The phase angle of the signal can be
obtained with respect to the oscillator angle by calculating tan−1 (Xs [n]/Ys [n]).
Different harmonic orders were captured by sweeping the oscillator frequency. Also, the
harmonic order and magnitude were captured and stored in a matrix to be used by the
harmonic suppression block. The implementation for the spectrum computation was done
under the control of a 32-bit reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processor. RISC is
a CPU design strategy based on the insight that simplified (as opposed to complex)
instructions can provide higher performance if this simplicity enables much faster
execution of each instruction [149]. ARM (Advanced RISC Machines) cortex M4
processor with 210 DMIPS (dhrystone million instructions per second) and DSP
extension was chosen for the implementation. Fast instruction execution, hardware
multiplier, and DSP instruction make it possible to run the spectrum analysis and
harmonic compensation algorithm, the 12 bit analog to digital with speed up to 2.4 MSPS
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(Mega Samples Per Second) and direct memory access allow capturing signals with a
high accuracy and sampling rate. The harmonic search and compensation algorithm were
built using a finite-state machine, which simplifies task management without using a realtime operating system and reducing the execution overhead.

Figure 11.4: Spectrum analysis procedure
c) Main Control Block
A fast serial communication link was used to transfer the spectrum from ARM cortex
M4 processor to dSpace 1104 embedded controller. The dSpace embedded controller is
used to implement the real-time control of the power electronics converter and the
Harmonics Suppression Controller (HSC). After transmitting the magnetic field spectrum
to the main controller, the measured fields would be categorized into the main and subharmonics. Each harmonic would be compared with the desired predefined harmonic
magnitude and the error signal is passed to the harmonics suppression controller HSC.
The main function of the HSC is to generate modulated signals that will cancel the
unwanted harmonic spectrum by finding the correct magnitude and phase angle for each
frequency. These modulated signals are then added to the sinusoidal modulated signal
used in a PWM controller. This technique has an advantage over the classical method of
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decreasing unwanted harmonics by increasing the frequency ratio. Increasing the
frequency ratio can reduce the main harmonics results from switching activity on the
inverter only, whereas the proposed technique can reduce the main and inter-harmonic
results from the inverter and the machine itself. Moreover, the harmonic suppression
process is selective and does not affect the average switching frequency. The online
feedback for the HSC makes the system adaptive to different environments and machine
conditions. Furthermore, the operator can select to suppress specific harmonics that cause
interference with other systems. The details of methodology, as well as the modulation
algorithms, are described in the next section.
11.5 Harmonic Suppression, Discussion, and Results
The procedure of suppression is implemented in two well-known switching
algorithms, SPWM) and SVPWM techniques with comprehensive comparison. The
summary of the aforementioned switching algorithms and the optimization in their design
is explained in the following section [150]–[152].
11.5.1 Sinusoidal PWM
The sinusoidal PWM is a type of “carrier-based” PWM. Carrier-based PWM uses
predefined modulation signals to determine the output voltages. In sinusoidal PWM, the
modulation signal is sinusoidal with the peak of the modulating signal always less than
the peak of the carrier signal. The details of this well-known method are illustrated
in [150]. There are two significant drawbacks with sinusoidal PWM. First, the converter
with this modulation generates a less line-line output voltage with the same amplitude of
the line supply. The other disadvantage, which is more related to the electromagnetic
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signature, is the short pulses. If the output is to be truly sinusoidal PWM, it is important
to include very small pulses when the peak modulation signal is close to the peak carrier
voltage. These small pulses can contribute significantly to inverter losses, while not
significantly affecting the output voltage. In addition, small pulses may be impractical
due to the time required to switch one device off and another device on [151]. Hence,
they create high-order harmonics. However, these harmonics may not be seen in the
output voltage or current; they generate low- and high-order harmonics of the stray
field [147]. The harmonic orders of magnetic stray fields of an induction machine drive
connected to the converter and controlled through SPWM are shown in Figure 11.5.

Figure 11.5: Magnetic field intensity (H) of the induction motor connected to the drive
using the SPWM technique
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In order to decrease the harmonic orders shown in Figure 11.5, two methods are
implemented in this paper: manual and automatic techniques. Both methods were applied
in real-time operation. The setup and the details of the components are reflected in Table
1 and Figure 11.6.
Table 11-1: Details of the Components in the Testbed Setup
Component

Characteristics
Six IGBT switches, I:80 A, VCES: 1200V.

Multifunctional converter
7.5 HP, 208 V, 1765 r/min, PF: 0.82, 60
Induction motor

Hz, EEF: 89.5%
dS1104

Digital controller

R&D

Controller

Board

and

Connector Panel
STM32F407, 168 MHz, CPU, 192 KB

RISC processor

SRAM
Coverage between 1 Hz and 3 GHz,
absolute amplitude accuracy: +/- 0.5 dB to
3 GHz, displayed average noise level:

EMI receiver/spectrum analyzer*

-

142 dB.m/Hz at 26.5 GHz

-

155 dB.m/Hz at 2 GHz and

-

150 dB.m/Hz at 10 kHz

Coverage between 20 Hz and 500 kHz, 36
Magnetic coil antenna

turns of 7-41 Litz wire shielded with 10 Ω
resistance and 340 µH inductance.

*Measurement components are MIL-STD 461F standard compliant.
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Figure 11.6: (a) Setup inside the enclosure (the converter and the motor) and (b)
control and monitoring setup. Note that the antenna is located 12 in away from the center
of the machine (∼3 inch from the cage)
11.5.2 SPWM Harmonics Manual Suppression
In the manual technique, the proportional amplitude of the most harmful harmonics is
injected into the control block to decrease the overall amplitude. The amplitude and phase
offset of the harmonic suppression block is set initially in Simulink and connected to the
dSpace 1104 digital controller interface, which can be controlled in real time. The
switching algorithm would be modified accordingly and the signal was transferred
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through the dSpace to the converter. In order to suppress the noises of the signal
processing components and all other elements, the machine and inverter were located
inside an enclosure, which was isolated electromagnetically, as shown in Figure 11.6.
The procedure of signal processing used in the test was mentioned in the previous
section. The block diagram of the control block for the manual suppression is shown in
Figure 11.7. The control of frequency is used for setting the desired harmonic to be
suppressed. Moreover, the amplitude and the phase offset can be adjusted for setting the
harmonics to have the most appropriate suppression. Three critical harmonics of the
machine, including 2nd, 4th, and 5th harmonics, were selected to be suppressed
manually. Therefore, the frequency of the suppression was set based on their harmonic
order and the amplitude and phase offset was adjusted in real-time in the control desk
interface. The even harmonics and main odd harmonics (5th, 7th, 11th, . . . ) are selected
as the harmful harmonics, which are originated due to the presence of a power electronics
component in the drive. Figure 11.8 shows that by adjusting the HSC to suppress the
second harmonic, the second harmonic of the stray field of the machine decreases from
−15 to −25 dB·μA/m. The block was designed to decrease the second harmonic, but
some other higher harmonics, such as eleventh and thirteenth, which are harmful
harmonics, are also reduced. The amplitude of the block for suppressing the second
harmonic was set to 3 and the phase angle was set to 0.7 rad. The total harmonic
distortion (THD) up to the 10th harmonic order for the cases without HSC and with HSC
is 0.63% and 0.37%, respectively. Accordingly, the study on the fourth harmonic and
fifth harmonic of the motor are also demonstrated in Figure 11.9 and Figure 11.10,
respectively. Similar to the second harmonic case, the HSC also performed substantially
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for the fourth and fifth harmonics. Note that the changing of the amplitude and phase
angle of the suppression block is real time.

Figure 11.7: Block diagram of the sinusoidal PWM with harmonic compensation block

Figure 11.8: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SPWM with and
without HSC for second harmonic suppression
The manual method is appropriate for reducing the level of harmonics to a specific
level. The THD for the cases without HSC and with HSC is 0.6% and 0.31%,
respectively, for Figure 11.9, and 0.63% and 0.25%, respectively, for Figure 11.10.
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Figure 11.9: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SPWM with and
without HSC for fourth harmonic suppression

Figure 11.10: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SPWM with
and without HSC for fifth harmonic suppression
11.5.3 SPWM Harmonic Automatic Suppression
In the automatic suppression, the harmonic contents of the drive are being captured
by the antenna and sent to the processor through ADC. Based on the procedure of the
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signal processing, shown in Figure 11.2 and Figure 11.6, the existing harmonic content
was compared with the actual one and subsequently the appropriate switching signals to
the switches to reduce the level of the proposed harmonic(s). The difference of this
controller shown in Figure 11.11 as compared to the manual one (see Figure 11.7) is
replacing the manual control of the amplitude and the phase shift of the harmonic
compensation block by the tracking algorithm. The HSC in Figure 11.11 is based on a
tracking algorithm. The tracking algorithm is performed using a state machine with three
states, as shown in Figure 11.12. The Init state is for initialization of the amplitude of the
respective harmonics to be canceled. The next state is the Phase_tracking, where
depending on the spectrum error, the phase increases or decreases. The spectrum error is
defined as follows:
Error (t) = Spectrum (t) − Spectrum (t − 1)

(4)

where Spectrum (t) is the average of 20 samples of spectrum and Spectrum (t – 1) is
the previous average of the same spectrum. The rules for the phase tracking are as
follows: if Error is positive, the phase increases and if Error is negative, the phase
decreases. Once the phase tracking algorithm has reached the minimum spectrum at the
harmonic frequency in analysis defined as a threshold, then next state is
Amplitude_tracking. The Amplitude_tracking state follows a similar rule as Phase
tracking algorithm. If the error is positive, the amplitude increases and if the error is
negative, the amplitude decreases. Finally, the suppression was implemented in real time
and the result was obtained (see Figure 11.13). Comparing this figure with the manual
test in Figure 11.9, the suppression was about 50% more. Moreover, some other even
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harmonic orders, such as sixth, were reduced. The optimum amplitude that the system
showed was 18 V and the phase angle was 0.85 rad. The THDs for the cases without
HSC and with HSC for Figure 11.13 are 0.51% and 0.44%, respectively.

Figure 11.11: Automatic harmonic suppression block diagram

Figure 11.12: State machine tracking algorithm
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Figure 11.13: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SPWM with
and without HSC for fourth harmonic suppression in automatic mode
11.5.4 SVPWM
As one of most promising modulation technologies in three phase systems, SVPWM
for a three-level converter has an advantage over sinusoidal PWM in voltage utility. The
SVPWM output voltage is 15% higher than that of sinusoidal PWM [35]. Therefore, this
method, as one of the main modulation technologies, was also used in this research for
both manual and automatic suppressions.
11.5.5 SVPWM Harmonic Manual Suppression
The manual suppression procedure is similar to the SPWM case, except the changes
in the modulation method, which is shown in
Figure 11.14. The fourth and fifth harmonic orders of the motor at 240 and 300 Hz,
similar to the previous case, are selected to be suppressed. The magnetic stray field of the
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induction motor at the same distance in these two cases is shown in Figure 11.15 and
Figure 11.16. As Figure 11.15 and Figure 11.16 illustrate, there is good suppression at the
intended harmonic orders, more than 10 dB·μA/m. Furthermore, the other higher
harmonic orders are also suppressed. The amplitude of the HSC block for the fourth and
fifth harmonic suppression was 19 and 16.9Vand the phase offset was 0.12 and 0.411 rad,
respectively. The THDs for the cases without HSC and with HSC are 2.02% and 1.55%,
respectively, for Figure 11.15, and 2.02% and 0.16%, respectively, for Figure 11.16. In
addition to the singular harmonic suppression, multiple harmonic suppression can also be
implemented by adding a multiple harmonic suppression (HSC) block. For instance, the
suppression of simultaneous fourth and fifth harmonic orders was also implemented. The
result is demonstrated in Figure 11.17.
Both intended harmonic orders are suppressed considerably. Moreover, many other
harmonic orders in the neighborhood are also suppressed. In this case, there are two
amplitudes and two phase offsets. The amplitude and phase shift of the HSC block for the
fourth harmonic suppression was 19 and –0.12 rad and for the fifth harmonic suppression
was 4 V and 0.08 rad. The THDs for the cases without HSC and with HSC for
Figure 11.17 are 2.01% and 0.73%, respectively. Note that since the computation would
increase by adding HSC blocks, the processor would stop working or delay in the answer
if the number of blocks went over 2 by using the mentioned processor.
11.5.6 SVPM harmonic Automatic Suppression
The procedure of the automatic suppression in SVPWM is the same as the SPWM
case. The harmonic compensation block of
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Figure 11.14 was modified as it was modified in the SPWM case in Figure 11.11. The
amplitude and the phase angle obtained from the real-time test were 17.5 V and 0.1 rad.
The THDs for the cases without HSC and with HSC for Figure 11.18 are 2.01% and
0.9%, respectively. Comparing Figure 11.18 with Figure 11.15, the fourth harmonic was
decreased to about –30 dB·μA/m, which was about 10 dB·μA/m better than the manual
case.

Figure 11.14: Block diagram of the SVPWM with harmonic compensation block

Figure 11.15: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SVPWM with
and without HSC for fourth harmonic suppression
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Figure 11.16: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SVPWM with
and without HSC for fifth harmonic suppression

Figure 11.17: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SVPWM with
and without HSC for simultaneous fourth and fifth harmonic suppression
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Figure 11.18: Magnetic stray field intensity (H) of induction motor using SVPWM with
and without HSC for fourth harmonic suppression in automatic mode
11.6 Summary
Improving the design scheme of the switching algorithm of power electronics
converter and motor drive to reduce the stray field for selected harmonic component was
implemented. A modification was implemented using the magnetic field of the machine
as the input to the control system. The sinusoidal and SVPWM were implemented and
the harmonic suppression block was added to them. The suppression was implemented
for several critical harmonic orders in two manual and automatic modes. Both modes
were real time. The results show that the ripples and THD are decreased in all cases;
consequently, the noise is decreased and the efficiency is increased. The results show that
the control using the automatic mode had better suppression in the targeted harmonics
because of changing the phase angle and amplitude in a higher range and resolution in
comparison with the manual mode. The method can be used for both steady state and
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transient condition; however, very fast response microcontrollers and controllers are
needed for the transient cases.
The advantage of this technique is that there is no need for any sensor inside the
machine or any revision for the machine. Furthermore, there is no need that the
modification in design is implemented and it can also be applicable in any range of
modulation indices or with any switching technique. The proposed HSC can reduce the
radiated field from multiple frequency components, which reduce the electromagnetic
signature and improve critical system security.
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Chapter 12

IEC 61850 Security Analysis

12.1 Introduction
Substations are an essential part of the transmission and distribution system.
Substation controls the power flow between transmission and distribution networks. In
the smart grid, substations will play a vital role in interconnecting distributed generation
located on the distribution side with the transmission network and end customers. In
addition, substations are a key component in monitoring and aggregating power from
microgrids.
For decades, substation automation and control were dependent on a low-speed
serial communication between substation digital devices, while the connections with
instrumentation and circuit breakers were made using an analog connection over copper
wires. These types of control and automation networks have several drawbacks, first
complex wiring makes it time-consuming and costly to install, commission and
maintenance. Second, in absence of interoperability standard, vendors implemented
property or standard communication protocols designed for other domains, such as a
Local Operating network (LON), MODBUS, PROFIBUS, FIELDBUS and DNP. Data
exchange between non-compatible protocols is made through complex protocol
translators. This complexity in installation, data exchange, and maintenance arise the
need for data modeling and a communication standard.
The IEC 61850 is a substation automation standard developed by the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) technical committee Number 57 (TC57) Working
Group 10 (WG10) and IEEE [153]. The IEC 61850 is developed to ensure the
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interoperability between IEDs manufactured by different Vendors, simplify installation
and maintenance of the substation automation system.
The IEC 61850 replaces the copper wiring and analog connection in the substation
automation systems by an Ethernet-based network. An ethernet-based communication
network provides higher speed and bandwidth, which allows a faster response. Moreover,
it allows free allocation of the functions. Figure 12.1 and 12.2 show a comparison
between the wiring and configuration of the substation automation system with the serial
data bus and IEC 61850 standard. In Figure 11.1, IEDs are connected to the Current
Transformers (CTs), Voltage transformers (VTs) and switchgear using copper cables.
Voltage and current measurements are transmitted as analog signals. IEDs and Human
Machine interface exchange information over the low-speed serial bus (station Bus), such
as PROFIBUS. Figure 12.2 shows the substation automation architecture with IEC
61850. Analog measurements from CTs, VTs, and switchgear signals are connected to
the process Bus through merging units. Merging units convert analog measurements to
digital data and transmit them over the high-speed Ethernet network (Process Bus). Data
shared over the process bus can be shared with all IEDs connected to the bus. IEDs are
communicated together and with HMI over Ethernet-based station Bus Sharing
instrumentation data, such as voltage and current measurement over Ethernet network
simplify the installation, reduce the wiring and allow free allocation of the functions
without the need to modify the wiring.
Figure 12.3 shows the direct connection of instrumentation devices (CTs, VTs) to
IEDs. In this connection scheme, the analog signal is hardwired to the IED. The IED
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convert the analog signal to digital form using embedded analog to digital, then the
digital data is used to perform the assigned IED function.
Relocation of the IED function requires changing of a hardwired connection. Figure 12.4
shows the connection of instrumentation devices to the process bus through merging unit.
The analog signal is connected to the merging unit, which converts it to digital form and
transmits it to the IEDs through Ethernet-based network process bus. IEDs receive
digitized data through the Ethernet connection. Relocation of functions from IED to
another doesn’t require wiring modification.

Figure 12.1: Substation automation using serial data
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Figure 12.2: IEC 61850 substation automation.

Figure 12.3: Direct connection of instrumentation devices without process Bus
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Figure 12.4: Connection of instrumentation devices with merging units and process
Bus
12.2 IEC 61850 Overview
IEC 61850 defines a data model for the substation automation device to ensure data
consistent across different IEDs from different vendors. The IEC 61850 Hierarchical data
model start with the physical device. The Physical Device (PD) is a hardware device that
connects to the network and has computation and hardware resources to run the firmware.
Each PD contains one or more Logical Device (LD). The LD device consists of one or
more Logical Nodes. The logical node is the smallest part of a function that exchanges
data. A logical node is a data object that consists of data elements and service (Methods)
related to power system function. IEC 61850 provide Abstract Communication Service
Interface (ACSI) that allows the creation of data object and service independent from
underlying communication protocols [153], as shown in Figure 12.5. IEC 61850-5 maps
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the abstracted data model to three different protocols, Manufacturing Message
Specification (MMS), Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled
Measured Values (SMV), as shown in Figure 12.6. The MMS is ISO 9506 standard
developed originally by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
Technical Committee 184 (TC184) for industrial automation. MMS utilizes a clientserver communication scheme to provide one to one connection. The MMS messages use
IP address to route the message over layer three of the OSI model. MMS protocol is used
mainly for communication between IEDs. GOOSE messages are used for fast transfer of
substation events such, as tripping signal [153].

Figure 12.5: IEC 61850 data model
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Since GOOSE message is used in a critical time event, a 4 ms restriction is applied
for transmission. To ensure fast transmission, the data is sent over layer 2 of the OSI
model. GOOSE messages are transmitted over separate VLAN with priority tag to ensure
appropriate transmission priority. SMV messages are used to transfer voltage and current
measurement from merging units to IEDs. Similar to GOOSE messages, SMV messages
are transmitted over layer 2 with multicast MAC address.

Figure 12.6: IEC 6180 ACSI protocol mapping
In addition to mapping data model to different protocols, IEC60850-6-1 defines the
Substation Configuration Language (SCL). The SCL is based on the Extensible Markup
Language (XML). The SCL uses three main files, the System Specification Description
file (SSD), IED Capability description file (ICD) and Configured IED Description file
(CID). Other types of files are used by SCL, such as Substation Configuration
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Description file (SCD).

The SCD file consists of s SSD file and ICD files [153].

Figure 12.7 shows the design and configuration process using SCL.

Figure 12.7: substation automation system designs and configurations process based
on SCL
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First, The SSD file is generated by the design tool. The SSD file defines the single
line diagram for the substation, logical nodes and complete system specification. Based
on the data from SSD and ICD, the system configuration tool defines the IEDs’ logical
nodes and the data flow and generates the SCD file. The SCD file contains a full
description of the entire system. The SCD file is used by the device configuration tool to
generate and load CID configuration files to individual IEDs.
12.3 IEC 61850 security
Evolving substation automation systems from legacy analog and serial interfaces to
Ethernet-based network increases the risk of a cyber-attack. The attack surface ranges
from inside person that infect the network with malware to supply chain, where the
devices can be infected with suspicious software during manufacturing and
installation [154]. The IEC 61850 doesn’t specify any security measures to secure the
IEDs and substation communication network. The security measures for the MMS,
GOOSE and SMV messages are specified in IEC 62351 standard. The cyber threats, IEC
security measures, and shortcoming are discussed in next sections.
12.4 MMS vulnerabilities
MMS messages are vulnerable to different types of known IP protocol attacks, such as
address resolution protocol (ARP) cache poisoning attack, denial of service, a man in the
middle attack and network flooding attack [155]. In the ARP poisoning cache attack
depicted in Figure 12.8, the attacker uses spoofed ARP messages to deceive the victim
and accept an invalid MAC (media access controller) address mapping and store it in
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ARP cache. The invalid MAC mapping replaces the legitimate MAC with attacker MAC
address.
MAC aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa
IP 192.168.0.1

MAC bb:bb:bb:bb:bb:bb
IP 192.168.0.2

IED

Server

MAC xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
IP 192.168.0.3

ARP Cache Poisoning
Mechanism
IP
forwarding

Ethernet Connection
Network Traffic

Figure 12.8: ARP Cache Poisoning Mechanism
Once the attacker replaces the legitimate MAC with his address, the network switch will
redirect all IP packets to the attacker machine. The attacker can perform a man in the
middle attack by modifying received packets and forward them to the victim machine. If
the attacker didn’t forward the received packet to the victim machine, it will cause a
denial of service. Denial of service attack aims to prevent the device from providing the
assigned service or exchanging the data with other devices. As mentioned earlier, such
attack can be performed using ARP poisoning or by overloading the device with too
many requests. Sending many requests to the network device could overload the
processor and memory resource and could lead to stopping the service [155]. In the
network flooding attack, the attacker sends a high rate of packets for network devices or
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to a non-existing IP address, which consumes the network bandwidth and increases the
communication delay.
12.5 GOOSE Message analysis and vulnerabilities.
GOOSE and SMV messages are sent directly to multicast MAC address on layer 2.
Since the layer 2 message doesn’t use The IP protocol for message routing, it’s not prone
to ARP poisoning attack. However, the attacker can still perform some types of attack
based on the message anatomy and transmission method. Figure 12.9 shows the structure
of the GOOSE message.

Destination MAC Address

Source MAC Address

Priority Tagging/VLAN ID

Ethertype
(88B8)

APPID

Length

Reserved 1

Reserved 2

Tag

Length

goosePDU

Tag

Length

gocbRef

Tag

Length

timeAllowedtoLive

Tag

Length

datSet

Tag

Length

goID

Tag

Length

t

Tag

Length

stNum

Tag

Length

sqNum

Tag

Length

test

Tag

Length

confRev

Tag

Length

ndsCom

Tag

Length

numDatSetEntries

Tag

Length

allData

Tag

Length

Data 1 (Boolean)

Tag

Length

Data 2 (Float)

Tag

Length

Data N

Figure 12.9: Structure of a GOOSE Datagram
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ALL GOOSE messages start with the destination’s MAC address, followed by
source MAC address, Priority Tagging/VLAN ID, Ethernet type, APP ID, Length and
two reserved fields. These fields are described as the following:


Destination MAC address: GOOSE messages use multicast MAC address as
the destination address. The GOOSE multicast address must start with 01-0CCD-01-xx-xx. The first three octets are (01-0C-CD) reserved for IEC 61850
protocol. The fourth octet is set to (01) for GOOSE messages.



Source MAC address: this field contains the MAC address for the publisher
IED.



Priority Tagging/VLAN ID: GOOSE messages contain IEEE 802.1Q VLAN
ID. The IEEE 802.1Q standard supports virtual LANs on an Ethernet network.
The IEEE 802.1Q VLAN ID consists of Tag Protocol Identifier (TPID) and
Tag control Identifier (TID). The TID is divided to Priority code point (PCP),
1-bit Drop eligible indicator (DEI). This indicator specifies if the message can
be dropped in the case of congestion and 12-bit VLAN identifier field.



Ether type: all GOOSE messages have a unique ether type field equal to 88B8.



APPID: this field is used by the subscriber IEDs to identify the messages they
are subscribing to.



Length field: The Length field represents the length of the datagram minus
eight bytes.



Two reserved fields: these fields are reserved by the standard for future use.
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A GOOSE message also has an IEEE 802.1Q VLAN ID, a unique Ethernet type, and
an APPID field which subscribing IEDs use to identify the messages they are subscribing
to. The Length field represents the length of the datagram minus eight bytes; the length
field is followed by two reserved fields, which the standard leaves for future use.
The goose PDU is composed of twelve subfields, which are described as the
following [156]:
•

gocbRef: GOOSE control block reference

•

timeAllowedtoLive: The time a receiver waits before receiving a re-transmitted

message
•

datSet: Name of the dataset.

•

goID: ID of publishing IED.

•

t: Timestamp indicating a new GOOSE event.

•

stNum: Counter that increments with every GOOSE event.

•

sqNum: Counter that increments with every repeated GOOSE message.

•

test: Specifies if a message is intended for testing or not.

•

confRev: Number of times the data set has changed.

•

ndsCom: Needs commissioning field.

•

numDataEntires: Number of data elements in allData.
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•

allData: Actual data being sent (bool, integer, float, etc.).

Since the publisher IED uses a multicast address to publish the GOOSE message,
there is no way to ensure the message is received by all subscribers. To overcome this
problem, the IEC 61850 implemented adaptive transmission time for GOOSE messages
depicted in Figure 12.10. When an event occurs, the IED increments the stNum Counter
and sends a GOOSE message as soon as possible. To increase the possibility of
delivering the message to all subscribers, the Publisher retransmits the Message with the
incremental time period. The publishers increment the sqNum with each transmitter. The
timeAllowedtoLive field contains the time period before next retransmission.

Figure 12.10: Adaptive GOOSE transmission time
GOOSE messages are prone to spoofing, replay, poisoning, and flooding attacks [157].
In the spoofing attack, the attacker uses a spoofed MAC address to multicast a fake
GOOSE message with a manipulated data field. The attacker can get access to the
GOOSE virtual LAN by VLAN hopping attack. After gaining access to the VLAN, the
attacker monitors the network to capture a goose message and decode the message to
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identify the data field and stNum. Then the attacker constructs and transmits the fake
message with incremented stNum, as shown in Figure 12.11.

Attacker
Monitor Network for
GOOSE Messages

Publisher
Decode GOOSE Message

Msg,stNum(1),data(true)
Msg,stNum(2),data(flalse)

Alter theAttacker
Boolean Values
from true to false or vice
versa

Msg,stNum(2),data(false)
Msg,stNum(1),data(true)

Encode the message

Subscriber
Inject the message with
Spoofed MAC address

Figure 12.11: Spoofed GOOSE message attack
The spoofing attack can cause serious damage to the substation. For example, the
attacker can change a Boolean field to trip or close a circuit breaker and energize the
wrong circuit. A replay attack is similar to the spoofing attack except that, instead of
constructing the fake message, the attacker records previous events and replays it later
with a spoofed MAC address. To prevent a replay attack, the subscriber should discard
any message with a stNum less than or equal to the previous message until a rollover
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occurs, as specified by IEC 62351 standard. However implementing stNum checks lead to
another type of serious attack, which is GOOSE poisoning attack.
In GOOSE poisoning attack, the attacker sends a message with a high stNum
number. If the stNum check is implemented the subscriber will discard all legitimate
messages with a lower stNum number [158]. GOOSE poisoning attack has the same
impact as denial of service attack but is more dangerous. Regular denial of service attack
depends on sending a huge number of messages to overload the receiver. GOOSE
poisoning attack can cause the same impact with transmitting a single packet, which
makes it harder to discover. Since the SMV messages use Layer two Multicasts as
GOOSE messages, it is also prone spoofing, and reply attack.
12.6 IEC 62351 Security Standard
As mentioned earlier, the IEC 61850 doesn't specify any security roles for the
substation automation network. The IEC 62351 is the standard that provides security to a
number of TC57 protocols, including IEC 61850. It was developed by TC57, the same
technical committee that developed IEC 61850, WG15 in 2007. Its objectives were to
prevent eavesdropping and spoofing attacks, detect intrusions, and authenticate data
transfers through digital signatures. The IEC 62351 standard is divided into 11 parts that
cover security for different protocols. Parts 3, 4 and 6 are the parts related to the IEC
61850 security. IEC 62351-3 defines the security for profiles including TCP/IP. IEC
62351-4 defines the security rules for MMS, while IEC 62351-6 focuses on GOOSE
message security. IEC 62351-3 requires TLS for all TCP/IP-based communications. This
is done in order to protect against eavesdropping, spoofing, replay attacks and some
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modification attacks [159], but it fails against denial of service attacks [160]. This section
also requires node and message authentication through the use of digital signatures [161].
IEC 62351-4 requires TLS and authentication specifically for MMS. MMS traffic is done
on the application and transport level. Security on the application level is done using peer
authentication which is accomplished by carrying authentication information in the
ACSE AARQ. It also includes AARE PDUs Authentication is made up of an X.509
encoded certificate, time stamp, and digitally signed time value. Security on the transport
level refers to TLS and specifies the minimal mandatory and recommended cipher suites
to

be

used,

TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA

and

LS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA[162]. IEC 62351-4 allows usage of secure and
non-secure profiles. This feature allows operation in systems that are not fully upgraded
to new security measures. To cover the communication security of IEC 61850’s peer-topeer profiles (GOOSE), IEC 62351-6 was created. The digital signatures and encryption
methods provided for other types of messaging require a lot of time to be generated and
verified. Therefore, section 4 states that “for applications using GOOSE and IEC 618509-2 and requiring 4 ms response times, multicast configurations and low CPU overhead,
encryption is not recommended” [154]. The only required security measure for GOOSE
messages is message authentication. The message authentication is defined by extending
the GOOSE Protocol Data Unit (PDUs) with an authentication value. This authentication
value is calculated by signing an SHA256 hash using RSA. Certificate exchange is not
done with these messages. All X.509 encoded certificates must be pre-installed on the
receiving nodes [162]. However, a study performed in [163] showcased that applying
asymmetrical encryption to multicast GOOSE and SMV messages while meeting the 4ms
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time constraint imposed by IEC 61850-9-2 is practically unfeasible with current IED
processor technologies, even if implemented on high-end, expensive hardware. This left
IEC 62351-6 with little industry acceptance. This leaves GOOSE messages with no
encryption and no authentication. Given all the efforts by IEC 62351, the lack of data
encryption paves the way for attackers.
12.7 Implementation vulnerability
System vulnerabilities can result from standard shortcoming, misconfiguration and
different vendors’ implementation for the standard. Vendors’ implementation could have
software bugs or drift from the original standard. Two different implementations of the
IEC 61850 were tested and analyzed to identify possible vulnerability and drift from the
original standard. The first platform is the LIBIEC61850 open source library.
LIBIEC61850 is a C library that provides MMS, GOOSE and SMV implementation,
which utilized in a different commercial product. The platform is a commercial IEC
61850 protection relay available at the Smart Grid test bed at Florida International
University. Three tests were performed to verify the proper implementation of GOOSE
messages’

stNum,

Timestamp,

and

source

MAC

address

fields

processing

algorithm [156].
In the stNum processing test, GOOSE messages are transmitted to both devices with
different stNum values. First, a message with stNum equal to 2 is transmitted, then
followed by a message with lower stNum, as shown in Figure 12.12. Each message has a
Boolean field which trips a digital output. Changing the digital output state indicates that
the IEDs process the message, while fixed output indicate the message is discarded. In
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this test, the LIBIEC61850 discarded the message with lower stNum as specified by the
standard while the commercial relay processes the message and triggers the digital
output.

Figure 12.12: Goose messages with two different stNum
In the time stamp processing test, a GOOSE message with an old timestamp (three
days) is transmitted to both platforms, as shown in Figure 12.13. In this test, both
platforms process the message and change the digital output state. It is noteworthy to
point out that, IEC 61850 recommends checking for a message’s time stamp only if it
recognizes a stNum different than that of the previous message. The experiments
revealed that when sending new messages with three-day-old time stamps exceeding the
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2-min skew, they were processed as long as they had status numbers equal to or higher
than the previous message. In the source MAC address processing test, a message with
invalid Source MAC address is sent to both platforms under test. Both platforms
processed the message with the invalid source address.

Figure 12.13: Outdated GOOSE message content
This test actually exploits a vulnerability in the GOOSE messaging protocol itself
rather than its implementation in commercial devices. In the GOOSE protocol,
subscribing IEDs use the APPID field to subscribe to the desired GOOSE messages.
Since the subscribing IEDs, in this case, do not check for the source MAC address, they
will process any message with their defined APPID, regardless of its origin.
Table 12-1 summarizes the results of the performed tests on both the commercial
IEDs and libiec61850.
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Table 12-1: Compliance Test Results.
Test

Commercial IED

LIBIEC61850

Standard
specification

Lower stNum processing

Y

N

Discard

Outdated time stamp processing

Y

Y

Discard

Invalid MAC address

Y

Y

Not specified

12.8 Summary
In this chapter, a security analysis and investigation of the IEC 61850 substation
automation protocol and IEC 62351 security protocol is presented. While The IEC 61850
migrate the substation automation system toward high-speed Ethernet network and
provide the necessary data modeling and interoperability standard, it doesn’t specify any
security measures to protect the IEC 61850 protocols. The IEC 62351 specifies the
security measures for the MMS, GOOSE and SMV protocols, but the analysis shows that
IEC 62351 is not the ultimate solution for cyber invasions on substations. IEC 62351 fails
to protect GOOSE and SMV messages from the cyber-attacks. IEC 62351-6 proposes the
use of digital signatures through the RSA algorithm to ensure the integrity of multicast
GOOSE and SMV messages, which is not feasible due to time constraint and hardware
limitation. The experimental testing shows that vendors’ implementation could introduce
some vulnerability, such as improper processing of stNum and time stamp fields. This
improper implementation allows replay attacks, while the proper implementation
according to the standard enables the GOOSE poisoning attack. A security algorithm to
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secure GOOSE and SMV layer 2 messages, and discard fake messages, while meeting
the 4ms delay time constraint, is required.
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Chapter 13

Sequence Hopping Security Mechanism For Energy Systems

13.1 Introduction
Modern power system automation and the smart grid rely on communication for
various reasons, including critical infrastructure protection and power routing.
Communication between substation IED devices is integral for substations to keep up
with their real-time operations. IEDs perform several protective and control functions in a
substation automation system, such as data and file transfer. Unfortunately, whenever
data are transferred, there is an opportunity for the data to be intercepted or corrupted. In
addition, data can be sent from or intercepted by malicious and unauthorized sources,
potentially causing catastrophic consequences. The industry has established data security
protocols in an attempt to avoid the intrusion of malicious and unauthorized sources.
However, these protocols often require intensive processing power for which existing,
and even some modern IEDs, are not equipped to handle, as discussed in the previous
chapter. Adding to the problem, some of the critical data sent between IEDs needs to be
transmitted quickly, limiting the amount of encryption/decryption time and further
increasing the processing requirements of IEDs. This combination of IEDs lack of
processing power and the need for critical information to be relayed quickly has resulted
in critical data being transmitted unprotected, leaving an opening for unauthorized and
potentially malicious users to cause harm to the system. In this chapter, a security
mechanism based on the sequence hopping number will be developed to secure the IEC
61850 GOOSE messages. The developed mechanism uses minimal processing resources
and secures the GOOSE messages without violating the 4 ms time delay restriction.
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13.2 GOOSE messages vulnerabilities and attack surface
GOOSE messaging protocol was developed for applications that require a fast and
reliable information exchange with strict time constraints within the boundaries of a
substation. However, recently, IEC 61850 has been extended to cover applications that
require inter-substation communication such as tele-protection which utilizes GOOSE
messages over WAN. Therefore, the criticality of the GOOSE messaging protocol is
inherited from the applications it is implemented in. GOOSE messages should be handled
with care because any misconfiguration might lead to devastating consequences, ranging
from system instabilities to complete blackouts.
The IEC 62351-6 devises an algorithm for proper processing of GOOSE messages in
order to mitigate some cyber-attacks such as replay attacks. From the publishing IED
side, each GOOSE message has a status and sequence number field (stNum and sqNum,
respectively). When a substation event occurs, for example, an overcurrent is sensed, the
publishing IED instantly transmits a message with an incremented stNum field. The
message is then repeated with variable increasing time delay until the maximum defined
period is reached. The sqNum counter increments with every repeated message until the
maximum number count (2^32-1) is reached; the point at which the sqNum counter rolls
over. IEC 62351-6 states that a subscriber IED, which detects a new message with a new
stNum, must discard any message having a stNum less than that or equal to the previous
message and which time allowed to live hasn’t timed out yet, unless a rollover of the
stNum counter occurs. If none of the conditions above are true, the subscribing IEDs
process the messages.
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The processing of state numbers set by IEC 62351 to counter replay attacks makes the
system prone to Denial of Service and GOOSE poisoning attacks. Since GOOSE
messages travel the network unencrypted, an attacker can monitor the network and
deduce the current state number. The attacker can then send a message with a very highstatus number, as discussed in the previous chapter. All the subscribing IEDs will then
discard messages from authenticated IED because they will have a lesser status number
than that published by the attacker. Also, the standard’s solution for data integrity using
RSA digital signatures will not meet the 4ms time constraint imposed on GOOSE
messages given the low processing power of current IED processors. Recent studies also
show that digital signatures fail to meet the 4ms time constraint on more advanced
processors [162].
The IEC 61850 uses a multicast MAC address to transmit the GOOSE message over
Layer 2; therefore the attacker can’t use ARP poisoning attack to redirect the message to
an intermediary device or block the message delivery. The only way to manipulate a
message is by resending a modified copy of the message.
The attack surface for the GOOSE messages can be summarized in the three different
methods as below:


Sending a fake message with incremented stNum.



Retransmitting old message after manipulating data field (spoofing attack).



Sending a fake message with very high stNum (GOOSE poisoning attack).



The security mechanism should provide a way to prevents these types of
attack and validate the message content without violating the 4ms restriction.
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13.3 Sequence hopping security mechanism
A keen analysis of the GOOSE messages’ vulnerabilities reveals that the
vulnerabilities result from two main sources. The first factor is sequential nature of the
stNum field; incremented stNUM field allows the attacker to easily construct and
transmit a fake or manipulated GOOSE message with the correct stNum. The subscriber
will process the message as long as it contains a new stNum field. The second factor is
the lack of the source verification mechanism. IEC 61850 implements a
publisher/subscriber communication scheme to deliver the GOOSE message, which is
called connectionless communication. In this communication scheme, the subscriber
subscribes to the message by the APPID only. The IEC 61850 doesn’t provide a method
to verify the data source. The attacker can send a GOOSE message with spoofed or
completely different MAC address and the subscriber will receive and process the
message as long as it contains the correct APPID and stNum fields. The proposed
sequence hopping mechanism solves the vulnerabilities issues resulting from these
factors. The sequence hopping security mechanism is inspired by the frequency hopping
technique which was developed for securing military communications. In the frequency
hopping communication, the transmitter transmits the data by rapidly changing the
channel frequency among different channels’ frequency with a pseudo-random pattern
know to both the transmitter and receiver. The frequency hopping systems implement
synchronization algorithms to synchronize the transmitters and the receivers’ pseudorandom pattern. In the sequence hopping security mechanism, we are proposing the
addition of a new field to the GOOSE message called the HseqNum or the “hopping
sequence number” and incremental counter. Each of the publishing and receiving IEDs
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will have synchronized pseudo-random generators (PRNG) fed with the same seed by a
secure mechanism explained in the next section. Therefore, synchronized generation of
the same random number will occur inside the publisher and the subscriber. The
subscriber will only accept messages possessing a matching HseqNum as that generated
by its PRNG. Any message with a repeated or unmatched HseqNum will be discarded. In
order to send a fake or manipulate a message, the attacker needs to know the next correct
HseqNum. Since the HseqNum is random and unique for each message, the attacker will
not be able to predict the next valid HseqNum. The proposed security mechanism is
composed of A Message Sequence Synchronization and Monitoring Server (MSSMS)
and synchronization clients, shown in Figure 13.1.

Legend:
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Unencrypted communication

Attack detection
Initial SEED gnerator

Data Manipulation detection

Random sequence generator
Message Rate and DoS
detection

SYNC

MAC APPID matching List
Invalid /repeated sequence
detection

SSL

Operation rules and policy
check

Network

3‐ GOOSE MESSAGE
transmission

SSL

3‐ GOOSE MESSAGE
transmission
GOOSE
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GOOSE
Message

SYNC Algorithm

Random sequence
Generator

SSL
SYNC Algorithm
Random sequence
Generator

HseqNum

4‐Validating

2‐ attach hopping
sequence #

HseqNum

HseqNum
Message Validation

Figure 13.1: Sequence hopping security mechanism block diagram
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The description and operation of the MSSMS and synchronization clients are
discussed in details in the next sections.
13.3.1 Message sequence synchronization and monitoring server (MSSMS)
The MSSMS is the core component in the sequence hopping security mechanism.
The MSSMS will be responsible for synchronizing all PRNG in publisher and subscriber
IEDs. The MSSMS will use an encrypted connection for synchronization and exchange
of the initial seeds with all nodes through SSL connection. Although the messages are
unencrypted, the mathematical complexity of the PRNG is extremely hard to reverse
without a long sequence of numbers. The MSSMS server will generate new seeds before
enough numbers were generated for discovering the currently utilized seed by correlation.
In addition to the synchronization task, The MSSMS will perform a monitoring task to
detect possible attacks and intrusion as described below.
Data manipulation detection: The MSSMS server monitors published GOOSE
messages stNum, sqNum and data fields. If the SMMS detects messages with new
sqNum but has a modified data field, it will generate an alarm signal.
Fake message attack detection: To detect any attempt to send fake messages from a
machine inside the network, the MSSMS will have a list of MAC addresses and their
association APPID. The MSSMS will keep track of the association of APPIDs with the
source MAC address of the message in order to prevent sending fake GOOSE messages
from unauthenticated devices.
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Detect attack on the sequence hopping mechanism: For early detection of any attempt
to attack the sequence hopping mechanism, the MSSMS server will monitor the
HseqNum field in published messages. If a repeated or out of order HseqNum is detected,
the MSSMS server will generate an alarm.
Physical and operation rules check. MSSMS will have a defined set of rules that
represents physical and operation restrictions. The server will check the GOOSE message
content and generate an alarm signal if the GOOSE content violates one or more of the
predefined rules. The message content will be validated by pre-defined policies related to
the substation operation scenarios. For example, if a power circuit is disconnected for
maintenance, the MSSMS server will consider any message with content intended to
energize this circuit as an invalid message and will eventually send an alarm signal.
The MSSMS server utilizes a multithreading to handle multiple simultaneous
connections. The server is developed using C programming language and run under
Ubuntu Linux.
13.3.2 PRNG synchronization process
To secure the GOOSE messages, the following steps, shown in Figure 13.1 and
detailed below, will be performed:
1- The MSSMS server will generate a sequence of random seeds.
2- Upon joining the network, a publisher IED will initiate an encrypted
communication channel with the MSSMS server. This encrypted channel will be used to
exchange the random seed with the publisher.
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3- The publisher IED will use the randomly generated seed to generate a new
sequence hopping number and attach it to each transmitted message. The flowchart of the
publisher synchronization process is shown in Figure 13.2.
4- The MSSMS will synchronize all the subscriber IED devices with the same
random pattern as well.
5- The subscriber will expect that the unique hopping sequence number for each
received message will match with its internal synchronized sequence.
6- Any message with invalid or repeated sequence number will be discarded. The
flowchart for the steps 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 13.3.
7- The MSSMS server will synchronize the devices periodically with a new pattern
to avoid discovering the random pattern.
8- After the synchronization process, the MSSMS server will monitor the messages
published by IEDs for possible attacks.
9- The MSSMS will monitor the messages’ publishing rate, check their sequence
hopping field for repeated or invalid patterns and check the message content against predefined operation rules.
13.3.3 SSL encryption
The communication between the MSSMS server, publisher IEDs, and subscriber
IEDs are secured using secure socket layer communication. The OpenSSL library is used
to implement the SSL communication. To generate a digital certificate for the publisher
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and subscriber, a certificate authority (CA) is created for the energy systems research lab
(ESRL CA). The ESRL CA issues and signs the certificates for the publishers and
subscribers IEDs. The ESRL CA root certificate is used to verify the IEDs’ certificates.
Figure 13.4 and Figure 13.5 show the CA certificate and signed IEDs certificate,
respectively.

Figure 13.2: Publisher synchronization flowchart
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Figure 13.3: Subscriber synchronization flowchart
In standard internet application, the client verifies the server identity by receiving
and validating its certificate using the CA certificate. This single-side validation is not
enough in this application. For complete security, the client needs to validate the server
identity before synchronizing the random sequence and the server must validate the client
identity before revealing the seed
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Figure 13.4: Root certificate

Figure 13.5: Client and server certificates
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.
13.4 Experimental validation
The proposed sequence hopping security mechanism is implemented and verified
experimentally. Two different types of implementation were tested. The first
implementation assumes that the security mechanism will be embedded in the device’s
firmware or applied as a software upgrade for the IEDs. The second type of
implementation adds the security feature to legacy devices as a bump in the wire solution.
In the embedded solution, two IEDs were developed to implement IEC 61850
GOOSE communication with an added security feature. The developed IEDs firmware is
based on the open source libiec61850 and OpenSSL libraries. The IEDs’ firmware run at
ARM based single-board computer with 700 MHz clock. The benchmarking of the
algorithm shows that the generation of the random sequence adds less than 0.015 ms
delay. The total end-to-end delay including construction, transmission, receiving,
decoding and validating the GOOSE message is 250 μs. To measure the end-to-end
delay, a function generator is connected to the publisher digital input, as shown in
Figure 13.6. The publisher IED is programmed to send a GOOSE message with the
Boolean field when it detects a transition in the digital input. The subscriber IED receives
the GOOSE message and changes the digital output status according to the value of the
Boolean field after validating the message. The function generator and the subscriber
output are captured using a digital oscilloscope to calculate the end-to-end delay time.
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Figure 13.6: embedded sequence hopping security solution test setup.

Figure 13.7: End-to-end delay time for the embedded sequence hopping
implementation.
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In the bump in the wire solution, the sequence hopping security mechanism is
implemented on two single-board computer, injection and verification boards, as shown
in Figure 13.8. Each board has two Ethernet network interfaces. The first board (injection
board) is connected directly to the publisher IED. The injection board synchronizes the
random number generator with the MSSMS server, receives the original GOOSE
message from the subscriber, inserts the HseqNum field and retransmits the message to
the network.

Figure 13.8: Bump in the wire sequence hopping security mechanism implementation
setup.
Figure 13.9 shows the client and server outputs during the identity verification. Both
MSSMS server and clients exchange the certificates, validate and print out the verified
identity. The detailed SSL handshaking and communication is captured using Wireshark
sniffing software and shown in Figure 13.10. The MSSMS server has the 192.168.5.53 IP

307

while the injection board has the 192.168.5.47 IP. As depicted from the figure, the
MSSMS server and client use SSL V3.0 with AES 256 encryption. Both server and
clients exchange certificates. After the handshaking, they established an encrypted
communication channel.

Figure 13.9: MSSMS server and client outputs during SSL initialization.
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Figure 13.10: SSL handshaking
The original GOOSE message published by the legacy IED is shown in Figure 13.11.
As depicted from the figure, the original GOOSE message has stNum equal to 50 and two
true Boolean fields. The injection board inserts the HseqNum field with a value equal to
158971337, as shown in Figure 13.12. The injection board maintains the same time
stamp, stNum, and sqNum as the original message. The total end-to-end delay is
measured by calculating the time delay between the events (digital input status change)
and the subscriber digital output status change. The input and output signals are captured
using a digital oscilloscope, as shown in Figure 13.13. As depicted from the figure, the
maximum end-to-end delay is 1 ms.
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Figure 13.11: Original GOOSE message
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Figure 13.12: GOOSE message with HseqNum field
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Figure 13.13: Bump in the wire solution end-to-end delay
A GOOSE poisoning and data manipulation attack were performed to test the
implemented algorithm. The Sequence hopping algorithm succeeds to discard fake and
repeated messages.
13.5 Summary
In this chapter, a security mechanism that addresses the shortcomings in the
IEC61850 and IEC 62351 is developed and implemented. The security algorithm protects
the IEC 61850 Layer 2 GOSSE messages by preventing message manipulations and
GOOSE poisoning attacks by utilizing random sequence hopping number validation. The
sequence hopping message validation technique requires minimum processor resources
and time. This allows securing the GOOSE message while meeting the 4 ms time
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restriction. The end-to-end time delay for the implemented security algorithm is 250 μs
for embedded implementation and 1ms for a bump in the wire implementation. The
implemented MSSMS server utilizes an SSL encryption channel to synchronize the
GOOSE publishers and subscriber. The encryption process doesn’t impact the GOOSE
message delay since it is used during PRNG synchronization only. In addition, the
MSSMS implement algorithm validates the message content with physical rules and
policies.
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Chapter 14

Conclusions and Recommendation for Future Work

14.1 Conclusions
The co-design of the smart grid as a complex cyber-physical system is demonstrated
in this dissertation through the design of a cyber-physical infrastructure for the microgrid.
The message-centric and data-centric communication paradigms were analyzed. A
comparison between both approaches showed that message-centric communications are
not easily expandable, as required by the dynamic nature of the smart grid. A common
data bus was implemented based on the data-centric communication approach to provide
an efficient, scalable and interoperable communication infrastructure for the microgrid.
The data models, along with the necessary QoS profiles for different types of the control
signal, are defined. The developed infrastructure was implemented and tested in the smart
grid testbed.
An AMI with flexible communication interfaces that allow connections with ZigBee,
wifi, and powerline communication networks was developed and integrated with the
smart grid testbed. The developed AMI allows modification, implementations and testing
new algorithms and ideas for seamless integration with the developed communication
infrastructure. Along with the AMI, a high-resolution synchronized measurement
network for the distribution network was developed. The reliability and resiliency of this
network are improved by utilizing the publisher-subscriber peer-to-peer communication
scheme, which eliminates the message broker and single point of failure. This was
facilitated by the use of the DDS backbone with proper QoS profile that eliminates the
need for phasor data concentrators.
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For accurate testing and emulation of the developed smart grid infrastructure, a test
bed consisting of a set of modeling and simulation tools representing a scalable HIL
infrastructure for a smart grid testbed was developed. The developed infrastructure
provides the capability of integrating different types of systems and components inside
the testbed and connecting several testbeds to study the behavior of the complex cyberphysical system. A Matlab toolbox was developed to allow integration with modeling
software, remote monitoring, and control through a computer network. TLS encryption is
used to address security aspect, as well as implementing a routine that checks all remote
command against physical rules before passing it to testbed devices.
To improve the microgrid performance by integrating modern communication
technology, a synchronization method based on the GPS common time reference for
PWM carriers of DC-DC converters is proposed. The proposed technique extends the
application of GPS synchronization to the DC microgrid to allow the operation of
distributed DC-DC converters modulators as one interleaved converter. The interleave
operation of the multiple converters improves the power quality without increasing the
size of passive element filters or the switching frequency.
Since the GPS signal is prone to jamming, spoofing and blocking, sensitive systems
should have a backup or alternative synchronization method to prevent degradation of
system performance. Therefore, a synchronization and PSCA for PWM carriers of DCDC converters based on carrier extraction was implemented as a backup converter
synchronization algorithm.
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The main goal of distributed microgrid architecture is to allow efficient integration of
renewable resources and to ensure continuity of service to the end user. One of the main
factors to maintain stable operation of the microgrid is the synchronization algorithm
with utility. For that, an improved adaptive synchronous reference frame phase locked
loop ASRF-PLL with islanding detection was developed. This technique shows an
excellent performance under unbalanced and distorted voltage conditions. Additionally,
to maintain continuous service without interruption in case of islanding, a reconfigurable
inverter control was developed to maintain stable operation in the grid connection and
stand-alone operation modes of the microgrid. The proposed method ensures islanding
detection and stable operation of microgrid when remote islanding detection and the
SCADA system fails.
After developing the communication and physical infrastructure for the microgrid, an
application layer representing the energy management system is developed. The
application layer utilizes the previously discussed communication infrastructure, AMI,
and measurement network to efficiently control the microgrids. The developed energy
management system has an online optimization module accounting for history, current,
and future system observations. Artificial intelligence techniques were utilized to forecast
future data related to customer behavior and energy availability. The online optimization
adapt the controller's parameters according to change in the customer behavior and
energy availability. A hybrid exploration simulation framework was developed to test the
efficiency of the optimized parameters before applying them to the real system.
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The system security and customer privacy are addressed in the design in both cyber
and physical layers. The physical design takes into account the failure of the
communication signal, as in the case of the redundant DC-DC converters synchronization
and islanding detection. The customer privacy is also addressed in the physical design by
implementing a synchronous reference frame-based active power filter controller to
compensate for current signature, in addition to different power quality issues for both
balanced and unbalanced non-linear loads. The developed controller automatically
changes the load current signature, which improves the customer privacy by deceiving
NILM.
To address the security and privacy concern that arises from remote identification of
electromagnetic signature for certain types of power systems, such as shipboard power
system, an HSC was developed to reduce the radiated stray field from heavy current
power system components, such as propulsion motors. The developed controller operates
online and doesn’t need any modification on the physical system design.
Security issues were also addressed on the cyber level. A security analysis and
investigation of the IEC 61850 substation automation protocol and IEC 62351 security
standard was performed. This study revealed several security shortcomings in the
standard. A sequence hopping security mechanism was developed to address revealed
shortcoming in the IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 standards. The developed algorithm
protects the GOOSE message from message manipulation and GOOSE poisoning attacks.
to provide the protection for new and legacy devices, the security mechanism is
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implemented as embedded and bump in the wire solution. Both solutions meet the time 4
ms time restriction by introducing time delay 250 μs and 1ms, respectively.
14.2 Recommendations for Future Works
The co-design idea covered in this dissertation address the challenge of designing the
smart grid as an integrated cyber-physical system. Several issues related to the system
modeling, scalability, interoperability and security are covered in this work. However,
due to the complex architecture and multidisciplinary nature of the system, it is
recommended that the following topics be expanded by others:


Data modeling and interoperability: currently there are two main data
modeling standards for the power system network, the common information
model and the IEC 61850. The common information model covers the
transmission and generation area, while the IEC 61850 covers substation
automation system. There is a need for a unified data model the covers
microgrids and distribution networks. This unified data model should be
expanded to cover new technologies and services, such as energy storage,
electric vehicles charging stations, vehicles to grid and grid to vehicles
services.



PMU and big data analytic: extending the communication network and PMU
application to the active distribution network produces a huge amount of data
with a high sampling rate. Processing this huge amount of data in real time to
extract useful information to improve the system stability is a big challenge.
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There is an urgent need for intelligent and parallel processing techniques to
leverage the available data resources.


Security: the dissertation proposed the sequence hopping security algorithm to
secure the IEC 61850 Layer 2 messages. This security mechanism could be
expanded to a multi-agent framework, where the agents propagate the alarms
and information to the neighbor area for better situational awareness and
decision.



Attack and anomaly detection: an artificial intelligent technique could be
integrated with the proposed MSSMS server to detect bad and fake data
injection. The intelligent techniques can validate received measurement by
learning the physical system’s behavior and dynamics, and comparing
measured data with previously learned behavior.
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